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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
TURKEY AND NEO-OTTOMANISM: DOMESTIC SOURCES, DYNAMICS AND
FOREIGN POLICY
by
Mustafa Gokhan Sahin
Florida International University, 2010
Miami, Florida
Professor Mohiaddin Mesbahi, Major Professor
This study examined the relationship between the Turkish Islamic movements and the
present government of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi,
AK Party). Since the AK Party came to power in 2002 it implemented unparalleled
political reforms and pursued to improve Turkey’s relations with the EU. Opponents
argued that because of the dominance of the secular military in Turkish politics, the AK
Party is forced to secretly advance its Islamic agenda using the language and symbolism
of democracy and human rights. This study argued that the ideas of the AK Party show
similarities with the “Ottomanist” thought of the late Ottoman era. With special reference
to the preservation of the Ottoman State, Ottomanism in an eclectic way was able to
incorporate Islamic principles like freedom, justice and consultation into the political
arena which was increasingly dominated by the secular European concepts.
Literature on Islam and politics in Turkey, however, disregards the Ottoman roots
of freedom and pluralism and tends to reduce the relationship between religion and state
into exclusively confrontational struggles. This conceptualization of the political process
relies on particular non-Turkish Muslim experiences which do not necessarily represent
vi

Islam’s venture in Turkey. Contrary to the prevailing scholarship, Islamic movements in
Turkey, namely, Naqshbandi, National View and Nur, which are discussed in detail in
this study, are not monolithic. They all uphold the same creedal tenets of Islam but they
have sharp differences in terms of how they conceptualize the role of religious agency in
politics. I argue that this diversity is a result of three distinct methodologies of Islamic
religious life which are the Tariqah (Tarikat), Shariah (Şeriat), and Haqiqah (Hakikat).
The differences between these three approaches represent a typological hierarchy in the
formation of the Muslim/believer as an agent of Islamic identity. Through these different
if not conflicting modes, the AK Party reconnected itself with Turkey’s Ottoman heritage
in a post-Ottoman, secular setting and was able to develop an eclectic political identity of
Neo-Ottomanism that is evident in the flexibility if not inconsistency of its domestic and
foreign policy preferences.
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Chapter I: INTRODUCTION
One of the most important political events in contemporary Middle East politics is
the rise to power of the religiously oriented Justice and Development Party in 2002 with
a landslide victory. Since it came to power, the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve
Kalkinma Partisi, AK Party) 1 followed a “zero-problem” approach in Turkish foreign
policy leading to the establishment of solid relationships with neighboring countries like
Syria, Iran and Greece (with whom Turkey was at the brink of war a few years earlier).
Domestically, Justice and Development Party began to carry out the reforms necessary
for Turkey’s bid for EU membership faster than any previous Turkish government. 2 The
rise of the Justice and Development Party and its accomplishments have been a serious
challenge to scholars of Middle East politics who, for the most part, could not anticipate a
pro-Western, conservative Muslim political party rooted in domestic Islamic social
movements coming to power democratically, and not threatening the existence of the
secular state. 3
In order to examine the significance of this transformation one should understand
the nature of Islamic social movements, Islamic political parties and their place in
Turkey’s recent history. Scholars from different perspectives have offered varying

1

Since the establishment of Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi in Turkish) its
acronym has been part of an unresolved debate. According to official party records given to the Ministry of
Interior the acronym is “AK Parti.” In Turkish “ak” means white and clean; a clear reference to the party
image of uncorrupted character. Many scholars (and most political opponents) use AKP (or JDP in
English). This work will use AK Party.

2

Sultan Tepe states that “in just two short years in power the JDP [Justice and Development Party] has
done pathbreaking work, adopting more than five hundred laws—a record number for any elected Turkish
government.” For more see Tepe 2005, 80.
3

Smith 2005a. Tepe calls this process a “quiet revolution,” see Tepe 2005.

1

definitions of Islamic social movements. Most of them, however, betray a structural bias
in explaining the diverse array of social movements, thus limiting our ability to analyse
the identities of these social movements in the public sphere. In explaining Islamic social
movements, I employ Tarrow’s definition, with minor modifications. Throughout this
dissertation, a social movement will be considered as a collective understanding and
action by people with common purposes and solidarity in sustained interaction with other
social actors. 4
Naqshbandi tariqah is the main historical-cultural Islamic movement in Turkey.
For the past two hundred years, this tariqah expanded from being one of many Islamic
movements into the most influential one due to its methods which proved successful
when Turkish political and social life underwent a period of reform. In modern Turkey
the Naqshbandi tariqah has branched off into various subgroups under the umbrella of the
Naqshbandiyya. 5 In this dissertation, only the major personalities and groups within the
Naqshbandi order are analyzed.
The significance of the Naqshbandi order becomes clearer when the republican
era of Turkish history is explored. From the establishment of the republic in 1923 by
Mustafa Kemal (d. 1938) until 1945, Turkey was under a single party regime, the
Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP). After two failed attempts, in
1924 and 1930, of leading political fugures to establish an opposition party, in 1945 Nuri
Demirag established the National Development Party (Milli Kalkinma Partisi, MKP).
MKP was liberal in economic policies but Islamist in cultural orientation. Although MKP
4

Tarrow 1994, 3-4.

5

Naqshbandiyya means Naqshbandi Order.

2

was more religious in character, the secular Democrat Party (Demokrat Party, DP)
(established in 1946 by the dissidents from the ruling Republican People’s Party) gained
the support of religious Muslims, especially followers of Said Nursi, and came to power
with over 50% of the votes. Since the 1950s the Islamic parties that gained the support of
the voting block of Islamic movements affiliated with Naqshbandi order were
increasingly successful.
The DP government was later toppled by the military in 1960. Since the 1960
coup, one that came with constitutional mandates empowering the military
establishement, Turkish political life became a playground for the military officers who
rotated easily controlled politicians one after the other. As a result, only a handful of
politicians were able to continue their political career while the military was directly or
indirectly involved in the political process. Therefore, from the 1960s until today four
major politicians dominated Turkish political life: Suleyman Demirel (Center Right,
1964-2000), Alparslan Turkes (Nationalist, 1965-1997), Bulent Ecevit (Center LeftLeftist, 1966-2002) and Necmettin Erbakan (Center Right-Islamist 1969- 2002). Due to
the anti-democratic nature of the political process, laws were passed which enabled these
leaders to centralize control over the entire party structure (including but not limited to
approving memberships and candidates, opening branches, and setting the ideological
orientation of the party). In Turkish political history, there is almost no example of
successful opposition candidates challenging incumbent party leaders.
Islamist parties were not an exception to this dynamic. With the support of a
Naqshbandi leader, Zahid Kotku, in 1970 Erbakan established the National Order Party
(Milli Nizam Partisi, MNP) as the political branch of the Naqshbandi order. Gradually,
3

however, Erbakan, as a charismatic leader, took sole control of the party, naming his
movement Islamist National View Movement (Milli Gorus Hareketi, MGH). Due to his
authoritarian style, other members of Islamic movements left his movement during the
mid-1970s. However on their own they could not become as succuesful as Erbakan; it
was only after the year 2000 that a major division within the MGH led to the
establishment of a successful alternative, AK Party.
Leaders of AK Party argued that the ideas and policies of their party are closer to
contemporary European attitudes on democracy, human rights, and open economies.
However, the Justice and Development Party’s earlier association with the MGH caused
suspicion in Middle Eastern and Islamic studies about the actually degree of ideological
differences. The general analysis sees the Justice and Development Party as an
ideological clone and offshoot of the Islamist National View Movement, discounting the
Justice and Development Party’s diverse background with the traditional Islamic
movements who, contrary to their counterparts in the Middle East, historically had a
special relationship with the state in Turkey. A close look at the tradition of Islamic
movements in Turkey and their influence over the Justice and Development Party prove
that the unique relationship between Islam and the contemporary state in Turkey cannot
be referenced exclusively to the National View Movement.
The Justice and Development Party’s rise to power and general success mark it as
the main Islamic actor in a country where Islam has been represented by a diversity of
other movements. However, the Justice and Development Party’s success does not come
from any single organic link with Islamic movements but is rather a result of the
confluence of different understandings of and approaches to Islam blended with Turkish4

Ottoman identity. Therefore, with regards to the changes in Turkish politics I will try to
utilize the concept of “Neo-Ottomanism” to represent the unique relationship between
religion, representing the Ottoman past, and the secular state, established after 1923.
The immediate rise of the Justice and Development Party occurred in the context
of the complex political upheavals of the late 1990s. This era was known in Turkish
politics as the 28th February Process (28 Şubat Süreci), a reference to the famous
February 28, 1997 National Security Council (Milli Güvenlik Kurulu, MGK) meeting
dominated by secularist generals who ousted the Islamists from government. This ‘soft
coup d'état,’ as many Turks now call it 6, banned the Welfare Party which represented
Erbakan’s Islamist National View Movement in the parliament. Later, the members of the
National View Movement established the Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi, FP). In
continuation of the 28th February Process initiated by the secular army and its supporters
in the judiciary, the Constitutional Court banned the Virtue Party. The policies of the
National View Movement leadership then came under scrutiny within the party by a new
generation of religiously sympathetic political leaders both in terms of substance and
style.
For many, the closure of Islamic parties by the secular establishment was aimed at
giving a clear message to Islamists that the road to political power as a religious party
was a non-starter. However, the policies of the Justice and Development Party, as an
Islamically oriented political party, are different from its predecessors. Furtermore, the
Justice and Development Party’s electoral success shows that wider sectors of the

6

Yavuz 2003. See also Kuru 2009, 161.

5

population rather than the mere supporters of Islamist National View Movement share
their ideas. 7
Main Characteristics of the Literature on Islam in Turkey: Religion, Secularism
and Identity between Rupture and Continuity
Since the establishment of the republic, the main discussion on modern Turkey has been
centered on the place of religion (representing the Ottoman past in its entirety) in the new
era. Founding fathers identified religion as a traditional institution that functioned as
cultural baggage or dead weight and was not part of the modern scientific imagination.
Accordingly, they thought that traditional representatives of Islam would wither away
because the process of westernization would bring with it positive developments such as
economic progress, secularization, and enhancements in education, transportation and
mass communication, all of which would somehow diminish the need for religion among
the masses. 8 For the founding fathers, the modern path involved the secularization of
state and society devoid of any higher value system other than loyalty to the state through
a new sense of Turkish national identity.Reforms were promulgated to create a new
Turkish Republic as a break from the traditional Ottoman past.
Literature dealing with Islam and politics in Turkey followed the same reasoning,
that Islam was cultural and historical baggage that had no place in the public domain of a
modern, secular state. There are three main characteristics of this scholarship. First, it

7

According to a survery done just before the 2002 elections, only 28% of Justice and Development Party
supporters voted for a religious party [Erbakan’s Parties] previously. For more see Vertigans 2003, 76.
8

One of the famous representations of this commitment is found in Mustafa Kemal Ataturk’s famous
speech he gave in the city of Kastamonu in 1925. When he introduced his reforms involving new dress
codes (prohibiting wearing traditional fez and turban) and closing the dervish lodges, he stated that
“Republic of Turkey will not be a country of shaikhs [and] dervishes...”

6

portrays religion as an anti-modern, anti western factor; secondly, they disregard the
strong continuities between the late Ottoman and early republican eras, consequently
portraying religion as an epiphenomenal factor belonging to the past, not the future. The
arguments typical of this scholarship are represented by a handful of scholars who have
saturated the discourse with essentialist analysis.
Unlike other parts of the Middle East, Turkey has attracted very limited attention
from scholars working on Islam and politics, for two broad and basic reasons. First, for
these scholars, modernization reforms were proving successful and secular Turkey was
becoming more of Occidental than Muslim. This is an example of “value-laden”
approaches in the social sciences. Pippin reminds us that modernization has a dual
character that is manifest among the intelligentsia and within scholarship. These scholars,
he argues, see the experience of modernization both as a process of historical
transformation and, more importantly, as an adoption of a new ‘philosophical and
civilizational ideal.’ 9 The normative convictions of this philosophical and civilizational
ideal result in the necessary (deliberate or not) misreading of the internal dynamics of an
“other” (in this case Islam in Turkey). The consequence of cultivating a dualistic reading
of world affairs based upon imaginary others is total: it reduces socio-cultural and
historical analysis into irrelevant representations where certain key assumptions about
cultural superiority are taken for granted.
Secondly, for decades Islamic studies in western institutions produced very few
scholars on Turkey; often Arabic and Persian were prioritized over Turkish and the main

9

Pippin 1997; Houston 2004, 49-69.

7

research questions were asked in reference to classical issues in Muslim history such as
the life of the Prophet, theology, and law. For them there was, certainly, another
important technical problem about studying Turkish; scholars had to learn two entirely
different alphabets (and in some cases grammars) to master in one language. First, they
had to learn Turkish with Ottoman paleography and then the modern Turkish in Latin
script. One of the major exceptions in the field is Bernard Lewis who is competent in
both “old” and “new” Turkish. 10 For a long time his ideas have near monopoly on the
role and place of Islam in Turkey. In his translation of Turkish scholar Fuad Koprulu’s
“Islam in Anatolia after Turkish Invasion” (originally printed in 1922 in Turkish in the
original Ottoman alphabet), Gary Leiser states that this major contribution by Koprulu
(whom Leiser calls the “founder of the study of the religious history of the Turks in the
entire Middle East”) “was virtually lost to the scholarly world, including to some degree
Turkey” because it was not accessible to scholars who did not know the Ottoman Turkish
language. According to Leiser, “only a handful of Western scholars, such as H. A. R.
Gibb, Harold Bowen, Bernard Lewis, and Speros Vrynois, have known of this work and
used it.” 11
Bernard Lewis’s main argument is straightforward. He argued that the
establishment of the republic was a clear rupture from the Islamic past into a modern,
westernized future. 12 For Lewis, in every era of history modernity has been the standards
10

For an interview-article in which Lewis demonstrates mastery of Ottoman and modern Turkish see
“Turkiye'nin gelecegi icin bedbin degilim bilakis nikbinim” (I am not pessimistic but optimistic about
Turkey’s future) see Zaman Newspaper September 27, 1998.
11
12

Leiser’s translation is published in 1993. Koprulu 1993, xviii.
Lewis 2002 [1961].

8

of the dominant civilizations. 13 The idea of the emergence of a new, modern Turkey
represents the optimism inherent in the notion that the past, being religious, was
unproductive and outdated, whereas a secular future promised endless opportunities.
Bernard Lewis has adopted the elitist view that the autocratic and traditional
Ottoman Empire collapsed and was replaced, as if by destiny, by a modern, secular
democratic Republic. 14 The Kemalist reform program is not considered by Lewis as
irreligious; its purpose was not to destroy Islam, but to disestablish it – to end the power
of religion and its exponents in political, social, and cultural affairs, and limit it to matters
of belief and worship. In this Kemalists were on the side of history in reducing Islam to
the role of religion to the private phere. In a modern, Western, nation-state, religion only
has public utility if it is in the service of national unity or the ideological legitimacy of
the state. 15In his main study of Turkey Lewis portrayed the Republican elite headed by
Kemal Atatürk as national saviors against a backward religious tradition (Islam). The
narrative put forward by Lewis gives the secularist establishment inaugurated by Ataturk
positive moral status, vis-à-vis Islamist actors. More recently, Samuel Huntington’s
article “Clash of Civilizations,” 16 solidified this scholarship by constructing an enemy

13

Lewis 1997, 129.

14

Lewis 2002 [1961]; Davison 1998, 87.

15

Lewis 2002 [1961], 406.

16

Huntington 1993. Basically, Huntington's thesis is based on Lewis' scholarship, 1990. Subtitle of Lewis’s
article is very telling; “Why so many Muslims deeply resent the West, and why their bitterness will not
easily be mollified.”

9

bent on violent warfare with the United States and other western countries on the bases of
cultural differences. 17
Other scholars on Turkish Islam who share the same ideas as Lewis are Tarik
Zafer Tunaya, 18 Niyazi Berkes, 19 and Feroz Ahmad. 20 Tarik Zafer Tunaya was one of the
earliest scholars to address the role of Islamism in Turkey as an anti-modern factor. He
argued that, against the anti-modern positions of Islamic social movements, the Kemalist
state introduced a progressive secularism that successfully actualized modernity. 21
According to essentialist scholars like him, there is a constant struggle between
modernity and tradition in the Muslim world and in Turkey; while secularism is the jewel
of a modern life-style, traditions based on Islam are relics of the past and are only
impediments to participation in the modern world. 22 These scholars saw continuity only
in the sense of traditional past trying to plague the modern present. 23
The “Turkish Model” literature follows the same kind of reasoning. It argues that
the Kemalist experience in Turkey is a unique example where a traditional society was
finally able to transform its backward status to achieve the pinnacle of success by
17

Hall and Jackson state that Huntington’s thesis “… has attracted an enormous amount of attention, both
for its simplicity in dividing the world into mutually exclusive communities characterized by deep-essential
differences, and for its pessimistic conclusion that these differences are so fundamental as to make the
communities in question more or less implacably opposed to one another.” Hall and Jackson 2007, 1-15.
18

Tunaya 2003 (originally published in 1962).

19

Berkes 1998 (originally published in 1964).

20

Ahmad 1993.

21

For more see Tunaya 2003.

22

The same essentialist views on Islam in general are also represented by Tibi 2002.

23

Tunaya 2003, 129.
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becoming, quite generically, modern. 24 The Kemalist model is not only a key example
used in scholarly writings but also a paradigm emulated by authoritarian regimes of the
Muslim Middle East. No country following the Kemalist model, however, is or has been
able to accommodate Islamic groups or religious concerns into the political system. Prerevolution Iran and Nasr’s Egypt are prime examples. 25
Recently, a new generation of scholars has begun to voice arguments against the
dominance of essentialist ideas in the discussion of Islam and modernity. Contrary to the
Turkish Model argument Zurcher, for example, argued that the early republican era was
so authoritarian that there was a huge chasm between the government and the people
because the demands of the marginalized and relatively helpless sectors of society were
never represented in state policy. 26 For him the authoritarian nature of the Ottoman
government was transferred into the republican era by the leading elite who were part of
the major late Ottoman secular political party of Committee of Union and Progress.
Yavuz considered this process to be draconian measures aimed at eliminating Islam from
the public sphere. 27
In Zürcher’s words the reform process to separate Islam’s influence in education,
politics, and daily life was an attempt to separate Turkey’s link with its Middle East
neighbors by de-emphasizing Turkey’s Ottoman past and its historical, cultural and

24

Mango 1993; Heper 1997. The Turkish Model thesis has been criticized by Altunisik 2005.

25

Sayyid reads modernization projects in the Middle East from a Kemalist project perspective. Sayyid
2003, 69-72.

26

Zürcher 2003.

27

Yavuz 2000.
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religious links to the Middle East. 28 Zürcher has drawn attention to Lewis's scholarly
bias. Based on archival evidence he has demonstrated that the late Ottoman period was
full of Muslim reformist thinkers who accepted the possibility of having mutually
beneficial cultural and intellectual exchanges with western nations. 29
This new generation of scholars was able to re-read the uncontested definitions
and explanations of the previous generation of essentialist scholars. The new generation
of scholars argued that the main weakness in essentialist approaches is that it seeks to
explain complex social events by reducing them “to a few “essential” causes.” 30 For
essentialists the current condition of the Islamic world is a result of Islam and Muslims
themselves. Islam is identified as the source of Muslim inferiority vis-à-vis the secular
west, which produced and embodies the secular paradigm.
One of the main methodological and theoretical criticisms of essentialist
scholarship is that it ignores the diversity in principles and ideological orientations of
Islamic movements in Turkey. This is based on the Constructivist premise that identities
are not given but constructed. Therefore, Huntington’s work is problematic because it
depends on an uncritical and passive readership to accept that Islam is a monolithic
entity. 31 We can argue that, the fundamental assumptions of all of dominant perspectives
within the literature are based on the same premises. According to these explanations,

28

Zürcher 2003, 196-200.

29

Besides Zürcher others have argued that the Kemalist project had its sources in late Ottoman era
developments. For more see Mardin 1989, Özbudun 1996 and more recently Heper 2000.
30

Yavuz 2003, 16.

31

Kubálková 2003, 93.
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first, Islamic principles are essentially irreconcilable with dominant western principles
like democracy, human rights and freedom. These explanations consider Islamic values
to be antithetical to the humanist values of the West; therefore, there cannot be a prowestern, modern, democratic Islam. 32 Second, it is only possible to have a moderate and
democratic Islam if there are strict secular controls over it. 33
Conventional scholarship argues that it is not a moderate reading of Islam that
leads to a peaceful and tolerant vision of the world among Islamists, but strict secularist
measures that socialize Islamic groups into a kind of passivity that softens their inherent
inclination towards conflict. This argument, in simplified terms, asserts that it is not
possible to have a moderate Islam unless we de-Islamize it. One must first reorient the
Islamic gaze from the sacred realm to the secular world and then use Islamic language
and symbols to legitimize the secular order. 34 It is a vision of Islam that is completely
domesticated and subordinate to secularism in Turkey. This argument gives token
acceptance to Islam as a tool for group identification and mobilization while dismissing
the possibility of different implications the Islamic worldview would have for the style
and substance of domestic politics.
Among Turkish scholars important critiques of Lewis' scholarship were produced
mostly by Turkish scholars living in the West. Most of the time, due to government
scrutiny, scholars were not able express their ideas and were often pressured by

32

Erdogan, a constitutional law professor and no relation to the Prime Minister Erdogan, has been one of
the most ardent critics of this understanding. Erdogan 1999.
33

Sayyid 2003.

34

Davison 2003 discusses the secular policies of the Turkish state.

13

government officials or ‘academics’ connected with government officials. Serif Mardin
can be considered in this vein. His analyses were based on interpreting religion as
continuity rather than historical baggage. 35 He consistently rejected the study of Islam as
a new phenomenon. 36 A recent controversy happened when the Turkish Academy of
Sciences denied the membership application of Serif Mardin because his books on Islam
criticized the secular reading of Islam in Turkey. 37
The Islamic world is made up of a mosaic of different races, cultures and
histories; it is impossible to speak of one Islamic identity. From Morocco to Indonesia,
there are over fifty countries with different political and economic systems, histories,
languages and cultures, all of which share the same fundamental religious tenets. 38
Scholarly works that focus on particular Islamic cases must be contextualized within that
specificity so that universal ideas about the nature of Islamic socio-political activism do
not distort reality. However, individual cases are used to develop universal explanations
that are applicable for the entire Muslim world and Islamic political identities. 39
Most of the movements that are dealt with in academic studies are revolutionary
political movements that had resorted to violence as a form of political expression.
Universalizing the nature of the relationship between Islam and politics or the place of
Islam within a state has been reduced to fundamentalist and anti-western movements.
35

Mardin’s book on Nursi is a major example. For more see Mardin 1989.

36

Cigdem 2005, 33-34.

37

“Kemalist Bilim Anlayisi” (Kemalist Coception of Science) Sabah July 7, 2007.

38

Ahmet Kuru’s recent work shows the differences not only between the western world and the Islamic but
also within the Islamic world. Kuru 2009.
39

Gole 1996; Gole 2000.
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Theorizing based on the actions of a limited number of movements in more strategically
placed areas, such as the oil rich Persian Gulf, does not contribute to our knowledge or
ability to understand Turkey. In these studies individuals as agents of change are ignored
altogether. 40
There are different manifestations of Islamic activism that have yet to be
articulated in the mainstream literature. Contrary to the monolithic and unitary portrayals
of Islamic movements common in western media and academia, a deeper analysis of
Islamic social movements suggests that they are substantially more plural and flexible
than conventional studies presume. In order to understand the internal dynamics of
Turkish Islamic movements this study utilizes a qualitative interpretive methodology. By
examining the historical development of the distinct religious communities and their
attitudes towards important religious and political issues involving the West and the
secular state, this study will shed light on the existence of diverse Islamic identities which
were long absent in the conventional studies.
There are differences within the overall Constructivist approach to the
relationship between actors and their environments (agent-structure debate) in identity
formation process. In this work, I tried to utilize a framework that does not overtheorize
structure over agency. This does not necessarily mean disregarding the role of structure
over the agent. However, structural explanations cannot adequately understand the selfreferential if not dogmatic identities of the religious actors that constantly challenge the
structural limitations around them. Mesbahi argues even Constructivists, who see social

40

Saktanber analyzes individual Muslim actors constructing Islamic identity. Saktanber 2002; Kandiyotu
and Saktanber 2002.
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relations as a “co-constitutive” process, often omit the qualities that come from actor’s
own imaginings and interpretations which are formulated independent of social relations,
from reading a religious text.41
I argue that the plurality of Islam in Turkey is represented by three interconnected
yet distinct Islamic approaches. They are Shariah, Tariqah and Haqiqah. Although these
Islamic approaches represent distinctive aspects of Islamic life and thought, they are not
closed entities. They are all on the same page in terms of their main creedal tenets while
also disagreeing on some critical issues. On the other hand, although these three
approaches have substantial influence on the AK Party, it is neither a direct continuity
nor independent of any Islamic movement. AK Party is made up of politicians coming
from different religious (also secular) backgrounds. Its principles are an amalgam of
conservative 42 cultural expressions together with the ideals of independent Muslim
thinkers in the country; Neo-Ottomanism can be a useful term to define it.
In the following theoretical chapter, I summarize the main questions followed by
a representation of the method preferred for this study in examining the relationship
between three Islamic approaches represented by the Hadith of Gabriel and Justice and
Development Party’s Neo-Ottomanism. The following three case study chapters will be
devoted to each one of the grassroot Islamic movements in Turkey. The third chapter
introduces the influential Naqshbandi Order. The fourth chapter deals with the Nur
Movement and its Gülen offshoot. The fifth chapter examines the Islamist-National View
41
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Movement that has done the most to develop the idea of political Islam in the modern
Turkish consciousness. In this chapter, the narrative of the separation of the National
View Movement and Justice and Development Party will be examined. In chapter six, I
analyze how these three Islamic movements influenced Justice and Development Party.
This chapter traces the current Islamic government’s foreign policy choices to the Islamic
method they emulate. The conclusion reviews the case studies and the resulting
theoretical implications, focusing on the trajectory of relevant political issues.
For this study, different sources were consulted. In terms of examining the histories
of these movements, primary and secondary sources in Turkish have been utilized. These
sources include the texts published by the leaders of these Islamic movements, their diaries,
and important interviews. In terms of understanding the members of these organizations
through personal interaction, I attended public and private events as an observer.
Surprisingly, United States is also home to many members of these Islamic communities and
their leading figures. I met with politicians (Minister of Education of the Justice and
Development Party), mayors (first elected mayor of Islamist Welfare Party), government
bureaucrats (in charge of auditing the Turkish schools abroad), leaders of Islamic groups
(such as an American Naqshbandi Shaikh in Tucson, Arizona who received his Islamic
studies diploma from the Naqshbandi order in Turkey), members of the Turkish Naqshbandi
students in North America in their annual 2006 gathering; immediate students of Fethullah
Gülen (leader of the prominent Gülen Movement); and the leaders of other Islamic groups
including but not limited to Mustafa İslamoğlu, and Faruk Celebi, the leader of the RumiMevlevi order who currently resides in Miami, FL.
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Research in Turkey also produced rewarding data. In 2006, I visited important places
that allowed me to gather more data about the National View, Nur and Naqshbandi
movements. Specifically, in October 2006, I visited cities of Burdur and Isparta, where the
Nur movement first began and later flourished. Especially in Isparta, my visit to “Nur
houses” where Said Nursi lived was very helpful in understanding the dynamics of the Nur
community firsthand. In November of 2006, I went to Ankara where I visited institutions
established by people inspired by the ideas of Fethullah Gülen. These visits continued in
Istanbul in late November, mostly to Naqshbandi institutions, in Fatih-Çarsamba, a town
famous for its Naqshbandi residents and leaders.
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Chapter II: THREE ISLAMIC APPROACHES IN TURKEY
This chapter deals with the normative foundations for Islamic belief, practice, and
identity. The source that I will use to draw out the parameters of normative Islam is the
Hadith of Gabriel. In this hadith, various modes of Islamic life and practice are presented
and serve as the basis of a typology of Turkish Islamic actors. This specific typology has
never been utilized in other studies analyzing Islam and politics, especially those focused
on the interplay between Islam as a religion in a modern world and Islam as a political
ideology. 43 The Turkish case is not an exception.
Once we are able to identify the distinct qualities and differences between various
cultural manifestations of Islam it becomes clear that there is no monolithic expression of
Islamic political identity. Employing the Hadith of Gabriel in my analysis of Islam in
Turkey will enable me to further explore the sources of pluralism among and between
Muslims in Turkey; this will enable me to present an overall framework in which classify
and identify Islamic political actors based on a system of thought and representation that
is natural to them. The implications of this, which will become clear as this study
progresses, is that the Justice and Development Party cannot be understood through rigid
terminological identifications (like an us-them dichotomy, anti-westernism, political
authoritarianism or taqiyya) which have been applied to other Islamic groups in the
Middle East. On the other hand this typology is capable of accommodating a wide range
of actors, from the most radical to the more or less pacifistic. In this way, theorizing
about Islamists will not impose on them certain characteristics that are only found in
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other groups labeled Islamic; their specificity is therefore maintained. In the Turkish case,
there are various modes of being within Islam which are hierarchically outlined through
the Hadith of Gabriel; the AK Party’s Neo-Ottomanism is not free from different modes
of Islam.
A common theme in the literature about Turkish politics from the beginning of
the 20th century has been a misapprehension of Muslim revivalist movements and their
critical position vis-à-vis Westernization. Revivalists attributed the backwardness of the
Muslim community, directly or indirectly, to the abandonment of Islamic religious faith
and practice. 44 The Naqshbandis were one such movement in Turkey. Because of their
organizational superiority over rival orders (tariqahs), and their status as representatives
of orthodox Sunni Islam, they were able to spread quickly and become a major religious
movement that has unsettled relations with the state. Scholars view the role of the
Naqshbandi order in protest against westernization as foundational. 45 They were the first
major critics of secular reforms in Turkey during the late Ottoman era. They did not see
the secular reforms of the state, backed by the western powers, as a viable solution to
what were, for them, domestic problems. 46 Yet these studies did not to recognize the fact
that Naqshbandis were an umbrella tariqah for Turkish Muslims wherein different sub
groups had developed different responses towards the modern questions.
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Turkish Muslim attitudes towards “others,” including the secular state apparatus
and Western powers, has been more complex than most studies will lead one to believe.
Now, contrary to the dominant trends in identity theories, the relationship between the
Muslim Self and the non-Muslim Other is not limited to the boundaries of a “self-other”
dichotomy. 47 The existing literature on this issue gives an inordinate amount of credit to
imaginary constructs in the formation of identity because, naturally enough, any actor has
to pay attention to their environment and existing power structures. However, structural
factors should only be seen as environmental factors that affect choices and opportunities
rather than strict limitations on Islamic actors and groups. Due to strong connections with
normative sources, Islamic actors do not act like ‘billard balls’; rather they are thinking
agents following deliberate policies in line with their identities, interests and goals.
Contrary to Western concepts of religion, Islam functions as a system of values
where identity is not a product of social relations, but of faith. 48 As a religious belief, its
value system comes not from the social life but outside of it. 49 For Muslims, this comes
from the traditional sources of Islam: the Quran and the Hadith. Both of these sources
47
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deal with the history of the early Muslim community and the prophethood of
Muhammad. Therefore, in explaining specific Islamic understandings while the external
environment is an important factor in the formation of identity, the references of various
Muslim actors within Islamic discourse deserves primacy of place in the study about
Muslim self-concept.
Major Islamic movements in Turkey mentioned here are the Naqshbandi,
National View, and the Nur-Gülen movements. The National View and Nur-Gülen
movements are both offshoots of the Naqshbandi tariqah. Although these major Islamic
movements are all on the same page when it comes to the creedal tenets, they have
articulated plural images of their individual identities, the secular Turkish state, the place
of Turkey in the world and its relations with the West. When Turkey began its bid for
European Union membership some major Muslim communities were suspicious of EU
membership. For them EU’s imperialism was not for the good of the Muslim population.
The Naqshbandis argued that this course would have devastating effects on the Islamic
culture in the country. 50 National View's leader, Erbakan, argued that the EU was a
Christian institution, and was therefore unable to accommodate Turkey. He argued that
Turkey must establish a union with Islamic nations. 51 On the other hand, decades before
Turkey’s European bid, in the 1930s, at the beginning of the Europe-inspired
authoritarian regime in Turkey, the Nur Movement’s leader, Said Nursi, supported the
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idea of Muslim and Christian nations forming strong ties 52 and foresaw a better and
closer relations between the Turks and Europeans. Later during the 1990s, Fethullah
Gülen, rooted in the Nur movement, argued that there were few legitimate or urgent
concerns on the question of EU membership, provided Turkey was self-confident in its
[Muslim] identity. 53 The various responses of Turkish Muslims to the same "others" and
environmental constraints defy simplistic representation because the reaction and
response of different leaders were studied attempts on their part from within the
individual expressions of Islamic approaches these movements adhere to.
To understand the plurality of of Islamic understandings and their representation
in the Justice and Development Party’s policies we need to study the major Islamic
movements and the Justice and Development Party’s relations with them. I argue that
there are three modes of Islamic approaches in Turkey. The first Islamic approach is
Shariah (Şeriat). Shariah is the outward interpretation of religion and its enforcement
over the society by means of a state apparatus. The second approach is Tariqah (Tarikat).
Tariqah signifies religion as the practice of particular established norms within religious
orders; it is the progressive internalization of the basic articles of faith. The third
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approach is Haqiqah (Hakikat). It symbolizes religion as a form of spiritual journey based
on the self’s connectedness with God.
While this study utilizes religious terminology to explain the variations in Islamic
practice in Turkish politics from the late Ottoman period, the normative connotations of
Shariah, Tariqah, and Haqiqah are based on the classical sources of Islamic tradition. The
references to Islamic sources considered authentic by the Muslims will enable me to
examine Islamic movements in their own understandings rather than employing an
incompatible typology that might not adequately address the diversity among them. The
operative text that demonstrates this gradation in religious practice is popularly known as
the Hadith (tradition) of Gabriel. Many Muslims and Islamic scholars consider this hadith
as authentic. More importantly, this hadith defines and demarcates different Islamic
understandings and is accepted by the Turkish Islamic movements studied in this work. I
will cite the text in full:
On the authority of 'Umar who said: While we were one day sitting with
the messenger of Allah (Muhammad) there appeared before us a man
dressed in extremely white clothes and with very black hair. No traces of
journeying were visible on him, and none of us knew him. He sat down
close by the Prophet, rested his knees against his, put his palms on his
thighs, and said, "O Muhammad! Inform me about Islam." The messenger
of Allah said, "Islam is that you should testify that there is no deity save
Allah and that Muhammad is His messenger, that you should perform
salat (ritual prayer), pay the zakat (alms), fast during Ramadan, and go on
Hajj"… He [Gabriel] said, "You have spoken truly."… He went on to say,
"Inform me about Iman (faith)." [Prophet Muhammad] answered, "It is
that you believe in Allah and His angels and His books and His
messengers and in the Last Day, and in qadr (predestination), both in its
good and in its evil." The man said, "You have spoken truly." Then he
said, "Inform me about Ihsan (literally doing what is good, beautiful)". He
(Prophet Muhammad) answered, "It is that you should serve Allah as
though you could see Him, for though you cannot see Him yet He sees
you… Then he [Gabriel] left and I stayed for a time. Then He [Prophet
Muhammad] said: "O 'Umar, do you know who the questioner was?" I
24

said, "Allah and His messenger know best". He said, "He was Gabriel,
who came to you to teach you your religion." 54
This tradition fits neatly into the tripartite division of Turkish Islamism noted
above. The shariah (Islam in the Hadith) approach is the most basic, broadly based, and
widely discussed in the literature about the Muslim world. It is relevant to nominal
identity in its most basic form as well as to issues of law and order and personal behavior.
The outward and basic interpretation of the religion requires enforcement over the society
by means of a state apparatus. In its basic meaning Islam here means submission. The
Quranic response to the Bedouins who say “We have faith” is “Say [O Muhammad!]:
You do not have faith; rather say, ‘We have submitted;’ for faith has not entered your
hearts.” 55 In the shariah-based approach the Quran, sunna of the prophet Muhammad (the
normative practice) and the sources of law that are not based on direct texts but derive
from a legal methodology which utilized the Quran and traditions of the prophet
Muhammad need to be implemented in society through state institutions. This narrow
aspect of Islam, popularly known as Shariah, is the most popular one among Islamist
political movements for whom religion is a law meant to be implemented coercively. As
will be discussed in the Islamist National View Movement chapter, Sharia has become
the most important aspect of Islam for movements involved in active political life.
Tariqah approach is the complete and steadfast identification of the believer with
the basic theological propositions of Iman (faith) as universal moral values. For the
Turkish Naqshbandis, tariqah meant a specific method that involved spiritual, ethical and
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social principles in order to perfect the soul of the believer under the strict auspices of a
leader (Murshid or Kamil Murshid). The most important aspect of this ‘perfection
process’ is that it should be implemented in and around a Sufi center (tekke and zaviye)
where tariqah members live a highly interconnected life. 56 An Iman-informed approach
to modern politics would question the absolute premises upon which secularism
establishes itself as normative. An imagination of life lived according to the principles of
God is considered as the most important aspect of Tariqah. 57 Issues relevant to Turkish
politics that would be addressed by this approach are corruption, the importance of family
values, and issues of practicing religion in social life according to a strict adherence to
tradition.
The last approach, herein labeled Haqiqah, is based upon the spiritual principle
(Ihsan in the Hadith) that when the Muslim is in a state of prayer he should be wholly
attentive to the object of prayer, God 58 rather than worldly objects. This is an ideal
spiritual station where individual believers can ascertain the quality of their own worship
by going beyond the surface of practicing religion and entering into the spiritual depth of
religious conscious. 59 This requires a self-controlled religious practice that does not
require an apparatus to control and promote practice of religion other than voluntary
joining; it is a theology of anti-institutionalism. Therefore, its application in (Turkish)
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politics, and at a general level of Islamic politics, is a bit problematic. How does one
know if the Justice and Development Party is in a state of Ihsan? That determination will
be based upon two interrelated factors: the level of emphasis which the party (in
contradiction to an Islamist regime or the Erbakan government) places on the state as the
agent of Islamic values, and the substantive policy principles of the party.
In their origins, these three Islamic approaches stemmed from the centuries old
tradition of the Naqshbandi orders. Naqshbandi orders have been a major Islamic social
movement of religious expression in Turkey. The primacy of the Naqshbandi order in the
social and political life of Turkey runs generally uninterrupted throughout the history of
the Turkish presence in Anatolia. 60 This is incomparable in the rest of the Muslim World.
It is therefore imperative to analyze the Naqshbandi tradition and its transformation over
time. The most important aspect of the Naqshbandi message has been the reformist nature
of the order; the leadership was cognizant of the rising power of the state apparatus and
constantly developed new methods of religious interpretation so that they could address
the challenges of rising political and ideological threats. However, over time different
members of the Naqshbandi order developed variant interpretations of the original
Naqshbandi message based on their own intellectual inclinations and personal
aspirations.
This study does not reject the possible material or ideological impacts of the nonTurkish Islamic influences coming from the rest of the Muslim Middle East. Non-Turkish
Islamic reactions to the secular modernization process has manifested in a radical
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withdrawal from the secular state apparatus. However, in Turkey the reaction of the
Naqshbandi order was different. Instead of being confrontational, the Naqshbandis
preferred to resist the coercive methods of the secular state via pacifist means. This
unique approach is characteristic of all major Turkish Islamic movements who were able
to preserve their religious identities without threatening the secular state. The personal
and organizational space created by their focus on teaching Islam through social channels
and redressing injustices through civil society activism and political lobbying via
apolitical means contributed to their success and added credibility to their future political
program. The rich and established tradition of the Naqshbandi order in Turkey did not
import methods from other Muslim and non-Muslim experiences. It was a product of an
indigenous tradition of Islam. First, in order to promote their message among the people,
the Naqshbandis already knew how to deal with oppressive governments based on their
centuries old experience with various political apparatus’s.
Second, and more importantly, the centrality of the Caliphate in the hands of the
Ottomans for centuries created a self-perpetuating Ottoman identity. As an Islamic
tradition, the idea of state as equal to the religion itself experienced its peak during the
Ottoman era. 61 Therefore, socio-political and cultural relationships between Islam in
Turkey and rest of the Middle East were mostly one directional: from the Caliphal core to
the periphery.
Naqshbandi approach as the main religious demographic in Turkey did not
approve of violence or openly confrontational policies towards the state. This does not
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necessarily mean that other religious movements followed the exact same method. Many
Islamic actors interpreted their own selves and the structure around them differently. This
led to different guiding principles and strategies among the representatives of Islam in
Turkey. The way different Islamic groups reacted to new environmental conditions
demonstrate to us the different internal dynamics (or identities) these actors developed
over time.
An important example would be the influence of scholars like Sayyid Qutb, Ali
Shariati, and the occurrence of the Iranian revolution on the National View Movement.62
The National View movement has politically been the most critical voice against the
secular state and the West. Necmettin Erbakan founded and provided leadership to the
movement from the early seventies. The National View movement’s cultural orientation
can be identified with the Shariah approach. They are especially prone to the ideological
uses of “otherness” with Islamic symbols and terminology to understand the self and the
other. However, as the National View Movement leadership attempted to implement
methods reminiscent of Qutb’s ideas or those of Iranian revolution involving street
protests, the religious wing of the organization denounced it and distanced themselves
from National View Movement’s political activities. 63 In this way, the anti-modernist
message of Qutb and others lost their appeal with the grass-roots Naqshbandi-Sufi
tradition. The National View Movement became the sole representative of the Shariah
approach in the political arena. It was interested in implementing Islamic religious laws
through the state apparatus. It tried to institutionalize Islam within the state’s law-making
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and enforcement structure. In this movement, control of the State via the political process
has been the primary goal. This Islamic approach emphasizes the state as the primary
instrument of Islamization of society.
The understanding that makes up the Naqshbandi tariqah is founded on the
traditional understandings that emerged in a sacred past that are not necessarily open to
change and flexibility. It is based on the theological principles enunciated in the hadith of
Gabriel: the reality of God as Lord over the world, the importance of prophets and their
scriptures as divine sources of guidance, and elements of the unseen such as angelology
and predestination. Tariqah emphasizes the spiritual development of individuals and
religious communities via the voluntary practice of the Sunna (normative deeds of the
prophet Muhammad); these traditional methods have been reinforced within the tariqah
system over the centuries. The Naqshbandi order’s Tariqah path is a moderate one in
between the Shariah and Haqiqah approaches. Tariqah approach is consistently “other
cautious” but does not necessarily try to create "enemy others" on a constant basis like
the National View Movement. It distinguishes between its vision of Islam and different
worldviews they see as innovation. But the driving force or motivation among the tariqah
actors does not depend on political adversaries to be combated. Their focus is on the
social community.
On the other side of the spectrum lies the Nur movement, which has consistently
viewed the state as an institution that provides security rather than cultural identity. In the
Nur community, the dominant Islamic approach is the “Haqiqah” Islam, which has a
more or less “other-less” Islamic understanding that focuses on the self rather than the
other. Its main point of reference is the tradition itself connecting believers to the Divine
30

Truth (Haqiqah) and the believer as agent of tradition. This is a self referential-identity
that is not spoken of in the scholarship. Nur community, as it is represented in the hadith
of Gabriel, emphasizes worshipping God as if they could see him. In their religious
psychology, nothing happens independent of the will of God. Therefore, they do not (one
could argue that they are unable to) devote energy in constructing an "other," but are in
constant dialogue with God through individual worship. 64
The Nur (the Light, understood in a spiritual sense) movement of Said Nursi 65,
and most recently Fethullah Gülen, 66 give primacy to belief in the Oneness of God. Belief
in God, the Nur community holds, is the first and foremost principle of an Islamic
identity. For them, the concept of ihsan established the equality of all believers before
God and motivates them to come together to encourage one another on the path of God.
The believers are also united in their distrust and apprehension of a society without
ethical or moral values grounded in belief in God. In that respect the main actor in
Haqiqah approach is the individual believer struggling to accomplish his duty towards
God over and above the spiritual distractions ubiquitous in a secular society. The person
affected by and operating within the cultural sphere of haqiqah is focused on worshipping
God with single-minded attention. Socially haqiqah is manifest in an ambiguous attitude
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towards power. One does not seek power for its own sake; the focus is to promote the
truths found in the tariqah path with minimal tension.
By looking at the relationship between the three major Islamic movements and the
Justice and Development Party, I will embark on the rather understudied issue of
contested identities of Islamic movements, their self-concepts, their perceptions of the
West and their unique relationships with the state apparatus. In concrete terms, this
involves how Islamic movements view themselves, how they view others and what is
their vision about the Turkish state in the world. Therefore, the main topic of this study is
centered on the special relationship between Islamic movements and the political system in
Turkey. On the other hand, special attention to the Justice and Development Party
government will show the limits of the influence of these three Islamic movements on the
Justice and Development Party, which can at most be considered an indirect continuation of
them.

In order to grasp the diversity within the Muslim world and the existence of
different Islamic political identities one needs to analyze Islamic identities from within
their changing environments where a reaction to the western world and the imposition of
modern norms is just one issue addressed by Islamists. Few studies of political Islam, and
the varied role of Islam in the modern world, are able to break out of this narrow focus.
Serif Mardin is a scholar who has been able to transcend these discursive limitations. 67
He argues that instead of focusing “on the differences in the role of religion as between
‘Western’ and ‘Eastern’ societies taken as polar opposites,” we need to recapture “the
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internal spring of Islamic social structuring as a dynamic process.” 68 The internal spring
of Islamic social structuring is rooted in a tradition of ambivalence to political power.
The three distinct Islamic approaches (Shariah, Tariqah and Haqiqah) represent different
approaches to the state, themselves, and sometimes imaginary others. Its simplest form is
Shariah. 69 Holy Law has cross-cultural and global implications for Muslims because it is
“God’s eternal and immutable will for humanity, as expressed in the Quran and
Muhammad’s example.” 70 But each actor discussed in this study practices Islam at a
different level based on the hierarchy explicit in the hadith of Gabriel which stretch from
political quiescence to accommodation.
Political Quiescence and Accommodation
The death of the prophet Muhammad brought about the major question of political
authority in his absence. The major split between the partisans (Shi’a) of Ali and the
Sunni school school of thought (ahl al-sunna wal jam'a) on political legitimacy. The
Shi’a argued that the prophet Muhammad’s caliph should be his closest relatives who
represented his family and were a link in the chain of divine knowledge revealed to the
prophet. The debate on the status of Muhammad’s family (Ahl al Bayt) as trustees of his
message is important because he did not have a male heir and his lineage was widely
recognized to continue through the children of his daughter Fatima and Ali ibn Abu
Talib. Prophetic traditions as well as the Quran support the superior status of
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Muhammad’s family. In addition, Muhammad had often praised Ali for his knowledge of
religion and at times left him as the leader of the community in his absence. 71
However, Ali was younger than Muhammad’s immediate peers were and after his
death, this older generation was able to win popular support and political legitimacy.72
Ali did not contest the leadership of his three immediate predecessors 73— though he did
articulate the claim that his position as leader was usurped from him— because he did not
want to create fitna, or civil violence and division, among the members of the burgeoning
Muslim community. Ali eventually became the fourth caliph after Muhammad but
immediately had to confront the politically active Umayyad family who had created
positions of power for themselves within the political structure of the Muslim state in
places like Syria and Egypt. The issue of the legitimate succession of the prophet as well
as the status of his descendents in representing Islam is still a contentious issue and the
subject of a scholarly discourse in its own right.
But this issue is also important for the majority Sunnis, who generally do not
accept Shia claims about Ali and the ahl al-bayt. Within the early Islamic state individual
believers implemented the Sharia in their personal lives, while the teachings of the
prophet Muhammad were being transmitted orally. Scholars of law, the ulema, were
prominent in their role as transmitters and proponents of Shariah. However, whose role
was it to confer legitimacy, on specifically religious grounds, on the rulers of the Muslim
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community? The religious classes were interested in promoting the practice of Islam and
the recognition and institutionalization of sacred law. Some scholars may also have been
motivated by personal ambition, but the point is that the avenue to Islamize society was
by the law: the establishment, in legal form, and socialization of divine norms. The state
in the early period of Islam, particularly the dynastic lineages that were developing, had
as its interest what any power structure does: growth and survival. This resulted in a
dichotomy between the reason d'être of the state and the divine will, as articulated by the
scholarly classes.
Two social classes emerged: the ulema (the faqihs or recognized Islamic scholars
of law), and the Sufis. 74 The ulema tried to institutionalize their legal ideas through the
state. 75 The Sufi movement grew as a reaction to this legalistic if not secular approach to
Islam. They focused attention on cultivating spirituality and distrusted the state because
they did not want their faith to be corrupted by association with institutions of power.
Within this dynamic lies the origin of Islamist relations with the state as the instrument of
the divine will.76 For the greater part of Islamic history, political powers have been able
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to co-opt the ulema by patronizing Islamic law and acquiescing to other demands made
by the masses of dedicated Muslims.77
The Sufi scholars preferred to stay away from direct involvement in the affairs of
the state. Although they were also part of the ulema (Islamic scholars), they preferred to
be independent from external constraints and political pressure; they therefore rejected
government employment. Their rationale for remaining aloof from politics was to
preserve the dignity of Ilm (Islamic sciences). 78 Two major examples of the tension
between the state and Islamic scholars with this type of mindset are of Imam Abu Yusuf
and Imam Ahmad b Hanbal. Imam Abu Yusuf was one of the earliest Islamic scholars of
the Hanafi school of thought; he accepted a government position and became a Qadi
(Judge). 79 Before him, other leading scholars (including his own teacher Abu Hanifa) had
rejected similar offers to protect the integrity of their intellectual office. Imam Abu
Yusuf’s participation in politics led to his exclusion from the scholarly community. His
critics argued that religious scholars should not be under the control of any government. 80
Ahmad b. Hanbal was imprisoned by the state for not accepting a government mandated
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theological position. 81 He was severely punished and spent the rest of his life in jail and
under severe conditions. Ahmad b. Hanbal’s standpoint later became the mainstream for
Sunni Islam. 82
The ulema eventually gave in to the pressures of the political authorities but
demanded that the state help establish the Shariah in return for legitimacy; after all, the
name of the ruler was mentioned at every Friday congregational prayer. On the other
hand, Sufi scholars had no interest in governmental affairs and preferred to live austere
lives in personal devotion to God. As a famous example, tensions did lead to conflict
with respect to controversial issues, some of doctrine and some of political power. AlHallaj was executed for saying ana’l haqq (I am the truth; or divine), but he also was
aloof from the state and refused to use his popularity to give legitimacy to the Caliph. 83
There was no authority that could monitor rulers in their handling of God’s law.
There developed a dichotomy wherein a certain body of scholars and their lay students
and followers became tacitly aligned to the state, or ruling authorities, as the instrument
to apply the Shariah in society as well as work for other Islamic causes. They did not
intentionally sell their consent for the sake of establishing the Shariah. Nor did the Sufi
scholars fall under the control of the government. The sufis were less inclined to
associate with any institution because, more or less, their goal was directed towards
81
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mystical experiences and worship. They did not have time for mundane issues, and often
would use the materialistic hypocrisy of the ruling classes as pedagogical examples in
their teachings.
This is a rough division between the ulema, who were involved in government,
and Sufi mystics operating in society. Lapidus states that in the course of fifteenth and
sixteenth centuries Ottomans brought the majority of the religious establishment under
state control. The bureaucratization of the ulema gave them enormous access to positions
and endowments, however, the ulema could no longer stay as the representatives of the
Muslim masses. 84 Ottoman ulema simply became civil servants paid by the state. 85
Because the ulema grew close to the state and maintained rigid ideas about the law, they
became deaf to social developments 86. The classical texts (the Quran and Muhammad’s
recorded traditions) and scholarly debating circles is where the nature of Islam is defined.
The state-backed jurists accepted the interpretations of the Hanafi school of thought
which was introduced among the Turks by the various Naqshbandi orders. Overall, the
Hanafi legal establishment allowed Sufi brotherhoods to practice interdependent and free
in their own affairs. The autonomy accorded to Sufi brotherhoods was also useful to the
Ottoman state which needed the cultural assets of these brotherhoods and their ability to
organize and inspire people as the empire was expanding throughout the Balkans.
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Muslim immigrants voluntarily settled in the new lands and continued the proselytizing
activities of their ancestors. 87
Originally, because Turkey was a religious country where the state was connected
to the religious classes, 88 this diffused religion and religious actors within all areas of the
government. The scholarly religious classes (Ilmiye Sinifi) had the authority to judge
religious issues. The highest religious authority was the office of Shaikh al Islam
(Şeyhülislam). The decisions of the Ottoman Sultan became law after the, albeit symbolic
at times, approval of the Shaikh al Islam. This system functioned efficiently during the
age of Ottoman hegemony. Then the ulema fell behind in the production and
dissemination of knowledge and other developments. As an institution, they were stuck in
the past whereas all around them new modes and innovations were developing. Often the
members of religious circles were themselves opposed to reform. They became the
representatives of the status quo, which they identified with their own well-being. One
major example is the opposition of the religious circles to the use of the mass print
technology in Istanbul. They worried that if religious books were printed by machines
hundreds of scribes would lose employment. 89 This kind of opposition delayed the use of
the printing press in the Ottoman Empire for over a century.
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The anti-reform status of the religious establishment and their inability to lead the
country through changing historical circumstances came hand in hand with another
development. As Serif Mardin reminds us, the decline of the religious classes (as a result
of their inability to guide the development of the nation) came together with the rise of
secular ideas from the European world. The bureaucratic elite (kalemiye sinifi which
means “Men or Class of the Pen”), who had been closely allied with the scholarly classes,
began to adopt the secular ideas of Europe where they went for education. They did not
have a formal education in the religious sciences, as Mardin states, and they were more
attracted to secular ideologies. 90
As the new elite gradually preferred secular ideas to the previously dominant
religious ones, they disconnected themselves from preceding Young Ottoman ideas and
became the epitome of the secular ideas in the Ottoman bureaucracy. 91 The decline of the
status of the ulema and the rise of the secular bureaucratic elite corresponds to the reform
projects of Sultan Mahmut II. He was the first Ottoman Sultan to introduce secular
schools alongside the religious education system. 92 Eventually they began to challenge
the religious class, even on religious matters, based on the basic training they received in

secular elite. As a result, for the ulema anything coming from the west was considered as anti-Islamic and
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Europe. This, mainly French educated, generation of bureaucratic elite who acquired
increasing power identified culturally and ideologically more with Paris than Istanbul.
They wanted to displace the institutional power of the clergy in Istanbul in conscious
emulation of the relegated clergy in Paris. 93
Previously the bureaucracy served the interests of the nation with the same
ideological commitment as the religious classes. However, the emergence of ideological
differences between these two classes led the bureaucracy to begin to develop its own
concept of religion as a private matter with no claim on the state or the political
discourse. Winning the support of another class, the army officers (seyfiyye, the men of
sword), like themselves who also did not receive a religious education, the bureaucratic
elites moved to disentangle the office of the Shaikh al Islam from positions of influence
with the Sultan. 94 As the men of religion began to loose their authoritative status they
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started to express their increasing powerlessness in reactionary terms. The pan-Islamist
policies of Abdülhamid II can be considered in this vein. For many Muslims in the
country Abdülhamid II was the "Great King" (Ulu Hakan) who was considered “worthy
of paradise” (Cennetmekan). It is during his thirty-three year reign that the Ottoman state
faced the biggest political, economic and military challenges of its time. To protect the
country from collapse, Abdülhamid II popularized the religiously based Shariah authority
to a greater extent than many of his predecessors had done. 95 He promoted Panislamism
to keep the weakening empire together 96 He was harsh on opposition groups from the
bureaucratic classes, which he repressed in order to forestall the decline of Islam as a
result of the growth of a secularly inclined civil service and military. His reign represents
the last attempt by a failing religious social institution to try to salvage a role for itself in
a world order that it had previously ignored.
From the beginning, the religious orders (tariqahs) functioned as institutions for
those who sought refuge from the spiritual emptiness. As they did for over a thousand
years, the members of the tariqahs sought knowledge from learned, pious teachers trained
in spiritual technique to maintain personal piety and purity. Over time, with the
increasing influence of secular ideas into Turkey the religious orders and the political
establishment became alienated from one another. However, not all Sufi scholars in the
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tariqah networks prided themselves on these accomplishments because they were acutely
aware of the rising secular threat to religion as a new phenomenon which required new
techniques. For centuries, the Naqshbandi order had progressively been developing
spiritual techniques for lay Muslims to cultivate a high level of faith. In these stagnant
conditions, the older leaders of the Sufi tariqahs were unable successfully to address the
threat of secularism and hegemonic western nation states: Britain, France, and Russia.
Said Nursi would soon begin to argue that the institutionalized tariqah system (of the
Naqshbandi) was not enough to meet the challenges coming from novel ideologies. 97 He
argued that secularism was based in science and technology, thus they were more
dangerous for a believing mind trained with the old methods. 98 Rather than representing a
competing religious belief system which could be dealt with by well trained scholars,
secularism was empirical, objective, and empowering. The traditional tariqah system did
not deal with the problems of the time. Therefore, Nursi did not join them and after
abandoning his political career, he initiated a human-centric religious movement that
focused on belief more than any other issue.
He proposed a renewed focus on Islamic tradition— for example, he denounced
the primacy of the Murshid (the teacher in the religious orders) and argued that the only
teacher is Muhammad himself— and the normative practice of Muhammad. 99 For him
this was the surest and shortest way to achieve a solid connection with God. From 1925
until he died in 1960 he published his ideas in a series of 114 books called the “booklets”
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(risale). The booklets were his contribution to tafsir (interpretation) of the Quran
according to the principles put forward by Muhammad. He rejected the institutions that
had mixed the primary practice of the prophet with the teachings and methods of various
teachers; he called his pacifist mission “Haqiqah.”
Later, Necmeddin Erbakan’s Islamist-National View Movement promoted an
approach deeply attached to the self-other dichotomy and uses of the “other” in identity
formation. Erbakan’s movement has constantly been anti EU-USA, anti-Zionist and against
the idea of religious dialogue. This is Shariah approach; 100 it gives primacy to the
authoritarian transformation of the society (similar to Abdülhamid II). The National View

Movement is a relatively new movement with intellectual origins in the Naqshbandi tariqah.
Some time in the late 1960s or early 1970s the Naqshbandi leader Mehmet Zahid Kotku
directed Erbakan to establish a political party as a means of reaching out to the public.
Erbakan later used the nationalist anger of immigrant Turks in Europe to bolster his
position as an Islamist leader. In doing so he applied the us-them dichotomy in identity
formation in its most extreme form. With student organizations like National Youth
Foundation (Milli Genclik Vakfi, NYF) National View Movement tried to establish Anatolian
social bases. The ideological source of the movement is mostly a byproduct of political
developments in the Middle East after WWII. The de-centralizing of the political right paved
way for Erbakan to politicize the rising Muslim consciousness. The anti-western and antiIsraeli radicalization of the Islamic movements in the Middle East and the success of the
Iranian revolution provided inspiration for him. From the beginning, Erbakan’s movement
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sought out and utilized real and imaginary "others" such as Freemason, Zionists, Crusader
Europeans, and the imperialist USA. 101
The static Naqshbandi methods had long lost their appeal in the eyes of the masses,
for which the Naqshbandi movement had little to offer in the face of enormous social and
economic transformations. The Naqshbandi movement eventually became a rather closed
community of like-minded members who no longer had an influence on the rest of society.
Today most Naqshbandis dress and live more conservative lives than ordinary Muslims in
Turkey. Besides personal conduct, Naqshbandi members often live in self-isolated enclosures
(such as Carsamba in Istanbul). This is a result of an "other" consciousness; the Tariqah
approach considers social life as the main source of moral degeneration and prefers to live in
isolation from secular society, which it does not wish to engage. Their identity is not
dependent on the existence of the "other" but they do recognize and are affected by
secularists.
Nur community is trying to renew the tradition that had disappeared with the
marginalization of the Naqshbandi movement. Followers of the Nur movement have a selfunderstanding that does not define the self in contrast to others because they are focused
wholly on the practice of religion 102 and work toward the ideal of Ihsan. In that sense the Nur
movement can be considered as "otherless." 103

An Islamic understanding of identity involves the normative construction of the
self. However, these norms do not come exclusively from society but from revelation.
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Revealed norms are to be experienced both individually and socially as a whole. The
ethos of Islam originates in the Quran and the practice and teaching of Muhammad. The
sources that Muslims read in order to understand the will of God for humanity are both
universal and specific to the social conditions of seventh century Arabia. Traditionally—
that is, before the rise of secular nationalism— Islam was practiced as a way of life and
was relevant to every aspect of a believer’s life. Actually, those who were sincere in their
desire to know God and live according to the normative example of Muhammad were
eager to model their lives on him. The Quran and Sunna were, and are, the foundation of
the faith for the community and the individual. The raison d'être of Islam is to bring
believers into the worship of God and to free them, or give them control, over their ego
(nafs). 104
This has always been in conflict with the anthropomocentricism dominant in a
modern world. God consciousness is contrasted with the Ego in contrasting visions about
the purpose of life. 105. Living life without worshipping God is the definition of an
egocentric life. 106 Said Nursi argues that Islam tries to form a community that is made of
responsible, God-fearing individuals. According to him, the person who is selfish will by
definition put the satisfaction of personal desires before all else. To institutionalize and
rationalize desire the ego must be able to define others from its own perspective. The ego,
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in Islamic and Sufi psychology, is not capable of understanding that it is a product of the
external environment. The nafs is constructed in relation to an "other," and the nafs, like
other structures or institutions, is interested in survival and power.
To be able to know and act upon the will of God, human beings need to have a
well-developed identity. Human behavior is predicated on identity. The way people think
about themselves will determine how they define the world around them and what paths
they pursue. To have an identity one should be a Subject, the agent who acts upon an
object. The object derives its meaning from the actions of a Subject upon it. The ego uses
this dynamic to establish itself as a reality, as part of who we are. It does so by directing
its gaze at an "other" and projecting ideas onto that object, this reinforces the ego identity.
Ideally, the Muslim with faith uses the Quran and traditions to establish his or her
identity. An "other" is not needed; in fact, identity formation vis-à-vis external objects
would conflict with religious identity. 107
The egocentric approach is applicable to the modern state. The modern state has
two closely related characteristics that are relevant for this study. The first is that it is
dependent on a materialist reading of the world and is only concerned about institutional
survival and growth. In addition to this, it bases identity on a particular understanding of
the material world: nationalism, communism, socialism. Secondly, it needs a real or
imagined "other" in order to formulate identity. This dynamic is not only ideological but
is the cause of real conflicts. According to Hobbes, the "other" members of society are
mere enemies whom one naturally fears. People must strategize against various threats,
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this is evident in his use of the famous saying Homo Homini Lupus. 108 The social world
is a brutish environment devoid of trust and security. The theory of state comes from this
understanding, later explained by Weber, that to end all violence we need to give the state
the monopoly of violence.
For Nursi, this understanding of social interaction should not have any place in
Islamic theology. The triumph of Hobbesian realism represents a shift from the theocentric perspective to an egocentric mode. Said Nursi explains this situation as a loss of
belief and trust in God. The consequence is that one’s own self and the world begin to
look like a Hell. Men by nature, according to Said Nursi, are limited to their own
environment and do not have the ability to control the world around them; this gives rise
to despair and a fixation on power and control. 109 According to Nursi, the ability to
construct a self-identity without comparing the self with external actors is only possible
for the believer in God. Nursi argues that the self fails to truly understand its place,
position and power because it has denied the relevance of God to life. There is separation
between the self and God in Islam. In all three spheres—shariah, tariqh, and haqiqah—
the self is subservient to God.
Nursi’s point is in line with the Quranic story of Adam and his sons. 110 The
Quranic description of Cain and Abel identifies one of the sons as respectful to God,
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while the other was under the influence of the ego. Satan tried to create enmity between
the two by showing the differences between them. When Cain mentioned the differences
to Abel, his response was “I will not attack you I fear from Allah” Eventually Abel was
murdered by Cain because of his need to identify the self in relation, negatively, with
external objects. 111 The Quranic message for Said Nursi is that the believer rejects the
method of identity formation of Cain, who in an attempt to define his own identity
through an imaginative misinterpretation of Abel committed a grievous sin. Nursi likes to
focus on commonalities so that he trains his own ego in the opposite method. In his
construction of identity the inclusion of other is dominant. He argues that against all the
minor differences we have major commonalities: “we believe in the same creator, we
believe in the same message, we believe in the same books, we believe in the same
messengers.” 112 This is why he promotes inter-faith dialogue with people of the book,
positive relations with Armenians, and decreasing the conflict between Turks and Kurds
in contemporary Turkey.
Returning to the typology used in this work, what is particularly important about
the Hadith of Gabriel is that the different modes of practicing Islam correspond to
different tendencies in viewing others. As stated before, for the Shariah-based actors,
such as Necmettin Erbakan and his political party movement, negative portrayals of the
other is critical in constructing Islamic identity. It decreases in importance in the Tariqah
approach and more or less disappears in Haqiqah approach. As different modes of
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practicing Islam leads to different perspectives on others, this process has undeniable
implications for the political process. The following chapters will analyze the historical
trajectories of the three Islamic approaches and their relationships with the Justice and
Development Party’s policies.
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Chapter III: NAQSHBANDI ORDER: TARIQAH
In this chapter, I argue that the Naqshbandi tariqah is symbolized in the hadith of
Gabriel by iman, faith. Its historical manifestation is characterized by the centennial
renewal of the faith side by side the intellectual and theological critique of innovation.
This approach is primarily practiced in inter-community relations (mostly closed to
outside world) and a shared piety towards God. However, Naqshbadis had to deal with
the fact of innovation and they became sensitive to the idea of “other” in terms of
practices that deviated from the Islamic norms established by the Prophet and practiced
by his companions. They look back to the earliest generations of companions as models
of Islamic behavior. Because they were focused exclusively on the correct practice and
belief they did not engage in controversial political debates. They substituted direct
political involvement by indirectly working to influence the state from the grass-roots
level. Their ideal institution was not the state, but master-disciple relationship,
represented by the tariqah orders. The Naqshbandis attempted to influence the state
through the individual leaders (caliphs) who lived in the capitol-major cities of the
Islamic world. But they preferred to live secluded from the main centers of power.
Contrary to the literature of negative essentialists, the Republican Era was not an
abrupt rupture of Islam's venture in Turkey. It was, rather, a period of change in what
should be considered the continuity of Turkish Islam, one that outlived many of its
political opponents. The Naqshbandi movement was very influential among loosely
connected Muslims through proselytizing activities both among the elite and the masses;
to better understand the role of the Naqshbandi tariqah in the venture of Islam I will
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analyze its impact on the secularized political arena rather than the impact of the secular
state on Islam.
The most prominent tariqah among Turks has undeniably been the Naqshbandi
tariqah. The Naqshbandi order was named after its founder Bahaeddin Nakqshband (b.
1318 CE). Over the centuries, the order became one of the most significant movements
throughout Central Asia, Asia Minor and the Balkans. Eventually, Naqshbandi teachers
socialized the majority of Turks into the practice of Islam. Its founder Bahaeddin
promoted the spiritual development of individuals in the religious community through the
implementation of the tradition of the Prophet Muhammad and other methods that Sufi
masters had themselves innovated as a result of studying and practicing Islam.
In Arabic, tariqah means “the path, way.” In the Islamic tradition, tariqah
specifically involves the members of Sufi brotherhoods who follow specific paths
developed in order to achieve understanding of divine reality (Haqiqah). This usually
happens by passing through spiritual levels Maqam. Gilles Veinstein argues that initially
this type of spiritual journey was a personal experience. After the development of the
Sufi Brotherhoods, the accumulated experiences of generations of teacher and students
were used to form a spiritual method and a corpus of rituals. In the tariqah, the leader
who was addressed as Sheikh, murshid or pir educated his disciples (Murid) in
specifically defined (or mechanical, to use Veinstein’s words) ways to help murids along
the Sufi path. 113 The established oral educational system within the tariqahs involved
teaching the very basic religious canon together with spiritual exercises meant to
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discipline the self and ego. This required communities centered around the personality of
the Sheikh. Sheikh-centered spiritual progress was mainly based on a negative
understanding of societal influences that might deter the members from fully realizing the
spiritual insights of the Sufi way. For them society was a dangerous place for the spiritual
aspirant to be in because they were away from the Shaikh's guidance and subject to
unknown cultural influences. Shaikh, who already passed many stages of spiritual
development, knew what the student needed for spiritual development. Therefore, he
wanted them free from the dangers of the society. 114 This understanding inspired an
Islamic life practiced mostly in intra-community relations secluded from the rest of the
society.
The place of Naqshbandi tariqah is not only important in the societal realm. Its
political involvement deserves equal attention. It would not be exaggerating to argue that
all of the different Islamic movements that have had political aspirations since the 19th
century have been the members of a Naqshbandi order or one of its offshoots. Erbakan,
founder of the Islamic political movement of National View, as well as the founding
fathers of Justice and Development Party are notable ones. There are presently debates
about the nature of the Islamic identity of the current Justice and Development Party
government; to answer that question it is vital to understand the role of the Naqshbandi
tariqah in influencing the Justice and Development Party. 115
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Mardin states that the “official history in Turkey only represents [the Naqshbandi
tariqah] through events or rebellions where Naqshbandism is associated with fanaticism,
treachery and reactionary qualities.” This narrative, as Mardin argues, dismisses the
positive contributions to society and culture during the period of growth of
Naqshbandism. It gave birth to all of the most important Islamic social or political
movements in modern Turkish history. 116
The beginning of major contacts between the Naqshbandis and the administrating
class dates back to the beginning of Islamization of Anatolia. Emergence of Islam in
Anatolia was a direct result of the westward movement of missionary Muslim Turkish
tribes from Central Asia. 117 As they moved into Byzantine lands, the members of the
Naqshbandi Order introduced Islam to Christians and pagans living in Anatolia. The
institutions the order established were in the interest of proselytizing these people. When
the worrior (Ghaza) state and its leader, Ghazi, made raids into non-Muslim lands the
Naqshbandis used the opportunity to preach to the non-Muslim residents of the newly
conquered lands. Similar to modern day missionaries Naqshbandis opened hospitals, soup
kitchens and other social facilities where they served Allah charitable works. In his
famous article, Barkan called them Colonizing Turkish Dervishes (Kolonizator Turk
Dervisleri). 118
Colonizing Turkish Dervishes were instrumental in the establishment of the
consequent Seljuk and Ottoman states. The state became guardian of their religious
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movement, and they were dedicated to protecting it against external threats. The idea of
the state among these Naqshbandi orders has not been seen as merely “instrumental.”
They knew that they needed the state, however they were not necessarily happy with the
unquestioned political authority of its leaders. They needed the leaders to provide
services like security and safety so that the religious communities could flourish in
society. Sometimes order members worked in administrative posts while some
administrators became actively involved in the orders. Religious communities were
constantly in contact with the state apparatus but this relationship was limited to
appealing to the state to help religious orders spread Islam among the non-muslims. As a
result, the Turkish state influenced society through its patronage of religious orders. This
was a special kind of collaboration between the dervishes and the politicians, operating in
their realm yet remaining separate. 119
The focus of the Naqshbandi message comes from its call for renewing the faith
through an emphasis on the practice of the early Muslim community. They view
themselves as the legitimate representatives of the prophetic tradition, linked with
Muhammad through a line of descendents going back to Abu Bakr. Abu Bakr is
important for the identity of the Naqshbandi order because he was with the prophet from
the beginning of his mission. The founding fathers of the Naqshbandi Tariqah view
Muhammad as more than a historical figure. He is one sent by the divine will, and all his
actions are worthy to be emulated. It was important for the Naqshbandis to trace their
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order to one of the companions of Muhammad because that was for them a source of
legitimacy.
The Naqshbandis represent the tradition of renewal in religion, called Tajdid. The
concept of renewing the religion, as Friedman states “stemmed from the conviction that
the period of the Prophet was the ideal which should be recaptured.” 120 This
understanding is an implicit acceptance that as time passes the authentic practice of the
religion decays and changes. Muhammad stated this in a hadith. ‘The best of my
community is the generation in which I was sent, then those who follow them, then those
who follow them.’ Friedmann argues that this “is only one of the numerous traditions
idealizing the earliest period of Islamic history and indicating that a process of
deterioration would set in after its completion.” 121 To remedy the deterioration
Muhammad said that at the beginning or end of each century God would send one of his
servants to the Islamic community who will renew the religion. Hamid Algar argues that
this hadith should be accepted as authentic. 122
Over the centuries, Muslim communities have followed different renewers
(mujaddids). For the Sunni tradition in Turkey, the list of the mujaddids has some
common personalities such as Imam Shafi'i, Imam Ghazali, Shah-i Naqshband, Imam
Rabbani (Ahmad Sirhindi) and finally Khalid-i Bagdadi. 123 The Nakshbendi tariqah in
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Turkistan has generally tried to promote the acceptance of Mujaddids from the
Naqshbandi ranks.
The Naqshbandi tariqah has a strict adherence to tradition and the idea of a
renewal without innovation because Islam has always been and is still sufficient to
answer all major questions in life. For Naqshbandis this is due to the divine source of
Islam. In this understanding, tradition is equated with the actual revelation of God, as if
its human agency is also divine. This is a major point where mainstream Naqshbandis
and other major Islamic groups differ. Many Naqshbandis preferred to stay away from
actively engaging in politics for the purposes of “al-‘amal bi’l ‘azima” and kept
themselves in line with the tradition while the others argued that new circumstances
required engagement with state institutions.
The division between those who follow “al-‘amal bi’l ‘azima” (acting with
strictness) and “al-‘amal bi’l rukhsa” created two major features that made up the
Naqshbandi identity. The first one has been strict adherence to Qur’an and the tradition of
Muhammad. This is the fundamental characteristic of the movement: renewal in the
present and possibly the future by calling people to the past. Dina Le Gall argues that this
has been the major Naqshbandi principle regarding tradition (the Quran and Sunna), 124
which was the simplest representation of “al-‘amal bi’l ‘azima”. However, in order to
renew and refresh religious practice some Naqshbandis tried to influence the ruling class
and bring the state apparatus closer to religion. 125 They created a mode of relating to the
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state where the tariqah and the state apparatus were in close communication but still
maintained their distinct identity.
Different personalities in the Naqshbandi tradition brought different methods and
messages within the overall renewalist tradition. However, this divergence of methods
should not be viewed as rigid constructs of how these religious orders operated. Some
Muslims felt that promoting tradition was the ideal method for the Islamization of
society. Others wanted to use the power and influence of the state to advance religious
goals. Although not recognized in the literature, still others were able to combine these
two approaches to varying degrees. The high point of religious revival that was able to
combine the sacred and worldly methods in the Naqshbandi tariqah was manifested in the
personality of Sheikh Ahmad al-Faruqi as-Sirhindi, more commonly known as Imam
Rabbani.
Under the leadership of Imam Rabbani (d. 1626), 126 the order spread throughout
the Indian subcontinent and transformed the heartland of the Muslim world. He came to
be known as the renewer of the Second Islamic Millenium (Mujaddid Alf Thani).127
Mardin states that, for Sirhindi “religion was not just an ontological position, a
metaphysical theory and a critical guideline, but an organizational means to stop its
infiltration by creedal formulations of Hinduism, a policy he felt was encouraged by the
Moghul ruler Akbar [Shah].” 128 Sirhindi’s local impact later spread throughout the
Islamic world through his influential work and writings such as the Letters, the famous
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one (Mektubat in Turkish). 129 Rabbani’s contribution to Islam was not limited to a
spiritual renewal but also temporal organization and protest against Akbar Shah as
degenerating figure because of his eclectic religious views. He emphasized that rulers
should be strict followers and proponents of shari'a. Akbar was extreme: he tried to
establish a syncretistic religion by uniting Islam with other religions in India.
Sirhindi’s reaction was quick and fundamental. Lapidus summarizes his attitude towards
others:
While florid forms of Sufism flourished, the syntheses of Muslim and Hindu
practices abounded, and the Mughal state pursued a policy of conciliation among
Muslims and Hindus, Sheikh Ahmad Sirhindi, who claimed to be the mujaddid,
the renewer of Islam in his century, waged an unrelenting struggle to persuade
the Mughal authorities to adopt policies befitting an Islamic state. He called for
the imposition of the poll tax on the Hindus and insisted on the obligation of
Muslims to subordinate rather than to integrate non-Muslims into an Islamic
society. He also opposed the insinuation into Islam of Sufi and Hindu practices
such as veneration of saints, sacrifice of animals, and religious festivals.130

Before Sirhindi the Islamic world had experienced physical and spiritual shocks,
an example being the Mongol invasions into the heartland of Islam. However since the
invasion of Kazan in 1552 by the Russians the Muslim world was perpetually losing
ground to the rising western powers. 131 The revivalist Islam of Sirhindi became one of
the most influential messages throughout the Islamic world.
Sirhindi’s goal was to ground Islam in the sources of revelation free from “alien”
ideas. The historical encounter between Islam and Hinduism was, for Sirhindi, the main
reason for the degeneration of the pure Islam. Therefore, he tried to emphasize an Islam
129
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solely based on Quran (the revealed text) and the Sunna (the living tradition of the
Prophet). This is a common feature of all revivalists in Islamic history. Sirhindi tried to
cleanse Islam from un-Islamic practices and innovations. He explains that during his
spiritual experiences he elevated and saw that “the highest levels of saints were the ones
who recited the prayers of prophet Muhammad rather than other ordinary or ‘man-made’
ones.” Sirhindi argued that the surest way rise in the practice of Islam is to strictly follow
prophet Muhammad’s Sunna. 132
Sirhindi and his renewalist movement were some of the earliest Muslims to sense
the existential threat posed by foreign involvement in the heartland of Islam. This grew
out of the realization that non-Islamic elements were beginning to influence Islamic
culture in a negative way. His emerging awareness of foreign domination led him to
speak about identity using an “us-them” dichotomy. With the experience of Sirhindi, for
many Naqshbandi movements political activity became a viable means to further the
interests of the religion.
Naqshbandis who were coming to similar conclusions began to deal with the
threat of secularism the same way Sirhindi did. However, in the Turkish case the
Naqshbandis developed similar methods of Sirhindi, as much as a century before him.
According to Algar, in the late 15th century Haji Ubeydullah Ahrar (d.1490) sent Emir
Ahmed Buhari (d. 1516) and Simavlı AbdullahI İlahi (d. 1491) to Istanbul, capital of the
Ottoman caliphate. Ubeydullah Ahrar, as Schimmel points out, was one of the major
Naqshbandi leaders whose students traveled East and West Turkistan into China where,
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inspired by their master’s ideas, they tried to influence the political body to establish
religious norms. 133 Hamid Algar states that the earliest presence of the Naqshbandi order
in Istanbul “was a result of direct transmission from the Central Asian homeland of the
order.” 134 Contrary to scholars who attribute a greater degree of Sirhindi’s influence on
the Naqshbandi tariqah, direct transmission of was from Central Asia a century before of
Sirhindi. 135
The most significant and influential representative of the Mujaddidi branch over
the course of Turkish history was Khalid al-Baghdadi 136 (1777-1826). Khalid alBaghdadi was of Kurdish origin. He was born in Norther Iraq’s Qaradagh region near
Suleymaniyah. He is from the Shafii school of thought. From early on he received
traditional Shafi’i Islamic education 137 in and around his hometown. 138 He was also well
educated in Islamic Jurisprudence (Fiqh). Later he became famous among his peers for
his studies in other fields including mathematics, logic etc. During his life, the Qadiri
order was predominant in his native region, but he did not join their order. Instead, he
traveled to India to study with a famous Naqshbandi master named Abdullah Dihlevi.139
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Abu Manneh explains that this is out of a spiritual quest where Khalid al-Baghdadi could
not satisfy himself in Mecca or around his hometown. 140 After receiving an intensive
education and training under ed-Dihlevi he was given an ijaza authorizing him to teach
according to the Naqshbandi method. He became deputy (Khalifa) but his diploma gave
him an exceptional position, khilifa tammah mutlaqa, a rank as Abu Manneh explains edDihlevi seems to have denied other deputies. 141 The date was 1810. As soon as he
returned home, he began his teaching activities.
A few scholars call our attention to the organizational skills of a Khalid alBaghdadi as a religious figure. 142 Mardin argues that what makes Khalid al-Baghdadi
important is the originality in his method. Contrary to his predecessors, he was able to see
the interconnectedness of the Islamic world. He organized his followers into small
missionary groups and then sent them to different parts of the Islamic world in order to
promote the religion. He stated during his time in India that he wanted to work for the
material benefit of Islam. He contributed to this dream through his organizational work.
Through the efforts of his students the work of Khalid al-Baghdadi has had a lasting
influence on religious activism in the region. 143 Khalid al-Baghdadi was aware that the
ruling elite were only interested in worldly success so he paid attention to statecraft in
order to influence society. 144 As a result, he gave equal emphasis to the organizational
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structure of the Naqshbandi order and the spiritual or religious teachings. In his writings
to his deputies he mentioned in detail how to influence government officials. Sometimes
Khalid al-Baghdadi argued that the reason the ummah went astray was because of its
rulers. It was Khalid al-Baghdadi’s vision that the Islamic world would be better off only
by returning to righteous conduct. 145 His principle focus in his both education and
teaching was based on Fiqh (Islamic legal theory) rather than any other religious or
positive sciences. This was a search for balance between worldly and religious pursuits.
His superiority in the field of Fiqh is one of the reasons why he was able to attract such a
large following, especially among other scholars from distinguished Islamic centers such
as Bagdad, Damascus and Istanbul.
Khalid al-Baghdadi’s network of deputies, with whom he was in constant contact,
numbered no fewer than 116. This web of deputies transformed the region and made
Naqshbandi dominant over the Qadiri order. There are other explanations for the success
of the Naqshbandi order. Hakan Yavuz attributes the worldly success of Naqshbandis to
the movements’ ‘democratization’ of the deputy system. 146 He argues that in Qadiri
tariqah the deputies or the masters were chosen from the family of the Prophet while in
Naqshbandi eligibility was decided on the basis of ability and merit. Moreover, their
liberal acceptance of new students increased their numbers so that they became the
predominant tariqah in the region. Mardin argues that encounters of Naqshbandis with
“Catholic and Protestant missionaries whose influence they had to combat” were
instrumental in leading the Naqshbandies to develop better methods to promote the faith.
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In Mardin’s words, the Catholic and Protestant opposition and the sense of a powerful
enemy “other” that it created made the Naqshbandis realize the need to increase their
numbers and limit the appeal of rival ideologies. 147 However, it is unclear just how
influential these external influences were on the development of the method used by
Khalid al-Baghdadi.
Because of his missionary system, Khalid al-Baghdadi was able to send his
deputies to Muslim cities like Baghdad, Cairo, Jerusalem, and Asia Minor up to Istanbul.
Memis lists 105 deputies of Khalid al-Baghdadi, 15 of whom were sent to Anatolia.148
The religious propagation of the this Naqshbandi branch throughout the Islamic world is
important for the effects it had in Ottoman lands, Istanbul in particular. Mardin explains:
… [I]n the 19th century the entire Anatolia began to be crisscrossed by
Naqshbandi networks. The increasing penetration of Sufi orders in this
area amounted to the implantation of elements of an Islamic civility at a
time when the Ottoman Empire had been unable to intervene in the intertribal conflict and the ensuing anarchy. The Naqshbandi leaders also
assumed roles of political leadership in this region. 149
Khalid al-Baghdadi was careful in choosing his caliphs and providing them with
guidelines when he sent them to important places. This demonstrates his ability to assess
opportunities to promote Islam. It looks like he gave different guidelines for his
representatives in accordance to the needs and ability of comprehension of the people in
the places to which he sent them. The guidelines to his caliphs in Istanbul are especially
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important. Es’ad Sahib explains the seven principles in detail. 150 First, he did not want his
representative going to Istanbul to establish personal friendship with government
officials. Khalid al-Baghdadi was interested in influencing the political elite indirectly
rather than via direct association. Secondly, Khalid al-Baghdadi did not want his
representatives to pursue a salary or donations from the government. This principle was
meant to sustain financial and religious independence from influence or manipulation by
the state.
The third principle dealt with the personal family issues of Khalid al-Baghdadi’s
deputies. We know that Khalid al-Baghdadi and some of his disciples were
polygamous. 151 However, he prohibited polygamy for his deputies in Istanbul and argued
that these kinds of marriages hinder the works of religious guidance (Irshad ). The fourth
principle was to preserve the dignity of the order by not intervening in the social relations
of the visitors to or followers of the order. He also prohibited accepting money from the
local people in exchange for religious counseling. Fifth, he regulated the relations of the
deputies with women. Khalid al-Bagldadi did not want women, especially younger ones,
to join the order. He thought that deputies associating with young women in the order
would create problems. Sixth, he wanted the deputy in Istanbul to be in constant contact
with him, even on minor issues. He instituted consultation on every issue and at regular
intervals. The last principle is about living a humble life. He urged his followers to live a
very modest life in imitation of Prophet Muhammad.
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Most of these principles involve social responsibilities rather than personal ones.
As a tariqah leader, Khalid al-Baghdadi emphasized the possible problems that would
emerge in a cosmopolitan city like Istanbul alongside the spiritual problems the deputy
might encounter. Because the caliph resided there, Khalid al-Baghdadi wanted to
establish his tariqah in Istanbul on strong foundations and develop relations with the
community. Khalid al-Baghdadi’s vision was targeted on the Sultan and the bureaucracy
and also Christian, Jewish and Shia minority communities. His letters demonstrate a
negative attitude towards non-Muslims and non-Sunni Muslims. Abu-Manneh says:
“We find him exhorting his disciples to finish the "Khutm ul-Khaujakan"
(i.e., the ending prayers which close the dhikr [prayer] in the Naqshbandi
practice) by a prayer for God to "annihilate the Jews, Christians, fire
worshippers (majus) and the Persian Shiites…” 152
Because the Ottoman Sultans held the Caliphate, they were considered the
representative of the entire Islamic world. Therefore, Khalid al-Baghdadi’s antagonism
against the Jews and Christians could be due to the Ottoman wars with the invading nonMuslim armies. Ottomans were losing on many fronts at the time and it probably
increased the negative feelings among the Islamic communities toward the invading
powers and their religions. Any war between Ottomans and any non-Muslim country was
seen a war between Islam and its enemies. As Abu-Manneh says, in a letter to his
followers in Diyarbekir in southeast Anatolia, he ordered his followers to pray for “the
survival of the ‘glorious Ottoman state’ upon which Islam depends and for its victory
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over the enemies of religion, the cursed Christians and the despicable Persians.” 153 Since
the days of previous Naqshbandi leaders, Naqshbandi communities began to feel pressure
from foreign opponents. Therefore, the Naqshbandis revivalists were defending
traditional Islam against all kinds of cultural, social and religious degeneration. They
were not tolerant of non-Muslim and non-Sunni elements in the Islamic world.
After Khalid al-Baghdadi died, the movement continued to be active in and
around Istanbul. By sending more deputies and students to the region, the Naqshbandi
movement was effectively identifying Istanbul as the center of gravity of the Ottoman
and Islamic world. For its part Istanbul was the most stable region of the empire and
ready for a spiritual and social movement. 154 The best method for instituting change
within the continuity of society was to slowly Islamize society through a return to
Quranic and sunnatic principles. Another factor contributed in making the Naqshbandis
influential in the capital. The military (Janissaries) backed by its religious wing had been
holding an anti-reform position. The Janissaries who opposed to the military reforms
assassinated Ottoman Sultan Selim III (1761-1808) who was known for his
modernization efforts especially in the military. 155
After Selim III, Sultan Mahmud II (1785-1839) got to the throne and began to
implement reforms inside and outside of the military by supporting the Naqshbandis in
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order to fight against the Bektashi order, which was literally the religious wing of the
army. However, Janissaries revolted against him when Mahmud II wanted to form
another army. After a bloody attack, Sultan Mahmud II closed down the Janissary Army,
in 1826 156, and initiated many reforms 157 and banned the Bektashi order. Under these
circumstances, Mahmud II tried to utilize the Naqshbandis as a pro-sultan alternative to
the Bektashis. The Naqshbandi tariqah, together with the Ulama, were more open to
reforms initiated by the Sultan than other tariqahs. This is the beginning of the rise of the
Naqshbandis. 158 The replacement of the Bektashi Sheikh, after that order was dismantled
by the Sultan, with a Naqshbandi one in the main Bektashi center 159 shows that Sultan
Mahmud felt it necessary to empower a more loyal one religious movement. 160
Religious orders played a major role in articulating an authoritative interpretation
of Islam. Mardin argues that when the Janissary corps referred to Islamic teachings they
meant specifically their Bektashi interpretation of it. 161 It was the only legitimate
religious interpretation in the eye of many military staff. As Mardin states, the firman
(religious or administrative statement) which abolished the Janissary Army and Bektashi
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order, used religious justifications against these two institutions, arguing that Bektashi
interpretation of religion was unislamic. 162 The rise of Naqshbandis continued thereafter.
In the coming years, important personalities began to emerge within the
Mujaddidi Naqshbandi tariqah. One of the most important representatives of them was
Ahmed Ziyauddin Gümüşhanevi (1813-1893). Gümüşhanevi was from merchant family
of the city of Gümüşhane from Northern Anatolia. At an early age he went to Istanbul to
pursue a religious education. From 1831 to 1844, he undertook traditional madrasah
education and shortly after completing his education, he became a disciple of Ahmed b.
Süleyman el-Ervâdî, one of the deputies of Khalid al-Baghdadi in Istanbul. Gümüşhanevi
was initiated into the tariqah via el-Ervardi and his friends. Later Gümüşhanevi
established his own tariqah (the Gümüşhanevi branch of Naqshbandi/Khalid alBaghdadi) in historic Istanbul by purchasing an unused or closed mosque and turning it
into a new gathering place for his followers. 163
Gümüşhanevi’s rise in the community corresponded to the years of Ottoman
decline. Two developments were particularly important. The first development was the
1878 Russian-Ottoman War. Gümüşhanevi rallied his students to volunteer in the war to
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protect the Muslims and the Ottoman state. 164 The second development was the
emergence of a new kind of bureaucracy that trying to modernize the administrative
system. Modernization of the empire hit the religious education system whose members
were excluded from entering government posts. 165 Only graduates of the secular military
or regular schools were offered jobs in the government. Among other madrasah students,
the disciples of Gümüşhanevi who did not hesitate to sacrifice their lives in the war to
protect the state were excluded from government jobs by the bureaucracy of the very
state that they fought for. Since then, this has become a dilemma that Muslims had to
challenge. The very state that they fought for often times did not appreciate their
sacrifices.
The madrasa accordingly lost its appeal and competitive edge. Gümüşhanevi’s
major contribution was to revive the madrasah system by compiling major religious
writings of the previous centuries that were not in the curriculum of religious schools.
These attempts helped new students to access many authentic religious writings through
Gümüşhanevi’s works. 166 Gümüşhanevi knew that he was living in tough times and was
aware of his limits. When the government decided to open an interest based bank he
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The most prominent example is the inclusion of Jawshan in his compilation. Very popular in
contemporary Turkey, Jawshan is a prayer that dates to the early part of Islamic history. The contents of
this prayer were initially transmitted by the descendants of Muhammad. Said Nursi argues that the Shia
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followers.

70

gathered all of his followers and established an assistance fund for his followers who
needed money but did not want to participate in interest based banking. Gümüşhanevi
was one of the earliest leaders to bring the community together and try to build
institutions in line with Islamic principles. In the absence of an Islamic government, the
Naqshbandis delivered services for society with weak leadership.
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Naqshbandis,

instead of challenging the government, offered solutions to emerging problems through
their own social networks. Via the community bank the members of the tariqah loaned
money to other community members without charging interest.
Gümüşhanevi died in 1893. Among his major followers were Haci Hasib Efendi,
Abdulaziz Bekkine and Muhammed Zahid Kotku. Haci Hasib Efendi (d. 1949) assumed
the Naqshbandi post because he was older than the latter two. Haci Hasib Efendi was
known for his soft personality which was not able to challenge to the modern life style
imposed by the devastating wars and social trauma. Kotku and Bekkine who were much
younger would be more influential in the Naqshbandi history. Both Kotku and Bekkine
had some form of spiritual and religious training before they received Naqshbandi
training. Originally, Kotku introduced his close friend Abdulaziz Bekkine to the order.
They studied the Naqshbandi thought from the deputies of Gümüşhanevi. Naksibend
message became more appealing to them than any other tariqah available in Istanbul area.
Bekkine was older than Kotku. Therefore, the Naqshbandi establishment (including
Kotku himself) chose Bekkine for the post after the death of Haci Hasib Efendi. Kotku
left for Bursa, a historically important city, and continued his teachings there. Bekkine
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had a short but successful tenure. He became the imam and preacher of the Ümmü
Gülsüm (Umm Kulthum) Mosque in the Fatih district of Istanbul which was the center of
the Gümüşhanevi Naqshbandi order. During his short tenure, Bekkine transformed the
order and made it open to greater parts of society.
Two different reasons can be given for Bekkine’s success. One is due to the
structural changes in Turkish society. He assumed Naqshbandi leadership at a time when
Turkey was passing from autocratic single party rule into multi-party democracy.
Repression of religious education was loosened and Muslim scholars had more
opportunities to promote Islamic teachings and practice. 168 However, his personality is
more useful to explain the success of his institute than the structural considerations.
Bekkine was young, energetic and, due to profound life experiences, visionary. His
parents were originally Muslim subjects of Russia who immigrated to Istanbul before
Bekkine was born. During his early childhood, he went back and forth between Kazan,
Bukhara and Istanbul for his religious education and family businesses. During these
trips, he was able to compare and contrast the positive and negative practices taking place
in Muslim societies. In one of his speeches, he gave an atomistic explanation about the
salvation of society from decay:
When I was returning to Istanbul from Russia, we took a Turkish
ship. The Turkish conductor began to check for the tickets. When he
found out that an old and poor man took the ship without purchasing
a ticket he kicked him so bad that poor man fell on the floor. The
Italian captain [unhappily] on seeing this, called the old man to his
room and respectfully hosted him until we had arrived in Istanbul. 169
168
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The Italian captain was more in tune with the behavior that characterizes
Muslims than the Muslim conductor. Therefore, what became clear from this story to
Bekkine was that one’s identity does not create or account for their personality. It is
incumbent on individuals to construct their own personality, consciously, in relation
to God.
As was the case for all Naqshbandis, teaching the Islamic message to all members
of society was the principle motivation for Bekkine. Like his predecessors, Bekkine
based his activities in the mosque. Upon listening to Bekkine speak, those who regul arly
attended the mosque joined the movement and later rose in its ranks. At that time there
were very few practicing Muslims so it was crucial for Bekkine to win over ordinary
Muslims to the basic practice of Islam. The limited number of religious institutions in
Istanbul provided an opportunity for nontraditional Islamic movements to emerge easily
and compete for followers. For a traditional movement like Naqshbandism this was a
major concern. Bekkine was persistent in trying to keep the congregation within the
Naqshbandi tradition rather than joining other nontraditional movements. 170 Bekkine
passed away in 1952 and his close friend Kotku moved to Istanbul to replace him. The
Naqshbandi community wanted Kotku as the new Hocaefendi, Senior Teacher, to replace
Bekkine’s official government post in the Ümmü Gülsüm Mosque. With the help of the
Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet Işleri Başkanlığı, Diyanet), the government
office in charge of all mosques and religious institutions in the country, the Naqshbandi
movement was able to install Kotku inBekkine’s mosque as the new Imam.
170
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For a short period, Kotku preached in the same mosque in the city of Fatih in
Istanbul. Ummu Gülsüm mosque was relatively outside of conservative Fatih closer to
Eminonu which has been a commercial center where both Muslims Turks and nonMuslim minority resided. In 1958, Kotku moved to the Iskenderpasa Mosque which was
at the heart of Fatih’s central residential neighbourhood. Iskenderpasa Mosque became
the main center for the Naqshbandi movement. 171 This shows that Kotku was able to
transform the small mosque community at the suburbs of the town into a major one at the
heart of Istanbul. Later Kotku’s Naqshbandi branch was named after the mosque it is
centered around; the Iskenderpasa community. In the new mosque, Kotku was able to
institutionalize his community in many different areas.
During his tenure, Kotku encountered issues that none of the previous leadership
experienced. First, as Turkey passed into the multi-party system, the Democratic Party
(Demokrat Parti, DP) came to power in 1950 with the support of the dissatisfied Muslim
periphery both in the cities and in the countryside. The DP was a secular party that had
sympathy towards Muslims' cause and eventually it easened up the restrictions on the
religious practice. There were more pro-Muslim members in the party who, together with
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their secular friends, were against the authoritarian policies of the Republican People’s
Party. 172
After the multiparty era, the Republican People’s Party was never able to get the
majority vote in the elections. On the other side of the political spectrum, the DP and its
successors capitalized on disaffected Muslim voters by addressing the religious concerns
of the Muslim population. 173 In this era, a new but relatively marginal generation of
young Muslims emerged. They were mainly from the countryside where the
secularization reforms enacted by previous governments were not able to take root as
they did in the city centers. Back home these immigrant populations had the opportunity
to learn and practice their religion in their homes or via underground religious
organizations led by local religious orders. When these young Muslims moved to the
major cities to pursue higher education they began to deal with the contradictions
between their cultural roots and the requirements of modern life. Particularly important
were students from the engineering departments of schools like Istanbul Technical
University. They attended the university during the day and at night they were in the
Iskenderpasa mosque or in the Imam’s house listening to religious sermons (sohbet) to
purify their hearts. 174
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The most prominent products of this generation were Necmettin Erbakan, who
established Turkey’s first Islamic political party, and the Özal family which produced
major politicians over the next forty years. Korkut and Yusuf Bozkurt Özal became
ministers in different cabinets while Turgut Özal became prime minister two consequtive
terms and the president. Korkut Özal began to meet with Muhammed Zahit Kotku and
the Naqshbandi movement at a time when he was spiritually challenged.
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His story is

representative of the lives of other students, workers, and professionals who tried to fill
the void of a secular life style with religious practice. Kotku had a successful career as a
civil engineer and government employee. His experience in the USA in the late 1950s for
language and professional training was very interesting. It was the first time he became
aware of the place of religion in public life. The uses of religious symbolism in public life
or the first amendment right to practice religion made Korkut more conscious of his own
religion. 176
When Korkut Özal returned to Turkey, he consciously sought to lead a more
religious life. He read many books on a variety of aspects of Islam and began to socialize
with Muslims at the mosque. One individual who he met helped him to focus his spiritual
energy in ways he could not have figured out on his own. Korkut became one of Mehmed
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This happened, although, at a time when famous Sayyid Qutb visited the USA where he became irritated
by the life style in American society while Korkut Özal found ways that made him more religious. Qutb’s
American visit often times is represented as the source of his radical transformation and an important
example of the inability of an Islamic identity to live side by side with a non-Islamic identity. In the similar
case of Korkut Özal as a prominent Islamic figure in Turkey, however, the impact of meeting with the
“other” is opposite. In his article Korkut explains how Americans were able to keep religious symbols in
their lives, this ability influenced him positively. For more see Özal 1999.
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Zahid Kotku’s pupils in 1960, and their friendship lasted over 20 years. 177 His brother
and many other professionals from Istanbul Technical University (ITU) and other
government institutions followed the same path. Ersin Gurdogan, a graduate of ITU, calls
this an Invisible University (Görünmeyen Üniversite) where students from prestigious
secular government schools seek spiritual guidance and religious instruction from Islamic
leaders. 178 Weekly meetings, which lasted only a couple of hours, helped to develop
group solidarity and personal relationships that later re-invented the Islamic movement
and gave birth to grass-roots social-political institutions in the country.
Zahid Kotku was the most influential proponent of Islam in modern Turkish
politics. Among his students were the charismatic leader, Necmettin Erbakan, who later
became prime minister. Erbakan met Zahid Kotku while he was in college. Erbakan later
became a successful professor and an active member of the political community. He
subsequently became the general secretary of the Turkish Chamber of Commerce.
However, he was later ousted from that position. In the 1960s, with the support of
Naqshbandi community, Erbakan began to establish the foundations of a religious
opposition movement that would challenge the secular elites in the government.
Kotku did support the political party of Erbakan, however, the nature of the
relationship between his tariqah and Erbakan’s political party is unclear. Existing studies
portray a direct connection between the Naqshbandi tradition and the rise of the Islamic
party. However, though they both pursue the interests of Islam, the relationship between
the Naqshbandi leader (Kotku) and the leader of the political party (Erbakan) has been
177
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rather ambiguous. 179 When they began engagement in politics it appears that Kotku and
Erbakan had different expectations. For Kotku the political process was only one method
among many for the pursuit of Islamic interests. Erbakan viewed the state as the agent of
religious reform, or at least an integral part of it. Kotku always warned his students
against the inherent corruption of politics, where human self (nafs) is vulnerable to
temptation; similar views were put forward by traditional scholars like Said Nursi. Kotku
recognizing the importance of participation in electoral politics to serve religion, and was
supportive activities of Erbakan, but he never directly engaged in political campaigns or
recommend one party over another. Kotku viewed politics as a modern social club that
could be used to reach out to the community. 180
It appears that as a religious leader Kotku underestimated the power of politics
vis-à-vis traditional means of social mobilization. Erbakan was a young and energetic
leader who was able to achieve some political success and attract large sectors of the
electorate who thought that controlling the political sphere would be a more viable way to
servereligion. Shortly before Kotku’s death he became annoyed with Erbakan’s activities.
In the late 1970s protests were occurring all over the country. Erbakan wanted to
capitalize on the discontent of young Muslims but this opportunism was not welcomed by
Kotku. Yasar argues that Kotku first asked Erbakan to close the youth organizations
which were involved in the street protests. After a while Kotku took a more radical step
and asked Erbakan to close the party entirely. He realized that the party and its regional
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organizations had become part of the problem rather than offering an Islamic solution to
social discontent. 181
Kotku had a balanced approach to politics: he kept in contact with the Islamist
party of Erbakan but consistently warned his followers against the dangers of directly
engaging in politics. We can argue that his Islamic background detracted him from
getting involved too much with politics. The political option was a novel approach
because of the democratic context but Kotku feared from the negative impact of it in the
polarization of the society. The society that he wanted to transform was not the same one
that his predecessor Khalid al-Bagdadi dealth with. The newly rising generation of the
ordinary Turks most of the times saw Kotku’s method as unaaceptable. Kotku lacked the
ability to form an institutional structure (schools, newspapers, civil society organizations)
to reach out to his opponents and inform them about his message. The tariqah method
simply lacked that ability.
Naqshbandi tariqah, therefore, returned to emphasize the social agency of the
individual believer more than the party. This means that the social group must focus on
influencing each individual through inter-personal communication, something the state
could not do without being coercive. Kotku thought that Erbakan, because he came from
the same social milieu in the Istanbul mosque network, would not initiate policies that
contradicted the principles of the order. However he overestimated the strength of
Erbakan’s commitment to Naqshbandi principles.. Erbakan wanted to be an independent
politician who did not want to be constrained by the ‘limited’ vision of the order.
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Moreover, he was riding a wave of popular support that would eventually make him a
Turkish Prime Minister. Eventually unrest in the streets led to the coup d’état of 1980.
Kotku also passed away in the same year so there was no authoritative leader capable of
challenging Erbakan.
The Turkish Naqshbandis were single-mindedly focused on bringing nominal
Muslims into their mosque networks and teaching them the basics of Islamic doctrine and
prayer. In this sense, they were unprepared to deal with intricate delicacies of the political
process. Erbakan’s emergence in the political arena and weakening of Naqshbandi
support for him highlights the differences between shariah-based Islamic activism and
Iman, or faith-based activity. Erbakan was a shariah-based actor motivated by the
prospect of bringing his brand of Islam to influence state institutions. The Sufi orders,
going back to Khalid al-Baghdadi, were interested in politics only to the extent that they
themselves could propagate Islam directly to state officials. Erbakan was closer to
Islamic movements throughout the rest of the Middle East who sought political success
than to the traditional orders. He, therefore, tried to establish his own community through
the party members that followed him.
Like Erbakan, Kotku’s other students had engineering backgrounds. They did not
receive formal religious education from Kotku, whose lectures were informal question
and answer sessions without a developed curriculum. Kotku picked the topics himself for
the benefit of the students. Few if any of them pursued religious training. 182 Tension
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increased after Kotku passed away. Before his death, Kotku informally appointed his sonin-law Muhammed Esad Cosan to his place by making him the formal lecturer in the
weekly lecture series. Within the community, especially among those with secular
degrees, Cosan was not welcomed. These professionals took a mechanical approach to
Islam similar to the vision of Erbakan. Cosan was a soft-spoken, learned Islamic
professor who was well versed in Arabic, Persian and Hadith tradition; but he did not
possess political acumen. Nor was he a formal madrasah graduate with a traditional
Islamic education like his predecessors. As a result, the political wing was able to
discredit him. Cosan then became a small community leader position until his retirement
while Erbakan’s followers devoted their time excitedly to political activities. This
division empowered the politically oriented shariah approach of Erbakan’s and
irrevocably limited the power and influence of the traditional tariqahs in Turkish politics.
Many Muslims associated with the Naqshbandis and Erbakan began to consider
Erbakan’s method more relevant to the political situation in the country. Only after his
retirement from his teaching position, did Cosan become more active in community
activities by publishing magazines and establishing a national radio station, which
eventually became AK TV. However, Erbakan was at the height of his influence among
Turkish Muslims. Even those who listened to Cosan’s teachings considered him relevant
only to spiritual and not political affairs. His TV and radio programs were later barred by
the government in the wake of the 1997 military coup d’état, and he left Turkey to live in
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self-imposed exile in Australia. 183 After his death in a tragic car accident, the unity within
the tariqah movement was lost for good.
The major problem with the Naqshbandi movement of contemporary Turkey has
been its inability to revive Islam with the kind of energy and effectiveness characteristic
of Sirhindi, Khalid al-Baghdadi, and later Said Nursi. Ubeydullah Ahrar, Imam Rabbani,
Khalid al-Baghdadi and to a lesser extent Gümüşhanevi and Kotku were effective within
the contexts of their times and provided relevant religious motivation that increased the
dedication of many of their lay followers. However, the process of urbanization and stateadministered modernization in contemporary Turkey made it impossible for the
traditional methods to survive. The superiority of secular ideologies and institutions in
the country created a number of significant obstacles for tariqahs. They were not able to
mobilize people politically and their religious message became subsumed in the identity
politics of Erbakan.
This chapter tried show that the strategies employed by the Naqshbandi
movement to influence the state from the outside backfired during the republican era.
Previously they were respected and sought out for guidance in religious matters. After the
institutionalization of the secular state their political position became irreparably
marginalized. Tariqah approach was unable to accommodate to the new social and
political arrangement where the public sphere was cleansed from any religious
representation by the Kemalist revolution. In such an alien setting, Tariqah approach did
not effectively answer the dominant questions of modern life. As they wanted to adapt to
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the new political system they tried to initiate a new political party controlled by the social
movement. However, it appears that the leaders of Naqshbandi tariqah underestimated
the power of political process and politicians, even the Naqshbandi influenced ones, who
attribute autonomy of space to it.
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Chapter IV: THE NATIONAL VIEW MOVEMENT: SHARIAH
This chapter is about the Shariah approach as outlined in the Hadith of Gabriel as
Islam. It is the most basic level because it only requires the acceptance and practice of the
main tenet of Islam whereas iman and ihsan are an internalization of these fundamental
principles. The Shariah approach is exclusively interested in occupying institutional
positions of power. It interprets the problems of modernity as an absence of divine
directive in society. While all of the major Islamists in Turkey agree on this point, the
Shariah based actors, in this case Necmettin Erbakan, believe that the problems
associated with modernity will be solved by merely institutionalizing Islamic Law.
Necmettin Erbakan’s National View Movement was originally a political branch
of Kotku’s Naqshbandi movement. Erbakan began to establish political parties in the
early 1970s under the auspices of the Naqshbandi tariqah. 184 Later, the National View
Movement distanced itself from the tariqah network and immersed itself in the political
process. Erbakan disagreed with the Naqshbandi method of influencing the state through
social activity and religious propagation and embraced political involvement. His earlier
connection with the Naqshbandi tariqah caused observers to associate the National View
Movement’s Shariah approach with the Naqshbandi movement.
For the National View Movement, controlling the state via democratic elections
has been the primary goal. Inspired by Islamic movements in the Middle East, Erbakan
sought to implement religious law. 185 The National View Movement tried to
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institutionalize Islam as a structural factor in the state’s law-making and enforcing body.
The ideas of Sayyid Qutb were the intellectual foundations upon which the National
View Movement based its design for an Islamic revolution. The Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan and the success of the Iranian revolution eventually led to the popularization
of Islamic causes and the Shariah approach. By capitalizing on the sufferings of Muslims
abroad, the National View Movement was able to channel the dissident and discontent
voices to the political arena in which they were the primary representatives of Turkish
Islamic identity. As a product of 20th century democratic politics, the National View
Movement has managed to become a popular Islamic movement, however, overall
solidarity of the movement is only a few decades old.
In a secular state such as Turkey, where the military has sponsored coups in
defense of the secular establishment, Erbakan’s prominence among both political and
religious circles merits the attention of serious scholars of Islam and democracy. He was
the first politician to bring the message of Islam to the parliament. Other Muslim
politicians preferred to blend their ideas with conservative 186 and centrist ideas, but
Erbakan was explicit that the political platform of his party was “Islamic”. In contrast to
other traditional religious leaders, Erbakan did not receive formal religious training. 187
Erbakan was born in a more or less secular environment. His father was a judge in his

stopped short of explicitly calling for the restoration of the Shari’a.” Jenkins, 2008, 131. Emphasis in the
original.
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hometown of Sinop. Sinop was a secular city in a relatively conservative region.
Throughout his early life, he received a good secular education and was quite successful
in it. His family later moved to Kayseri and then to Istanbul where Erbakan attended the
prestigious Istanbul Erkek Lisesi (Istanbul Boys High School). Later, he attended the
Istanbul Technical University (ITU) 188. Among his classmates were Korkut Özal (former
minister), Suleyman Demirel (former Prime minister and 10th president) and Turgut Özal
(former Prime minister and 9th President). He became involved with the Naqshbandi
order while he was in college.
One campus of Istanbul Technical University was located in the district of
Besiktas which was very close to the center of Naqshbandi activism in the neighboring
district of Fatih. Fatih was named after Mehmed II (Muhammad the Conqueror) who
conquered Constantinople in 1453; after the conquest, he was nicknamed “Fatih,”
meaning conqueror. The famous mosque, the Fatih Mosque, on the historic peninsula of
Istanbul is also named after him. 189 Today the Fatih Mosque is not only famous for
prayer services but also for its funeral ceremonies. Out of a symbolic gesture, funeral
services of famous Muslims are usually done in the Fatih Mosque. This has been the case
for especially for the Naqshbandis.
Some famous Muslim figures whose funeral services were done in Fatih Mosque
are Naqshbandi Sheikh Esad Cosan, famous Muslim poet of Naqshbandi origin Necip
Fazil Kisakurek, former prime minister and President Turgut Özal (whom we later
188
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learned that was also linked to Necip Fazıl and Naqshbandi Sheikh Zahit Kotku). 190 After
the building of the mosque, the city became known as Fatih. Most of the conservative
students who attended Istanbul Technical University during 1960s and 1970s used to live
in Fatih. They were easily able to commute to college in the neighboring town while
living close to their Sheikh in Fatih. During his college years, Erbakan practiced Islam
and associated with the students and Sheikhs. 191 In 1953, he became associate professor
and was also active in business life. In 1956, together with friends from the Naqshbandi
community, Erbakan established the legendary ‘Gümüş Motor’ company in Konya.192
Gümüş Motor was the single most important business venture by Erbakan and his
associates. Although Gümüş Motor eventually failed, Erbakan’s followers used it as a
model of indigenous industrialization.
After the failure of Gümüş Motor, Erbakan entered the Turkish Chamber of
Commerce (Türkiye Odalar ve Borsalar Birliği, TOBB) in 1965. He later became its
general secretary. He was trying to be the voice of small business owners on the
periphery against the big corporate elite centered in Istanbul. In an attempt to widen his
sphere of influence, he ran for the presidency of the Chamber which was the biggest trade
chamber in the country. In May 25, 1969, he won the presidency of the Chamber at the
expense of the corporate elite. Süleyman Demirel, who was both the leader of the ruling
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Justice Party (Adalet Partisi, AP) and the Prime Minister opposed Erbakan’s election
arguing that Erbakan as the General Secretary of the Chamber could not run for
president. The case was taken to the court where the court decided in favor of Demirel. In
August 8, Erbakan lost his position but did not want to leave. Erbakan locked himself
into the president’s office leaving the office only after police broke the door in.
Consequently, what brought Erbakan to the forefront of the political arena was his
rivalry with Suleyman Demirel. Often Erbakan’s “us against them” discourse found its
utmost representation in Demirel’s personality. As a result, with the support of his closest
friends from Demirel’s party, Erbakan started his political activity through which he
managed to be elected to parliament as an independent candidate from Turkey’s most
conservative city, Konya. In Turkey, major political party leaders have always chosen
either their hometowns or Istanbul as their preferred place to pursue political office.
Erbakan broke from this tradition in a highly symbolic and successful maneuver to base
himself and his ideology in a traditional setting. Erbakan became an exception in Turkish
politics because of his ability to go beyond traditional family ties. His Islamic message
enabled him to establish the political movement within the Muslim community,
successfully using his Islamic identity in a highly secular political environment. 193
Erbakan began to use religious identity as a political tactic; he criticized his
opponents for their lack of Islamic morals. His main, yet most radical, tactic was to label
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his political opponents “freemasons” or “servants of Zionism.” 194 On May 15, 1970 in his
first year in parliament Erbakan gave a speech on Turkey’s entry into the (then called)
Common Market. He argued that the Common Market was a Zionist project. 195 He was
aware of the effectiveness of these images in uniting people behind him. This tactic was
especially important for him because it gave him quick results, which motivated his party
more than the religious messages grounded in Naqshbandi teachings. After becoming an
independent lawmaker in 1969, he was able to mobilize people from within political
networks and among ordinary citizens which were dissatisfied with the failed policies
promoted and institutionalized by the business and political elites.
Increasingly, these activities became the base of a separate movement, National
View, which Erbakan centralized under his leadership. Erbakan established the National
Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi, MNP) in 1970, and in each successive decade he would
establish and act as leader for political parties that were extremely influential players in
Turkish politics. 196 For example, after the 1971 military intervention, the MNP was
banned from politics so the next year Erbakan established National Salvation Party (Milli
Selamet Partisi, MSP). Erbakan’s movement was beginning to be called Selametciler
(Salvationists) because the MSP became influential when it got 12% of the general vote
in the 1973 elections.
Dedicated to being the voice of the Muslims in the parliament, Erbakan’s party
later alienated the Muslim constituency, which he had helped build around a political
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project. Muslim constituency did not identify with Erbakan’s constant appeals to the "usthem" dichotomy. Especially, leading Members of the Nur community who originally
were active members of the National Salvation Party began to have problems with
Erbakan’s political methods. 197 For example, Erbakan’s relations with parties on the
other side of the political spectrum were unacceptable to the Nurcu bases. After the 1973
elections, Erbakan formed a coalition government with the Republican People’s Party,
the most secular party in Turkey and long-time representatives of Kemalism. The
coalition with the Republican People’s Party, however, was not intended to be a
rapprochement between the seculars and the Islamists. It was simply a short-term
political maneuvering. Later the coalition became a point of contention between the
Republican People’s Party and the National Salvation Party when the parties accused
each other for the failure of the government.
After Nurcu members left the National Salvation Party, they began to support
Demirel’s center right Justice Party. 198 Demirel was a charismatic figure and was also
able to get support from another major religious order, the Süleymancis. 199 The
competition for support of Islamic movements caused a stir of competition among
political parties for its electoral power. Erbakan mainly stuck to his Naqshbandi wing,
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however, when he claimed to exclusively represent Islam in the political arena, his claim
became a rather dividing factor within the overall Islamic community.
The most important question surrounding Erbakan’s movement was the nature of
his relationship with the Naqshbandi order of Mehmed Zahid Kotku. Because Erbakan’s
political involvement began with Kotku’s direct confirmation and support 200, many
assumed Erbakan’s parties was representative of Islam. Kotku’s aims were similar to any
other major social religious movement in Turkey. He aspired to contribute to the creation
of a religious society headed by a political leadership more respectful to the religion. Like
his predecessors, 201 Kotku wanted the state to coexist with the society without directly
interfering in the religious realm. As a leader of a tariqah, Kotku felt that the state
apparatus was completely incapable of developing a pious believing Muslim through
social policy. For him only an incremental evolution towards higher levels of religious
belief, as promoted by the tariqah system could make a person true believer. Initially, his
goal was to form a political party that will be the voice of Muslims in the parliament in
order to make the state respectful to the Muslim rights. Like many, he was aware of the
fact that the state’s tolerance towards Islamic movements would create the social context
necessary for active Islamists to teach and guide the believers. Kotku’s ideas in this sense
aresimilar to Said Nursi’s. 202
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There was another difference between Erbakan and the Naqshbandi movement.
The political identity of the Naqshbandi movement was not formulated in contrast to an
alien ideology, political party or institution. The Naqshbandi order has always articulated
its teachings on the basis of a conservative reading of the Quran and hadith. Moreover,
Kotku maintained contact with the leaders of all major political parties, including centrist
Demirel, who happened to be the major political rival of Erbakan, and Alpaslan Türkeş,
who was an ultra-nationalist ideologue who mixed ideology with religious symbolism. 203
The semi-openness of the proselytizing activities of the Naqshbandis contradicted
Erbakan’s exclusive concern with political power through electoral victory. As a result,
the Naqshbandis began to be dissatisfied with Erbakan. His short-term coalitions with
hard-line secularists for short-term political gains were also unacceptable in their eyes.
They were open to political parties on the right; however, leftist parties like Republican
People’s Party were constantly anti-religious, which made it unacceptable for
Naqshbandis to associate with them. Basically, the Naqshbandis wanted political activism
to be an extension of social consciousness and not the creator and controller of society.
Therefore, they wanted self-professed Islamic parties to act in accordance with Islam, and
make their commitment to the parliament or other political institutions secondary.
In the 1977 elections, Erbakan’s vote declined from 12% to 9%. 204 On one hand,
this shows that Erbakan was already beginning to alienate his religious constituency by
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being overly aggressive. 205 On the other hand it shows that Erbakan’s movement was
able to mobilize 10% of the population on a consistent basis. Because of this Erbakan
was able to gradually become more or less independent from the social movement that
had been his initial base for his early business and political activity. Eventually he
alienated Kotku and began to distance himself from Erbakan’s party in public, and in
private he spoke critically of Erbakan, but was never taken seriously. Erbakan allowed
Kotku to be discontent in private as long as he was able to rely on his religious followers
for easy votes. Therefore, he maintained a low profile, and following a “wait and see”
approach that worked to his benefit. Erbakan kept his position in the movement while the
old charismatic religious leader, Kotku, passed away leaving in his place a lesser figure
his son-in-law Esad Cosan. 206
After the 1980 military coup, Erbakan and his party were banned from politics
once again but this time by the military rule. However it did not diminish the popularity
of Islamist political parties. After the military government, Erbakan established the
Welfare Party. It became a major player in the post 1980 political arena. Until 1987, due
to the ban on Erbakan, his close associates took control of the organization of the party.
Traditional Islamic communities during the military's rule preferred to continue their low
profile religious activities on the societal level. This factor was emblematic of the
differences between the traditional tariqah and the newer, younger National View
Movement founded by Erbakan.
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With Erbakan in sole control of the political party, their official rhetoric became
more anti-state and anti-western, similar to Islamist movements in the Middle East.207
There are two major reasons for this surge in spiteful political language. First, Erbakan
started to become aware in the early 1970s that his method was successful in uniting the
discontent masses behind his leadership against corrupt parties who “imitate the west”. 208
If he had moderated his language, his party would not have been able to distinguish itself
from centrist moderates. With strong religious and anti-western rhetoric Erbakan
presented himself as an alternative to the prevailing centrist parties who had been
ineffective and corrupt. A second factor might be found in the Iranian revolution and
Russian invasion of Afghanistan. In Turkey Erbakan was the first to bring Islam into
mainstream politics; he had no local precursors, so he imitated Middle Eastern countries
where political movements gained more power than the Naqshbandi grass root Islamic
movement. In order to save the ummah he envisioned a religious movement led by
populist political leadership. After 1980s, the influence of the Middle Eastern Islamist
literature and the Iranian revolution added to his desire for strict control of the general
Islamic movement.
After the military rule, civilian authority was resumed and Turgut Özal 209 came to
office in 1983. Due to the ban on his leftist opponents, Özal was able to unite the center
right and Muslim votes under the banner of his newly founded Motherland Party
(Anavatan Partisi, ANAP). His ban on certain parties that were initially banned during
207
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military rule could not remain in place because people wanted the freedom to form
parties true to their desires. He approved the referendum which lifted the ban on Erbakan
and many other major figures in 1987. From 1987 until the mid 1990s Erbakan’s new
Welfare Party was able to show only small signs of success in local and national
elections. However, it was in the local administrations that the Welfare Party gained
popularity throughout the country. In 1994, the party won an overwhelming percentage of
votes in town, city and county elections. The Welfare Party garnered a major political
achievement in the municipal election of March 1994 when the Refah party won the
mayoral elections of Turkey’s two largest cities, Istanbul and Ankara. Its electoral
success in 1994 was followed in December of 1995 in the general election. Between
these two elections the Welfare Party’s image among the public changed from a
“marginal” political party to become a nationally recognized political movement. 210
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the future Prime Minister of Turkey, won the Istanbul
County elections and became the new, young and energetic face of the Welfare Party as a
pseudo-Islamic party. Erdoğan’s success was both a result of prior success and a cause of
the Welfare Party’s future accomplishments. His election was initially a result of Welfare
Party’s name recognition. Later his skill and aptitude in solving Istanbul’s chronic water
and environmental problems solidified the Welfare Party among the electorate.
Welfare Party was able to get the most votes in the 1995 general elections, with
over 21% of the general vote. Itwon 158 seats in the 550-seat parliament. Welfare Party
tried to form a coalition government with other centrist secular parties, the Motherland
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Party 211 and the True Path Party (Dogru Yol Partisi, DYP), but they opted out of a
coalition with Erbakan and built a coalition with each other. Historically rival parties
Motherland Party and True Path Party formed the coalition under Motherland Party’s
leader Mesut Yilmaz, as Prime Minister, and True Path Party’s leader Tansu Ciller as his
deputy. This coalition later disintegrated amidst corruption charges. Ciller left the ANAYOL 212 coalition and formed a new coalition government in June 1996 with Erbakan in
exchange for pardoning the charges against her in the parliament.
Ciller was suspected by many of corruption and bribery because of her
unaccounted and conspicuous wealth. Also during the previous election campaigns, she
attacked some conservative Muslim politicians with the terrorist label. Though she was
an unlikely partner, Erbakan used her seats in the parliament to form a coalition
government. His policy, since 1973, was based on political pragmatism and bridge
building. This was not welcomed by the Naqshbandis and those who voted on the basis of
Islamic identity. With the support of Ciller, secular Turkey had its first islamically
oriented party since the founding of the republic. Ciller was subjected to harsh criticism
from secular circles for this alliance, but this was the only way for her to protect herself
from prosecution. 213 Erbakan became the Prime Minister and Ciller Minister of Foreign
Affairs and Deputy Prime Minister. With the support of Erbakan’s party corruption
charges against her were dropped in the parliament. 214 Abdullah Gül who later became
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the President on the Justice and Development Party ticket in 2007 became, speaker of the
cabinet while Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, outside of the cabinet, was the mayor of Istanbul.
Erbakan's foreign policy was, at least symbolically, directed towards the Middle
East and Muslim countries. Contrary to established foreign policy, he made his first
foreign visit to Tehran to meet with then President Muhammad Khatemi. 215 The result of
his trip was a $20 billion deal with Iran to import natural gas. 216 Erbakan used other
occasions to promote his agenda in foreign relations and initiated the D-8 summit in his
first year. D-8 stands for the union of eight developing countries. All the members are
Muslim majority countries, which made Erbakan’s project, at least for the opponents, an
islamic union. The members of D-8 are Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Bangladash, Nigeria,
Indonesia, Malaysia and Egypt; they are already members of Organization of Islamic
Conference (OIC). Some of the party members supported D-8 as an alternative to EU. 217
Erbakan considered it risky to align solely with the trans-Atlantic countries. His
visit to oil rich Iran and establishing D-8 were attempts to diversify the foreign policy
options available to Turkey. However, he was never able to explain the benefits of these
policies in terms of Turkey’s national interests. Erbakan’s policies appeared to be a
useless deviation from mainstream thinking rather than an improvement of it. His foreign
policy choices did not leave a positive impression on domestic or international observers.
An example of this failure was his visit to Libya. The visit was a total fiasco. In front of
the press, Muammar Gaddafi publicly humiliated the Turkish government because of its
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treatment of Kurdish people. Erbakan’s silence turned the majority of the public opinion
against him. The Libya trip was a major problem for the members of Erbakan’s own
party too. 218 In an attempt to balance Erbakan’s pro-Islamic policies, the Turkish
military, unilaterally, began to establish relations with Israel in an unprecedented way. 219
As a result, during Erbakan’s tenure, military involvement in politics increased. Cevik
Bir, Deputy Chief of Genenral Staff, openly called Iran and Syria the main threats to
Turkish security. He argued that it is the Turkish-Israeli cooperation that stabilizes the
region against the terrorist threats (of these countries). 220
An event organized by one of Erbakan’s mayors in the city of Sincan in the
suburbs of Ankara caused a major problem for Islamists. It was organized around an
important foreign policy issue for Muslims. With the help of the Iranian Embassy in
Turkey the Mayor of Sincan organized “Kudus Gecesi” (Jerusalem Night) to show
solidarity with the Palestinians. During the program pro-Hamas slogans were chanted and
the Iranian Ambassador gave a speech. Secularists saw this as an Islamist threat to the
secular state. A few days later local tank divisions rolled into the streets of Sincan,
making a direct warning to the Islamists. Tensions between the military and the Islamist
government were at their highest during the monthly National Security Council
meetings. These meetings were constitutionally arranged and semi-binding events held
between the Government and the Army. The meetings are organized by the secretariat
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which is held by an Army general and headed by the President. In the February 28, 1997
meeting, the National Security Council advised the government by means of a binding
resolution that took very harsh measures against religious practice. 221
The National Security Council resolution included both symbolic and practical
measures. During this era Islamism was declared, by the military, a greater threat than the
PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party), which is a terrorist group who is responsible for killing
over twenty thousand civilians. 222 The NSC asked the government to enforce a secular
dress code in government buildings and universities. This was the beginning of what has
transformed into a controversy over the headscarf in Turkey. Secondly, and most
importantly, the February 28 resolutions transformed the educational system in Turkey in
its entirety. Primary school education was extended from five years to eight years. From
the outset this was an educational reform program that in its essence sought to limit the
influence of religion in the public schools. This decision resulted in the closure of general
vocational high schools as well as Imam-Hatip schools (for imams and preachers; they
are the leading institutions for religious education in Turkey). The military junta of 1997
curtailed all and more of the religious freedom introduced after the 1980 military
intervention. Throughout his political career, Erbakan was open and supportive of the
Imam-Hatip schools and religious education. However, the pressure put on him by the
military establishment forced him to act out of character.
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The ban on religious education was not limited to public Imam Hatip schools; it
applied to Quranic schools as well. Quranic schools were not part of the mainstream
education system in Turkey. Religious foundations responsible for educating hafiz
(preservers: those who memorize the entire Quran by heart) usually ran the Quranic
schools. Like Imam Hatip schools, Quranic schools were the main centres where
Islamists had strong control. Their students were able to pursue both secular and religious
educations. For instance, students at these schools generally did not attend the regular
schools but were able to obtain a diploma by taking the standardized exams at the end of
the school term. In this way, Islamists were able to isolate their kids from the influence of
the government curriculum which due to a measure passed during February 28
processprohibited religious education to children before they entered high school. On the
other hand, Quranic education was limited to government-controlled courses which were
only offered during the summer term.
Though Erbakan attempted to placate the army and the secular bureaucracy his
passivity had the opposite effect. In May 21, 1997, the state prosecutor filed a motion to
close the Welfare Party; it was accused of anti-secular activities. Erbakan and his
coalition partner, Ciller, began to discuss whether they should change positions, Erbakan
becoming deputy Prime Minister and Ciller taking over the Prime Minister’s office.
However, there was a growing dissatisfaction within the Muslim community, including
Erbakan’s National View, over the new anti-religious laws and the fact that Erbakan had
compromised the interests of his constituency in order to maintain power. They
considered the secular bureaucratic campaign against them as a serious threat to their
identity. Erbakan had assumed that the threat was only to his position in office.
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His constituency was more concerned with preserving some of the gains in
religious freedom made over the past few decades than with the position of the party’s
leader. For example Abdullah Gül, who later left Erbakan’s movement and formed a new
party, 223 in an interview said that he warned Erbakan and his associates not to sign the 28
February resolutions. Gül and others would have preferred for them to resign their
government positions in protest of military coercion. 224 However, Erbakan did not want
to leave office until the very last moment. Eventually Erbakan’s government resigned
from the office in June 18, 1997. Confronting the possibility of the party’s closure,
Erbakan’s attorney Ismail Alptekin established a new party, Virtue Party in December 17,
1997. In January 16 1998, the Welfare Party was closed and its leadership banned from
politics for 5 years. The Welfare Party was the third party associated with the Islamic
National View Movement that was closed by the constitutional court.
This moment marks the beginning of changes for Islamic parties in Turkey. The
Virtue Party replaced the Welfare Party but at the time it was not clear who should lead
the party because Erbakan was banned from politics. The general tendency in the
movement was to follow Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s leadership. Erbakan, who unwillingly
approved Erdoğan’s earlier bid for Istanbul Mayor, rejected this option. He did not want
the party to have a charismatic successor capable of overshadowing him. Erdoğan's
record in Istanbul as an independent leader, rather than a loyal follower of Erbakan,
threatened to marginalize the party ideologue. Erbakan had earlier disapproved the
candidacy of Erdoğan for the Istanbul Mayoral position; it was only as a result of the
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appeals from the Istanbul branch of the party that Erbakan accepted Erdoğan’s candidacy.
This time Erbakan did not bow to pressure. Eventually an old associate of his, Recai
Kutan, became the leader of the party. The party fell into chaos again. 225
Due to his mayoral responsibilities Erdoğan was not involved in the party
management, but his influence was beginning to surpass his official position. Many
scholars overemphasize Erdoğan’s leading role in the opposition movement against
Erbakan. However, it can be argued that Abdullah Gül was the main oppositional figure.
Immediately after the establishment of the Virtue Party, Abdullah Gül started to assert his
personal style within the party and among the discontented members of the party. Some
critical issues increased the division between Erbakan and Gül’s supporters. Although
Erbakan was banned from politics he did not want to lose his control of the party. 226
This frustrated the younger generation who wanted to change the party’s
confrontational tactics. This new generation, who wanted to reform the ideological
content of the movement's message, are known as the “reformists” (yenilikciler). 227 The
revivalists within the party were fond of and respectful towards Abdullah Gül; he had
always been known as a soft spoken, polite and respectful of the ‘establishment.’ But
after the military coup and the co-optation of Erbakan, Gül began to voice the discontent
of the younger generation. At the time nobody ever imagined Gül would one day be the
Prime Minister or President of Turkey.
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Gül was born in 1950 in the city of Kayseri in Central Turkey. Kayseri is famous
for its flamboyant business environment, rich businessmen and Muslim culture. 228 He
went to college in Istanbul and majored in Economics. He did his MA and PhD work
under Sabahattin Zaim, a famous Muslim professor of labor economics. Zaim was a
scholar whose students later played major roles in Turkish politics. For example, with his
support Gül went to London to pursue graduate research. 229 Although Gül entered his
political life in Erbakan’s party, his earlier life was dedicated to the mainstream Muslim
communities. However in the case of Abdullah Gül and many other members of new
political elite who established Justice and Development Party, its is an understudied fact
that these people do not come from one ideological block. 230
After finishing graduate studies, Gül returned to Turkey and began teaching
economics in a newly founded state university in Sakarya, near Istanbul. After 1983,
Abdullah Gül left academia and joined the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) located in
Saudi Arabia. IDB is organized under the Organization of Islamic Conference which
represents Muslim countries in the UN. In 1991, Abdullah Gül joined the Welfare Party
and promoted their policies in his hometown Kayseri. He held important positions both in
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the party and the government. Due to his European and Middle Eastern experiences, he
came to represent the party in the international arena. His image as a soft spoken
moderate Muslim leader was an asset to the Welfare Party. Before he became the rising
voice of the opposition in the party, Gül articulated the National View Movement's
foreign policy.
In the April 18, 1999 elections, the Virtue Party received only 15% of the general
vote, an almost 30% decrease. Abdullah Gül and his friends blamed the party
administration for the failure in the elections. In the first party congress Abdullah Gül,
who was forty years younger than Erbakan, challenged one of his candidates and openly
declared his candidacy for the party leadership. It was unheard of within the Welfare
Party to contradict Erbakan; party members had become accustomed to Erbakan dictating
policy by fiat rather than consultation. Erbakan and his close associates had become
elitist, viewing themselves as the leaders of the Islamic community. Erbakan identified
the interests of the nation and of Islam in general with his personal rise to power. His
previous term in office demonstrates the danger of identity politics and an excessive
reliance on the state.
Erbakan, although, came from a traditional, mosque-based Tariqah approach
when he was forced to make a choice between the needs of religious Muslims and his
own position he chose the latter. 231 However, the reformist generation within the party
gave primacy to the needs of the masses, used milder language and strategies, and
actually promoted Islamic identity. Abdullah Gül rose as a leading figure among the

231

Famous Islamic poet Necip Fazil has similar ideas. Kisakurek 1998.

104

dissatisfied within the party while Erdoğan supported him from outside. Apparently,
ordinary members of the party welcomed Gül’s method. However, Abdullah Gül still lost
the election to Recai Kutan by a count of 633 votes to 521 votes.
After the elections in the party congress, the divide between so-called
traditionalists and reformists increased. The traditionalists tried to marginalize the
reformists from influence in any post. No reformist, or non-loyalist of Erbakan and his
allies, was given any administrative positions. The unexpected success of the reformists
was a major threat to the party elites who tried to clean the reformists from the party
ranks before the next election so that these dissidents could not join the parliament. It was
the first time the National View Movement had such large scale opposition within the
party. 232
However, in June 2001 the Constitutional Court closed the Virtue Party, the
fourth political party of the National View Movement. After the closure of Welfare Party,
nobody expected a ban on the Virtue Party, which appeared to be substantively different
from its predecessors. The reason for this legal action by the state was that Erbakan,
though legally banned from politics, was involved in inner party disputes on behalf of his
associates. Right after its closure, under the auspices of Erbakan, members of the
National View Movement established the Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi, SP). At this
point, the question remained whether the reformers who had lost the party congress to the
traditionalists would join the new party? But tensions among the parliamentarians of the
former Virtue Party was increasing. Consequently, in August 2001 Erdoğan and his
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followers established the Justice and Development Party and fifty-two lawmakers of the
banned Virtue Party joined the Justice and Development Party.
In the party meetings in and around city of Fatih, which was traditionally
Naqshbandi and pro-Erbakan, many previous National View Movement members who
had just joined Justice and Development Party needed to give an explanation because,
until then there were no major public signs of dissatisfaction among party members
against Erbakan. It was the first time many members learned the inner workings of the
party. Some began to debate about how Erbakan was able to create a base of loyal
followers. In one of the meetings, one Justice and Development Party member
specifically told the audience how the myth of “mujahid” Erbakan was created within the
National View Movement. He said that all the party members thought Erbakan was
involved in a sacred struggle. This idea gave Erbakan unquestioned legitimacy in the face
of criticism. Just like other charismatic leaders Erbakan became autocratic. The negative
tactic of formulating identity in contrast to an imaginary "other" was the essence of his
political style. Within the discourse of party members Erbakan directed his criticism and
anger at the west, the United States, or Israel. This tactic gradually socialized National
View Movement members into the politics of fear and identity. When members from
within the party questioned his decisions, such as the anti-religious laws he supported, he
had them branded as traitors and enemies.
Erbakan’s method was more appealing than the Naqshbandi method which was
losing its influence especially among the new generation of young Muslims. Those who
were fed up with the Kemalist system wanted a quick revolution. Traditional tariqahs
emphasized gradual change, first of the individual, and then of his environment.
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Erbakan’s method was typical of mass movements under strict control by an elitist cadre.
The unquestioned nature of shariah is blended with political issues so that the holders of
sacred positions who serve shariah could deflect criticism onto a constructed foe or just
claim authority based on the cause.
Four former members of National View Movement mainly led the Justice and
Development Party: Abdullatif Sener, a successful finance professor and long time
activist; Abdullah Gül; Bulent Arinc, a leading figure in the movement and friend of
Erbakan; and, Erdoğan, former mayor of Istanbul, who had just finished a prison sentence
for political reasons. Erdoğan was mainly active in the Istanbul branch. The other three
major figures were active in National View Movement party headquarters, close to
Erbakan. Although Erdoğan was famous within the National View Movement, his name
became well known publicly only after he came to the office as the mayor of Istanbul.
Istanbul, with its 14 million residents and major businesses, has been the heart of the
Turkish economy.
When Erdoğan began to successfully address the major issues of this metropolis,
his popularity soared and he became a household name. Erdoğan was distinguished on
the basis of his ability and merit. Turkish voters, especially the younger generation,
wanted a leader that was capable of solving problems and not self-absorbed, like
Erbakan, or corrupt, like his predecessors. Although the other three leaders were well
regarded within the party, they all came to an agreement on Tayyip Erdoğan’s leadership.
With his charisma, Erdoğan was able to win the support of the new party members and a
significant portion of the electorate in the next election campaign. Six months after its
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establishment, in the November 2002 general elections, Justice and Development Party
came to power with over 34% of the popular vote.
For many scholars there are not many differences between Erbakan and his
former students. In one of his old speeches Tayyip Erdoğan said “Our mission is not one
simple-minded fight or world conquest; it is to spread and promote the rule of the religion
of Allah. The first condition of this mission is peace and concord.” Serif Mardin
interprets this speech as “cautiousness related to the banning of Islamist organizations by
the military regime established after the 1980 coup.” 233 The Justice and Development
Party has had to deal with these types of suspicion since the day it was established.
Opponents asked the same critical question: is Justice and Development Party different
from Islamist National View or is it practicing taqiyya (dissimulation)? Will Erdoğan, as
in Algeria and Iran cases, pose a threat to the democratic system? Will he turn Turkey
into a fundamentalist theocratic state? To answer this question we need to focus on his
personal and political Erdoğan.
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was born in 1954 in Istanbul. His father was a devout
Muslim. Erdoğan was born in the Islamic month of Recep (Rajab). Therefore, his father
named him after this holy month. 234 Erdoğan’s family was from Rize, a black sea region
town known for its conservative-Muslim population. Financially, Erdoğan’s family was
underprivileged; therefore, until his college years, Erdoğan worked for street vendor
selling water or traditional Turkish donuts. He went to the Imam Hatip Schools. Many
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practicing Muslim families preferred Imam Hatip schools which are funded by the
government. These schools are originally intended to educate prayer leaders in the
mosques in line with government interests. Erdoğan’s political life began in high school,
where he was involved passionately in the National View Movement activities. He was
the head of the High School branch of the National Turkish Students Union (Milli Turk
Talebe Birligi in Turkish, MTTB). 235 MTTB has widely known for its Muslim student
activities.
Although he attended Islamic school, in college he did not pursue a career in
theology. In college, he attended to the Management department of Marmara University
in Istanbul. In his college years, he was active in party politics. Right after college, he
entered into business life with a prestigious company while continuing his political
activities in the National View Movement. He had a successful tenure in city and county
offices of the National View Movement. In the 1980s he helped to increase the influence
of National View Movement’s Welfare Party among different segments of society.
Istanbul was his political arena and he managed his conduct and professional life in such
a way that he became appealing to all segments of society, not just those who practiced
Islam or embraced identity politics. He was a major reason for the success of the National
View Movement in the 1990s.
The rising star in politics at the time, however, was Turgut Özal, another
Naqshbandi turned politician. Previously, Özal was a successful undersecretary of the
Prime Minister in charge of economic affairs. Coming from the Naqshbandi background
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he and his brother Korkut were active in political life. Because of their religious
background, the Özal brothers were known as “brothers wearing takunya” (takunyali
biraderler). Takunya, a traditional wooden sandal, is mostly used in mosques to get
ablution before the daily prayers. The Özal brothers openly practicing their religion, used
to wear these sandals and noisily walk through the hallways of the government offices
making everybody hear that they are getting ready for the daily prayers.
The military was aware of his religious character, the international and financial
expertise of Özal made him indispensible to the military government of the 1980. As a
result, he continued to work as the top bureaucrat in charge of economic affairs. A few
years later, Özal left the government and decided to run for Prime Minister. With years of
government employment and international experience, the Özal brothers were more
pragmatic than the ideologically committed Erdoğan at the time. Later, Turgut Özal’s
younger brother Korkut played an advisory role to Erdoğan after Erdoğan established
Justice and Development Party.
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During the 1980s, Erdoğan and Erbakan contrast

sharply with the Özal brothers, though both of them come from the same Naqshbandi
background. 237 The Özal brothers had more government experience than the Erbakan and
Erdoğan. As a result, the pragmatic Naqshbandi members supported Turgut Özal’s
Motherland Party.
Neither of these conflicting political lines, however, was monolithic either.
Earlier, Tayyip Erdoğan who was also politically strict had differed from Erbakan in
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many areas. This was especially noticeable when he became the party president in a
highly cosmopolitan district of Beyoglu in Istanbul. Beyoglu has traditionally been the
“French Quarter” of the city. It hosted the Consulate of France, semi-private French High
schools and more importantly historic churches and synagogues with their congregations.
On the other hand, Beyoglu has been a hub for not only the religious minorities but also
the entertainment center for the secular Turks with pubs and bars spread throughout the
historic neighborhood.
When Tayyip Erdoğan began working in Beyoglu, his party base was literally
nonexistent among the residents. After successful campaigning by paying visits to bars
and pubs and getting in contact with the religious minorities, Tayyip Erdoğan was able to
make his party one of the most appealing ones. He lost the Beyoglu city election with a
slim margin and was able to popularize his name among his supporters and party officials
as a successful leader who could win votes from a variety of voting blocks. This was the
primary difference between him and Erbakan. He continued as the president of the
Welfare Party in Istanbul and prepared for the coming local elections.
As stated before, after long discussions within the party ranks, in 1994 Erdoğan
became a candidate for mayor of Istanbul, but Erbakan did not want him to be the
candidate from the National View Movement because Erbakan doubted his personal
loyalty. With the backing of prominent party members, Erbakan unwillingly made
Erdoğan the candidate for Istanbul County. The secular media attacked Erdoğan on
religious grounds; the Muslim community supported him because he was their ‘fellow
Muslim brother’. Islamic communities such as the Nur and Gülen movements, which did
not vote for the National View Movement for a long time, openly supported Erdoğan.
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Erdoğan was also able to mobilize the female vote. Contrary to many political parties
including his own Erdoğan paid great attention to the women’s branch. As long as the
new techniques were in line with his moral vision Erdoğan accepted their use on the basis
of pragmatism. He revolutionized the role of women in the party; they, in turn,
voluntarily visited many underdeveloped sections of the city to ask for support of
Erdoğan. As a result, many segments of society, including conservative Muslim families,
and others from center right ideologies voted for Erdoğan. With a slight margin, he won
the election.
Erdoğan's success helped him win his election campaign. The key to his success
was that he managed the administrative tasks of mayor as well as all the public services
very efficiently. Before his term in office, there were major problems with air pollution,
traffic, water distribution, and garbage collection. As his name became the public
recognition for his party, even Erbakan mentioned him to show how successful the party
was. However, Erdoğan’s relations with Erbakan were not good. Although Erbakan was
his leader, Erdoğan wanted to maintain control over his office. He did not let other party
members get involved in his job. As he became more independent his relations with
Erbakan deteriorated. Erbakan’s involvement from above was destabilizing Erdoğan’s
coordination where he was used to being the sole decision maker.
His popularity increased to such an extent that he soon became a popular public
speaker throughout the country. He was invited to party events in the cities where local
party officials wanted to attract non-affiliated voters. In one of these events he went to a
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southeastern Anatolian city named Siirt. 238 The reason Erdoğan attended a rally in Siirt
was because his wife's family was from there and he wanted to win the support of the
citizens. In the rally, Erdoğan gave a motivational speech where he quoted a poem of the
Turkish Poet Ziya Gokalp. Ziya Gokalp was the intellectual father of Mustafa Kemal
Ataturk, the founder of Turkey. 239 The poem later became a part of a major controversy
that transformed Erdoğan’s political life. The most controversial part of the poem was the
following part.
“The mosques are our barracks,
The domes our helmets
The minarets are our bayonets
The Believers our soldiers” 240
For Erdoğan it was an ordinary speaking engagement. As usual, he quoted many
other poems throughout his speech. For Erdoğan the main connection uniting the people
of Siirt and rest of the nation was Islamic identity. However, prosecutors felt that his
reference to believers and religious symbols was provocative. They filed a lawsuit against
him in 1997, and in accordance with the article 312 of the penal code, in April 1998 he
was charged with openly inciting enmity among the people by referring to differences
pertaining religion, language and race. For many, this was an attempt by the secular
establishment to sabotage Erdoğan’s political future. He was sentenced to a term of six
months prisonwhich constitutionally barred him from seeking elected office.
238

Siirt is in the southeast Turkey but contrary to most other cities in the region it is not a Kurdish majority
city. Arabic descent Turkish citizens make up the majority of the population in Siirt. As the boundaries
between Turkey and Syria were drawn by the Allies right after the WWI, the geo-cultural realities often
times were disregarded.
239

On Gokalp’s ideology see Yavuz 1993.

240

Mecham 2004, 345.

113

Rather than ending his political career, the prison sentence increased Erdoğan’s
appeal in the eyes of Turks who often sympathize with the victims of injustice. People
with centrist leanings began to think positively about Erdoğan because the poem he used
was originally published in official school textbooks and widely known among them. The
political sentence also heightened Erdoğan’s status within the National View Movement;
he appealed to a wider audience than the traditional National View Movement
constituency. After his prison sentence ended, Erdoğan began to organize with a diverse
group of people from different social backgrounds, but mainly former National View
Movement members. He called his movement Movement of the Righteous (Erdemliler
Hareketi) which later became the Justice and Development Party in July 2001. Fortyeight lawmakers of the Virtue Party joined the Justice and Development Party. 241
Together with former National View Movement members, the Justice and
Development Party organized a coalition of politicians from centrist parties like the True
Path Party, the Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetci Hareket Partisi, MHP) and the
Motherland Party. It was difficult for Erdoğan to keep the party together in the beginning
years. Erdoğan was known as a micromanager and insisted on handpicking each party
official. His absolute control caused some early departures, especially from the members
who joined the party from other political parties. 242 Due to the political ban Erdoğan
himself was not a member of the parliament. Legally he was allowed to become a party
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member but not a prime Minister or a lawmaker; yet, he was leading the party during the
elections to decide who would rule the country. Under these circumstances, Justice and
Development Party attended its first election and won 34.3% of the popular vote,
becoming the first majority party government in almost two decades. Only the
Republican People’s Party passed the 10% national threshold.
Due to Erdoğan’s political ban Abdullah Gül became the Prime Minister. Gül and
Erdoğan were able to cooperate within a party system where authority is generally
centralized, though both of them have autocratic temperaments. It was a suprising
situation for Turkish political history because charismatic leaders, like Erbakan, never let
other charismatic leaders overshadow them. Previously, there were debates about whether
Erdoğan would let Gül to be the Prime Minister. Contrary to Erbakan’s method of
choosing loyal members over competent ones, Erdoğan and Gül proved that they were
different from Erbakan where they were able to overcome selfish political desires.
Abdullah Gül’s appointment to Prime Minister caused two problems, for the party
and the political system. For the party it created a dual leadership between the Prime
Minister and the powerful party president. This had the effect of creating double
loyalties. The most important problem was for the political system. The main opposition
leader was Deniz Baykal, an ardent secularist and opponent of Erdoğan. He declared that
he did not want to see the leader of the winning party banned from politics. With the
support of Baykal, the parliament amended the constitution and Erdoğan’s ban was
removed. He was able to run for office again. Six months after the elections Erdoğan was
elected to the parliament from the city of Siirt. As soon as Erdoğan was elected Abdullah
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Gül resigned, allowing Erdoğan to become Prime Minister; Gül became Minister of
Foreign Affairs and deputy Prime Minister.
After the election, Erdoğan began to visit the capitals of European countries. After
he established personal contacts with his counterparts in Europe, he began implementing
reforms to democratize the country opening order to help Turkey gain EU membership.
The Penal code was changed, legal aspects of human rights problems were improved, and
democratic reforms began to be implemented. 243 Erdoğan’s relations with Muslim
countries were balanced. For example, he developed Turkey’s relations with Greece
while also engaging more proactively with Muslim Middle East countries. However, he
never used Islam as political message in his foreign policy rhetoric. Contrary to Erbakan,
Erdoğan’s main priority has always been EU membership. 244 Erbakan paid his first visit
to Iran to symbolize the orientation of his foreign policy. Erdoğan did the opposite, going
to Europe to push for EU membership for Turkey. This era marks the highest level of
Europeanization and democratization, more so than the Kemalists. 245 However, during
Erdoğan’s tenure the debates continued whether he was sincere in the reforms or secretly
wanting to pursue Islamic agenda.
In this chapter, I tried to demonstrate that the rise of Erbakan does not necessarily
correspond in any substantial way with the gradual Islamization of Turkish society. The
division within the party when Nur community and Qadiri tariqah members left
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Erbakan’s party shows how different Islamic communities did have different opinions
about the so called Islamic methods utilized in the political arena. Erbakan’s success is
more representative of a broad public discontent with the other political parties on issues
of efficiency, ethics, and corruption. Especially after 1990s, the success of the city
mayors (Tayyip Erdogan being the most important one) in local governments contributed
to Erbakan’s rise as the first Islamist prime minister. His ideological appeal was only a
secondary factor in his electoral success in 1995. As his rhetoric became increasingly
inflammatory, he lost the political support of the Nakshbendi tariqah and later the nonreligious vote. This eventually contributed to the rise of the Justice and Development
Party, who learned from Erbakan the limits of rhetoric in maintaining public confidence.
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Chapter V: NUR AND GULEN MOVEMENTS: HAQIQAH
In this chapter, I argue that, the Nur and Gülen movements are modernist as well
as traditionalists; they seek a middle-way to address problems endemic to modernity.
Their traditionalism is based on the belief that the Quran is the last and most complete
form of revelation, and as such can guide Muslim. They are modernists in the sense that
they engage the changes inherent in modernity and are positive toward scientific
advancements; i.e. they do not dismiss modernity in its scientific aspect, but they strongly
criticize secularism as a self-professed universal ideology. Nursi wanted to contain the
radical intrusion of modernity on Islam by returning to the primary sources of religious
knowledge and making them relevant to the modern condition.
Bediuzzaman Said Nursi inspired the most influential Islamic social movement in
Turkey. 246 The movement that has gathered around his ideas has overshadowed the
historically dominant Naqshbandi order. There are different variants of this movement.
This section will focus on the ideas of Said Nursi and Fethullah Gülen. Although the
Gülen community is not recognized by the “Nur” title, both of these movements are
commonly referred to as “the Nur community” or “Nurculuk”. The Nur community is a
spiritual legacy of Said Nursi’s interpretation (tafseer) of the Quran; Nursi taught that the
Quran is a source of divine light (Nur) that has the power to enlighten humanity. 247 The
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books he authored are known as Risale-i Nur (Epistles of Light) 248, which later became
the name of the community: Risale-i Nur community or simply Nur community.
Said Nursi deserves attention because he was able to inspire a movement
grounded on purely Islamic values without creating an “other”. To understand the
development and transformation of Nursi’s approach to Islam we need to study the
different stages in his life. His life has three important epochs. In the first phase, he was
actively involved in politics until his visit to the National Parliament of Ankara in 1922
which was established by Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk) and his friends. This phase is called
Old Said (Eski Said). The second era began at the end of the Ottoman Empire and with
the rise of the new republic. After he returned to Ankara from Istanbul, Nursi retired from
his political activities and began to live a semi-secluded life in the city of Van, while the
country was steadily being secularized from the top down. This era is called the New
Said (Yeni Said). The “Third Said” Era (Ucuncu Said) more or less corresponds to the
beginning of the multi-party era when the Democrat Party (Demokrat Party, DP) won the
majority vote against the Republican People’s Party in 1950 until Nursi’s death in 1960.
The Democrat Party promoted tolerant policies towards Muslims and Islam; Nursi openly
supported them against the Republican People’s Party.
Old Said Era (until 1920s):
Said Nursi was born in southeastern Turkey
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during the turbulent years of the late

Ottoman era. His hometown, Bitlis, was a major center for Islamic scholarly research.
248

Initially, Nursi named his books “Kelimat.” A Turkish word of Arabic origin Kelimat, means the Words.

249

There are different accounts of when Said Nursi was born. Conversion problems between three different
calendars caused this confusion. Two calendars used during the Ottoman era were Hicri (Islamic Lunar)
calendar which was used for religious issues and Rumi (Ottoman Solar) calendar for administrative and

119

This Kurdish city was second only to Istanbul in the training of religious sciences. 250 This
region was officially named Kurdistan because the majority of the population was
Kurdish Muslims. 251 Nursi was Kurdish and learned Turkish in his late teens long after
he mastered in Arabic and Persian, the two major languages taught in the traditional
madrasa system in the Ottoman era. Majority of his writings either were originally in
Arabic or penned down Turkish by his students. Nursi was born into a Sayyid family that
was descendants of the prophet Muhammad. 252 Being a descendant of prophet
Muhammad has been a source of legitimacy for the ulema in the Islamic world in general
and the Ottomans in particular. 253 Vahide states that Nursi’s family was members of the
Khalid al-Baghdadi branch of the Naqshbandi order. 254 Therefore Naqshbandi scholars
gave him his first informal training in the Islamic sciences, especially the study of

economic issues. After 1926, Miladi (Gregorian) calendar began to be used. By interpreting some
information in Nursi’s own books, Mardin, Kosoglu and many others argue that Nursi was born in 1873.
Sahiner, the most famous biographer of Nursi, argues that Nursi was born in 1876. However, Nursi’s
autobiography states that Nursi was born in 1877. Most recently, after a detailed analysis, an editorial
article in Koprü (a journal published by young generation Nur scholars in Istanbul) argued that Nursi was
born in 1878. I take 1878 as the most accurate account. For more see Mardin 1989; Kosoglu 2004, 25;
Sahiner 2006, 40; Nursi 1996, 2122; Risale-i Nur Enstitusu 2000.
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jurisprudence 255. However, Nursi never became a formal member of a Naqshbandi
tariqah. 256 In spite of the dominance of the Naqshbandi tariqah in the region, he instead
insisted on his self-proclaimed spiritual adherence to the teachings of Abdulkadir
Geylani. 257 Nursi often showed a mastery over the traditional curriculum, despite his
somewhat attenuated educational career. 258
In the following years, Nursi pursued a career as a local master teaching while
also acting as an arbitrator between the rival tribes in the region. Due to his independent
resistance to influence from the religious and political authorities, he was named Mullah
Said the Famous (Molla Said-i Meşhur). Because of this reputation, he was able to
establish relationships with the local and regional authorities, i.e., governors. Sometime
after 1896, Nursi met with Tahir Pasha, the governor of the city of Van. Tahir Pasha’s
political and official activities informed Nursi about contemporary debates in Europe. He
became Nursi’s gateway to the political and philosophical discussions in Europe
concerning the future of Islam and the Ottoman Empire. 259 One day Tahir Pasha
informed Nursi that the secretary of the British House of Commons made remarks
insulting to Muslims, their faith and the place of the Qur’an in their lives. From
newspaper clippings that Tahir Pasha showed to Nursi, it became clear that Britain and
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other regional players from Europe would disunite the Muslim world by demeaning Islam
and Qur’an as its unifying factor. 260 Nursi was motivated by the threat that hegemonic
powers would attack Islam as a source of identity and empowerment among believers, to
study Islam and make the promotion of the faith his life's work. 261
Despite living in isolation from the large cosmopolitan cities, Nursi was following
events both inside and outside of the country. He was informed about the major
developments in the world. However, his focus was mainly on the changes within the
Islamic world and the activity and perspective of reformist groups. In his book Divan-i
Harbi Örfi Nursi states that “my predecessors in this matter (Islamic Unity –Ittihad) are
Sheikh Cemaleddin-i Efgani (Afghani), the late Mufti of Egypt [Muhammad] Abduh,
from the extremist [Turkish] scholars Ali Suavi, Hoca Tahsin and those who took Islamic
Unity as their goals like Namik Kemal and Sultan Selim.” 262 Similar to Namik Kemal,
one of the major figures of Ottomanist thought, Nursi wanted constitutionalism which
will bring rule of law, freedom and and most importantly consultation 263 which he
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considered as an Islamic requirement. Sultan Selim, on the other hand, wanted to bring
all Muslims under a loosely connected administrative body. 264
At this time, he realized that the traditional form of Islamic theology (kalam) was
incapable of providing guidance and solutions to the challenges facing Islam. 265 Nursi’s
followers argue that he did extensive readings in modern sciences at the residence of the
governor. For traditional scholars (ulema) of the Ottoman madrasa system this was a
challenging reform. 266 Displeased by the progressive deterioration of the social and
economic well being of the people, he began to look for new ways of reforming society
via the educational system. In one of his later works, he proposes three primary reasons
for the decay of the Islamic world: poverty (fakirlik), ignorance (cehalet) and (civil)
unrest-conflicts (ihtilaf). In addition, he proposed three solutions to these problems:
science (marifet), art (san’at) and unity (ittifak). 267
The instrument Nursi intended to use to mediate and solve these problems was an
educational institution, a university that could study and enact changes based on modern
sciences and religion. 268 In order to overcome the obstacles in the Muslim world in
general and Eastern Turkey in particular he wanted to utilize the positive role of Islam in
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society via education. 269 The problems of ignorance and turmoil in the Muslim world, for
Nursi, could only be resolved if people followed religious principles. Nursi wanted to
unite regional communities from different backgrounds through the Medresetu’z-Zehra
project. Therefore in the new university (in Nursi’s words house of sciences, darul funun)
education would be in Arabic (vacip, meaning obligatory); Kurdish would be the second
language (caiz, meaning permitted) and Turkish would be electives (lazim, meaning
necessary). 270 Although Nursi was in a highly Naqshbandi setting his university project
was beyond Naqshbandi imagination which was limited to local madrasas. 271 The
university project was unorthodox, unusually modern flavored 272 but necessary for Nursi.
The reason Nursi produced a “modern flavored” project, however, was because the
problems faced by his society were the products of modernity. He was flexible enough to
accommodate global challenges within his own educational and cultural boundaries. As a
result, after long years of establishing himself as a respected scholar in the eastern parts
of the Empire, he left for Istanbul, the capital city of the Ottoman Empire, hoping to meet
the Sultan in order to receive funding for his university project. It was late 1907 and
Nursi was around 30 years old. 273
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When Nursi came to Istanbul, he found himself in the midst of debates regarding
new ideas of constitutionalism, freedom and westernization. During these years, Nursi
was heavily involved in political debates. After the proclamation of the Second
Constitution (Ikinci Mesrutiyet) 274 in July 1908, he gave lectures in support of the
declaration of the constitution and the importance of freedom [of thought] for the wellbeing of the Islamic community. 275 The Second Constitution toppled the famous Ottoman
Sultan, Abdulhamid II. Due to his pious life and strong support for Jerusalem and
Palestine, he was a hero for many Islamists. However, in the opinion of Nursi,
Abdulhamid’s authoritarian character precluded him from being considered heroic
because his management style was ultimately counterproductive. 276
He discussed the applicability of constitutionalism and its role in strengthening
Islamic unity, and made the additional argument for a renewed focus on education as the
most important way of promoting Islam in Turkish society. These discussions resulted in
two important books: The Reasonings (Muhakemat) and The Debates (Munazarat),
published in 1911 and 1913, respectively. 277 As a result of his publications and public
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appearences, coming from the periphery of power center in Turkey, Said Nursi was quite
successful in winning the recognition and respect of two major classes in Istanbul; the
scholars and the soldiers/politicians. For Nursi the center of gravity was not necessarily
the Ottoman state but the influential players within the state, the scholars and politicians.
If he could influence these two classes, he felt, he would ultimately be able to influence
the entire society.
His aim was to link developments like constitutionalism, and other specifically
modern issues, with the future of Islam. In 1911, he went to Damascus and gave one of
his most memorable speeches in the Umayyad Mosque. This famous sermon is called the
Sermon of Damascus (Hutbe-i Şamiye). 278 In the sermon, Nursi explained the reasons for
underdevelopment in the Islamic world and offered six solutions to what he defined as six
moral and spiritual diseases then widespread in the Muslim world. The six diseases,
according to Nursi, were the prevalence of hopelessness or despair in social life (Ye’s) ,
the absence of truthfulness in social and political life (Sidkin … Olmesi), the love of
hostility (Adavate Muhabbet), ignoring the bonds that unite and strengthen the believers
(Rabitalari bilmemek), pervasive despotism in the lives of people either at home or with
other members of society (Istibdat), and the exclusive focus of people on personal
aggrandizement (Menfaat-i Sahsiye, egocentricity). 279
Nursi is distinct from many of his contemporaries in locating the problems of his
time atomistically in the misbehaviors of individual human beings as actors rather than
the environmental factors like foreign influence. He argued that hederived his cures for
278
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these social ills from the [pharmacy of] Quran (eczahane-i Kur’aniye), for these diseases
first effect the individual Muslim and then become pervasive in society. 280 The cures
Nursi offered are hope (Emel) 281, truthfulness and trustworthiness (Sidk) 282, mutual love
among Muslims (Muhabbet), 283 consultation (Mesveret), 284 solidarity (Rabita)285, and
freedom (Hurriyet-i Ser’iye). 286 The explanations he articulates target individual actors as
agents capable of changing the future of the Islamic world. Although Said Nursi preferred
a political method to cure society’s problems, it is noteworthy to see how even in the Old
Said era, Nursi’s cures for the diseases in the society are also unit level explanations.
Until the outbreak of the World War I, Nursi traveled back and forth between
Istanbul and Eastern Anatolia. While in eastern Anatolia, he defended and explained the
inevitability of the developments taking place in Istanbul; while in Istanbul he lobbied for
the university project for eastern Anatolia. Before being able to finish his University
project WWI began, he became a commander in the army and fought on the Eastern
Front against Russian and Armenian forces. 287 He was captured by the Russians in 1916,
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and was only able to return to Istanbul after the Bolshevik Revolution. Afterwards, he
lived in Istanbul on and off until the end of 1922.
During his years in Istanbul, Nursi began to perceive at a deep level the almost
unalterable changes in the religious character of society. As the Ottoman state declined in
power, the educated elite preferred a western lifestyle to an Islamic one. Nursi warned his
pupils about the impact of these changes in his publications and lectures. 288 He had a
productive life in Istanbul. He published books and became an active member in social
organizations. 289 His actions were intended to promote an awareness and identification of
the Islamic notion of all believers belonging to one Ummah.
He was not satisfied with the situation of the Muslim World. After WWI different
independence movements emerged throughout Anatolia. Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk), who
left Istanbul for Anatolia after the invasion of Izmir in May 1919, led the most prominent
and ultimately the most successful independence movement. Under coercion by the
invading powers, the office of the Sheikh ul Islam (the highest religious authority) of the
Istanbul Government issued a fatwa (Islamic legal opinion) against Mustafa Kemal’s
independence movement in Anatolia. However, Said Nursi supported the independence
movement, and issued a counter fatwa. 290 He lost his faith in the Istanbul government’s
ability to save the empire or promote the teachings of the religion. Apparantly, in these
288
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days, he began to lose hope in politics as a method of serving the interests of religion.
This feeling had been with him for some time but it only began to solidify at this time due
to his age. 291
From his own writings known as the Risale-i Nur collection , it is obvious that
Nursi was comfortable with the idea of citizens becoming active in the political process;
however, at the same time he retained a cautious attitude against the possible damages of
politics. Nursi says that the purpose of writing Risale-i Nur is to serve God by teaching
the necessity and benefits of faith (iman). 292 In this respect, Risale-i Nur’s main strength
comes from the principle of sincerity (ikhlas or ihlas in Turkish). 293 It does not pay
attention to politics, but instead deals extensively with the issue of faith, purpose in life
based on faith, and sincerity towards God in all one does. His intellectual focus was
balanced between the promise of political power and the grave peril of possibly being
overcome and corrupted by that power. When he finally realized the futility of pursuing
positions in state institutions as a means to advance the cause of Islam, he ended his
active political activity. He coined a famous saying: “I seek refuge in God from the Devil
and Politics”. 294
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The end of Nursi’s active political life coincides with the fall of the Ottoman
Empire. 295 His change of attitude predates the Republican period and corresponds to the
general failure of Islamists in gaining access to state power in a moral way. This was a
direct result of the deterioration of the office of Sheikh al-Islam and the rise of the
secularized bureaucracy which intensified an atomistic approach to the salvation of
Muslims rather than an institutional one. In late 1922, Nursi accepted an invitation by the
governmental body that represented the independence movement in Anatolia and went to
Ankara. 296 He attended a welcoming ceremony organized for him and gave a speech in
the parliament. His visit to Ankara, where he met with the influential members of the
parliament, increased his discontent with the materialism of the secular elite, and their
blatant disregard for Islam as a legitimate point of reference in developing a national
culture and identity. He tried to call the lawmakers to practice Islam by calling them to
pray daily and perform other acts of worship for the sake of God. He even published a
booklet about the importance of the five daily prayers. 297
From the perspective of the secular elite in Ankara it must have been strange to
listen to a scholar talking to them about the importance of belief in God and practicing
religion while they themselves considered Islam to be the main cause of decline in the
country. His experiences in Ankara might be considered as a peak of his transformation
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into a rather apolitical position. 298 Nursi readily admitted that his efforts did not pay. 299
Although he was offered a government position Nursi rejected it and went back to Van,
the city he left decades ago with a dream to study, teach, and live by the Quran. He
decided to devote his life to the study of Quran one more time. He was perhaps willing to
spend rest of his life in that cave. 300 Nursi stayed in the Cave-Madrasa where he only
devoted his life to his students and the study of Quran.
New Said Era (1920s – 1950):
The Ankara Parliament declared the Turkish republic in October 29, 1923. By then the
Ankara government had established its authority as the sole legitimate representative of
the Turkish people. The early years of the republic witnessed one of the most
comprehensive reforms in Turkish history. On March 3, 1924, the parliament enacted a
major law named Unification of Education Law (Tevhid-i Tedrisat Kanunu). The
unification of education law brought all educational institutions under governmental
control. This resulted in the closure of all religious madrasa schools throughout the
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country. On the same day, the office of Sheikh ul-Islam 301 was closed and the Islamic
caliphate was abolished. 302
In 1925, the leading Kurdish groups, frustrated with the republican reforms in
addition to not receiving the official promises of autonomy, rose up against the Ankara
government. The groups led by the famous Kurdish religious figure, Sheikh Said. Sheikh
Said asked for Said Nursi’s support. Nursi presented a quasi-Ottomanist argument and
argued that the Turkish children of the Ottoman Empire should be respected because they
served the cause of Islam for centuries. His principle concern was to ensure that Muslims
did not engage in fighting with other Muslims. 303 Other Kurdish groups responded with
dissatisfaction; they argued that the new government and its policies were anti-Islam and
should not be tolerated. Nursi still declined to legitimize inner conflict.
Still, Sheikh Said and his followers began the uprising and declared a war against
the Ankara government. The Sheikh Said Revolt, which is famous in Turkish as the
“Seyh Said Isyani”, led to a series of events that subsequently undermined the position of
Islam in modern Turkish history. Sheikh Said lost the war but the government backlash
was directed at all sectors of state and society. First the moderate government of Fethi
Okyar-Celal Bayar was forced by Mustafa Kemal’s closest associate, Colonel (Albay)
Ismet, to resign. Ismet Pasa then formed a government and imposed martial law on the
entire country. The Independence Tribunals (Istiklal Mahkemeleri) were established with
301
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the aim of officially indicting, prosecuting, and executing dissident voices. The Sheikh
Said revolt gave the newly established government an opportunity to consolidate its
power over state institutions and unite its forces against the dissident voices in order to
forestall opposition to modernization reforms. 304 The Independence Tribunals were
instrumental in suppressing opposition through targeted, thorough, and widespread
executions.
Because of the Sheikh Said rebellion, Said Nursi was accused of sedition, taken
by government officials, and sent to exile to Western Anatolia. His arrest caused great
unrest in the region. According to Abdulkadir Badilli, one of Nursi's Kurdish students,
the people of the Eastern region were shocked upon learning that Nursi was apprehended
and exiled by the state. Despite newly drawn borders, these people had relatives and
friends in the other newly partitioned countries of the region. 305 His exile lasted over 30
years until his death in 1960. 306
The beginning of exile was the peak of the transformation of Nursi that began
with his disillusionment in Istanbul. Nursi has always searched for new ways and
methods to promote his ideals. He was never afraid of speaking truth to power. However,
in his secluded years before the period of exile he was already beginning to become
304
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softer. In his view, saving Islam meant not saving the Ottoman Empire but saving
individual Muslims from straying from the guidance and spiritual nourishment offered by
their religion. From this perspective, he was against any kind of rebellion or armed
struggle against the authorities.
In the early republican era, the closure of traditional religious schools, sufi orders
and bans on all kinds of religious education made Muslims more alienated from their
environment. In this situation, Nursi pushed for seclusion and reconstruction of the faith
from inside out rather from the periphery. Nursi was not an armchair theoretician or
speculator; he experienced and perceived his future project as an isolated endeavor for
sincere believers. 307 On the other hand, he was not the only thinker to recognize the
challenges and threats to his faith from changing environmental factors. There were
influential figures who dealt with the same problems in the rest of the Middle East:
Muhammad Abduh and Sayyid Qutb.
Comparing Nursi with Abduh and Qutb, Haddad says, “All three reformers
focused on reinterpreting Islam for modern life. While Abduh struggles to modernize
Islam and Qutb sought to Islamize modernity, Nursi’s program at the end of his life
sought to contain modernity, to devise a course of life that proves the sufficiency of Islam
whatever its environment.” 308 His main aim was to establish an Islamic identity
regardless of the environment. He called it “Haqiqah” (Truth). Haqiqah Islam gives
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primacy to the belief in God. 309 Faith in God (Iman), as all Muslims believe in, is the first
principle in Islamic thought. However, Nursi’s interpretation of belief is distinct from
Shariah and Tariqah-Islam in some major ways. 310 First, contrary to Shariah Islam, Nursi
does not think that there is only one level of belief. Those who have a strict interpretation
of Islam overemphasize the differences between a believer and a disbeliever. For them if
a person is a believer they automatically become superior to disbelievers, who are
portrayed negatively. This stance acknowledges nominal Muslims as part of the ummah
regardless of personal commitment to the ummah. One could be a Muslim but also
aggressively secular and through a commitment to secularism they could undermine the
needs of the ummah. Second, Nursi argues that belief is much more important than the
spiritual pursuits such as spiritual pleasure, spiritual ecstasy, and keramat (supernatural
actions).” 311
In Nursi’s Haqiqah interpretation, there are two levels of belief, belief by
imitation (taklidi iman) and belief by exploration (tahkiki iman). 312 Nursi argues that
when tariqah members give excessive emphasis to spiritual pleasure limits the quality of
the spiritual life of the entire community. It makes them weak and vulnerable to divisive
internal and external factors. Among others, Nursi’s “fifth letter” in his book Letters is
devoted entirely to this issue. This work functions to explain why Nursi differs from
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Tariqah Islam and justifies why the bond between man and God should be more
important than personal spiritual pleasures. 313
Often times, members of Tariqah escape from the negative impact of society and
prefer to live in seclusion seeking spiritual peace. Nursi, on the other hand, argued that
the dire condition of the humanity in general and Muslims in particular necessitates
believers to sacrifice and struggle in order to reconnect human beings with their spiritual
nature. Nursi argued that the loss of faith in God had become a major impediment in
interpersonal relations. He stated that to believe in God individuals should rely on the
power of God rather than their limited personal will. 314 For Nursi, relying on God’s
power makes people more just while ego-centric life leads to selfishness and injustice. He
was giving spiritual solutions to temporal and material problems.
For Nursi, a chaotic and brutal portrayal of the world is only possible if human
beings de-sacralize the world. This is a product of the bifurcation of reality into secular
and sacred realms. Nursi argues that the fundamental principle of this kind of a world is
constant fight (jedal or cidal in Turkish). Jedal means conflict or chaos in a disorderly
world. 315We can argue that although they come from different perspectives those who
escape from society for religious purposes and those who accept an atomized modern
lifestyle are all divorced from the reality of God. They all fear that their environment will
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have a negative impact on them. Usually both of these understandings lead to
authoritarian state understandings, be it a leviathan or theocracy.
This is evident in Nursi’s dissatisfaction with Abdulhamid II and early republican
era policies. Said Nursi was unhappy with Abdulhamid II’s authoritarian policies
intended to improve the position of Islam. That is why he supported the secular
Committee of Union and Progress (Ittihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti, ITC) because they
promised freedom. 316 However, after gaining power CUP continued authoritarian
policies; eventually, its ideology gave birth to the Republican Peoples Party’s single party
regime which did not keep its promises. Eventually Nursi realized that structural reforms
were insufficient to bring about change, so he returned to his roots. The atomistic
approach as a societal project is the main difference between the revivalist and political
Islamists; the revivalists give primacy to human beings one by one while for political
Islamists it is the state apparatus that might help them to reach out to other human beings
to shape and reform them. As Haddad states, “despite these similarities in experience”
Nursi and his contemporaries “developed a radically different idea about the means of
saving the Muslim ummah”. 317
In Barla Nursi began to develop his project one person at a time. He was living in
a very remote and underdeveloped part of the country. Western Turkey, with its
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somewhat secular residents have been quite distant from religion, although not entirely
against it. This was a perfect opportunity for Nursi to achieve his goals from scratch. The
elements of human agency according to Nursi are all related to religion as a faith rather
than to worldly pursuits or the state. 318 Focusing on scripture gave Nursi the means to
reconstruct an Islamic identity that relied on the power of Allah.
His writings were less scholarly and more symbolic. Compared to his previous
abstract works Nursi was becoming practical, trying to relate God to the practical aspect
of people’s lives. He reminded his students of Allah as the cause of all causes
(Musebbibul Esbab), all-powerful (Kadir) and shaper of everything (Rabb). 319 His idea
was to call Muslims to the omnipotent, omnipresent, and omniscient God. Often his
explanations were filled with stories that he gathered from the people of Barla. In stories
recounted by local residents, they recognized Nursi through his continuous meditation
(zikir) at night. His humble life, founded on strong religious practices, influenced the
local residents and caused the people to come to him for advice and guidance. Barla was
a small village whose residents were poor, just like Nursi. He may have intentionally
begun his dawah activities in this environment because of the familiarity of it. The first
piece Nursi wrote as part of his newly emerging magnum opus Risale was on resurrection
and the life after death (Haşir Risalesi). It appears that Nursi directly targeted
strengthening the faith of the believers, which was totally a contradictionto his previous
political stance.
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The demographic characteristics of Nursi's followers changed as his message
developed over time. He attracted a number of students (Risale-i Nur Talebesi) from all
over the country who were interested in his teachings after having read Risale-i Nur.
Nursi was able to author most of his major works in Barla, and, although he was in exile,
he was attracting followers from the rest of the country who either read his short risale
(letters), heard stories about him and were interested in meeting him, and other visitors
who found his message relevant to their personal lives. The most important aspect of this
newly forming movement was that it was connecting the people to the main textual
sources of Islam. Traditionally Turkish society was socialized into Islam through the
interpretive teachings of different tariqahs. Often these teachings contradicted the actual
interpretation of the Quran by the prophet and the earliest Muslim community. However,
in Barla there was neither established tariqah nor secular institutions to compete with
Nursi’s message.
His audience was, on the other hand, illiterate, at least in religious sciences. Until
1926, the official alphabet in Turkey was a slightly different form of Arabic that was
called Ottoman. However, there was a problem: Nursi was not good at writing in Turkish.
He learned to speak Turkish in his teenage years, but did not write. Nursi, therefore,
sought the help of his expanding student body to record his ideas and print them in
Turkish. 320 He used to edit these works afterwards to check for errors and discrepancies.
Student would reproduce these letters by hand because they did not have access to
320
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printing presses. His followers in their native towns and cities later secretly disseminated
these works. 321
After the Oneness of Allah, as the sole creator and 'owner’ of the Day of
Judgment, where all human beings will be resurrected, Nursi focused on issues like the
role and normative example of Prophet Muhammad in Islam. His famous work on the
importance of Prophet Muhammad is called Miracles of Muhammad (Mucizat-i
Ahmediye). 322 In 19th Letter, Nursi commented on the importance of Prophet Muhammad
and his tradition (Sunna) as the second pillar of religious knowledge. For him
prophethood was the link between the divine and worldly. This was an identity
construction based on the sources of Islam rather than outside references.
Rising dominance of Western values, therefore, was an important issue for Nursi.
He “categorically rejected the concept of the West as normative or of its values as
universal.” 323 For him, Muslim society had to be based on the sources of Islam itself.
Nursi’s ideas on the West and its degenerating impact on Turkish society are not different
from that of Tariqah or Shariah Islam. Similarly, Erbakan was also critical of the West.
Major difference in Nursi’s ideas from these approaches and its impact on his followers
has been the absence of a view based on constant conflict (or clash in Huntingtonian
sense). 324 His notion of self-reliance was instrumental to the process of identity
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formation; and, his harsh criticism of western dominance pinpointed Nursi’s account of
the false dichotomies used within secular discourses and identity formation. 325
His criticisms of western influence, however, were not essentialist because he did
not view the West as a monolithic entity. He blended a detailed criticism of the
anthropocentric tenets of modern thought with an appreciation of the progress and
freedom of European society. 326 He had a twofold view of European culture: Christian
Europe, which was based on the message of Jesus 327 and the events of his life; and,
secular materialism and positivism that is responsible for the general moral and spiritual
corruption of modern societies, from notions of the state based on the security dilemma to
the materialistic culture of modern capitalism. 328
In Nursi’s terms, this is the “decadent” nature of the European Civilization.329
This decadent nature is apparent to Muslims who have faith and can easily recognize
human constructs that lead one to deviate from faith. Moreover, in the pre-Istanbul and
Istanbul periods of his life, he was skeptical of learning from the West or apologetic
approaches to secularism. Because modern Europe was alienated from its Christian origin
through the influence of secularism, Nursi was apprehensive about modernizing Islam
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along the same lines: the bifurcation of the secular and sacred spheres. Nursi did not think
that there was any need to reform or modernize Islam. He only attempts to ground people
in the long forgotten principles of Islam. To counter the negative, centrifugal effects of
modernity Nursi felt “that it was necessary to fashion a cadre of Muslims whose lives are
centered on the Quran.” 330
When Said Nursi emerged, the problem the Islamic world was encountering was
not about the content of itiqad or its application. The problem was how these were
perceived by the scholars and by the masses. In short, there was a need to articulate the
values of Islam accessible to the modern mind. Supporters of Nursi claim that the
movement is authentically traditionalist and is principally intended to rejuvenate the way
Muslims think and practice. 331 Disregarding the regional differences in its application,
this issue involves the belief system (itiqad) and the jurisprudence (fiqh) of the Sunni
Muslim world. In that regard, the Nur movement is a continuation of the
mujaddidi/khalidi branch of the Naqshbandi movement.
For Nursi, belief required recognition of the oneness of God, His messengers, the
Scriptures, angels, the day of Judgment, and predestination. Fiqh deals with how the
belief system is applied in the social setting. In The Words, Nursi addresses the role of
tradition, calling for a return to the original practice of the earliest Muslim community
and identifying with the cumulative tradition that had developed throughout the Muslim
world for centuries. In that regard, there is no fundamental difference between Nursi and
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Qutb. The major difference however lies in his ability to create a message embedded in
the tradition, critical of the West but not conflict-prone.
Gülen Movement
The personality of Said Nursi and his message to his followers was deeply rooted in the
modern Muslim experience, but at the same time connected to and invigorated by
tradition. This is also evident in the Gülen movement. The Gülen movement is an
offshoot of the Nur movement. It is inspired by the ideas of the prominent Turkish
Islamic scholar M. Fethullah Gülen. He deserves attention because of his support for
Turkish democracy within a more complex domestic and international setting than his
predecessors do.
Gülen inspired the most prominent Islamic movement in contemporary Turkey.
The movement inspired by his ideas has established over 200 private schools
(elementary, secondary and high schools), over 100 university preparation courses, 3
national newspaper companies— one directly controlled by the movement— hundreds of
radio stations, international TV broadcasting companies and banks. Outside of Turkey,
the movement is active in over 100 countries operating schools and educational
institutions which are estimated to number around 500. 332 It has been highly successful in
mobilizing people from Turkey to volunteer in these activities. Fethullah Gülen’s success
shows how inspirational his message is in the eyes of the volunteers, many of whom have
never met with him.
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There are mainly two factors contributing to this process. First, Gülen has
consistently educated students in a systematic way since the early days of his tenure as a
preacher. From his writings and lectures we learn that he was a man of self-sacrifice in
educating a young and loyal student body that would disseminate his message throughout
the world. He was active in promoting projects for the benefit of his community and he
was an effective organizer who tried to lead his studebts by example (temsil in
Turkish). 333 Gülen’s immediate students who received their religious education directly
from him accomplished many of the projects simply by following Gülen’s role model.
Many of the projects in different parts of the world have been undertaken directly or
indirectly by the studebts inspired by Gülen’s teachings. In order to reconstruct the ‘true
message of Islam,’ Gülen chose loyal students to whom taught traditional Islamic
sciences such as fiqh, Hadith, Arabic etc which required sacrifice. 334 To accomplish his
demanding teaching responsibilities, like his predecessor Said Nursi, Gülen has never
married.
The second factor that made Gülen’s ideas so widespread in the country and
abroad was his ability to convey his message in a way that is appealing to a younger
audience. Since the early days of his preaching years, as a long-term project, Gülen was
able to influence the many young students to sacrifice for a bigger cause; the wellbeing of
the society. His main argument was, which proved successful, that the sacrifices they
333
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were making were commensurate with thoseof the earliest Islamic communities of
Islam. 335 For example, in the eyes of Gülen’s followers, prophet Muhammad’s journey
from Mecca to Medina to seek asylum and security to spread his message resembles the
current case of Fethullah Gülen's movement. At the end of the Cold War, he urged his
followers to go Central Asia to establish institutions to help the people of the region with
education and development. Gülen argued that the sacred immigration (Hijra) is a duty
on their shoulders to help their brethren in Central Asia who suffered “eighty years of
communist oppression.”
The frequent and strong references given to the early years of Prophet
Muhammad’s time have been the backbone of Gülen’s message. He would frequently tell
the story of Mus’ab bin Umayr, one of the earliest Muslims and close companions of
Prophet Muhammad. Mus'ab left his wealthy family and immigrated to Medina to
support the cause of Prophet Muhammad. He did not know much about the religion
except for couple of verses he heard from the prophet. However, this young man was able
to convince the entire city of Medina and make it the home of Prophet Muhammad. Many
of Gülen’s young followers took Musab as a nickname or named their male children after
him. When the Cold War ended, Gülen was able to call upon “contemporary Mus'abs” to
make the same sacrifice. The young generation of Gülen supporters embraced the idea of
becoming agents of change for the message they got from Gülen’s teachings. The
dynamic relationship between the structural and spiritual factors led to the unprecedented
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success of Gülen (including his immediate students) and increased its appeal among the
younger generation.
There are three major eras in the life of Gülen (and his movement). First, the local
life which lasted from his birth until 1960s when he left his hometown. Second, national
appeal from 1960s to 1990s. Gülen began his activities in the 1960s and when he got to
1990s, his movement has become the most influential Islamic movement in the country.
The third era from 1990s until present which corresponds to the internationalization of
the movement. Beginning with 1990s Gülen ‘s students reached first to Central Asian
Turkic Republics and as of today almost every country in the world has an interfaith
dialogue or Turkish cultural center inspired by Gülen’s ideas. His life story will be used
in order to further explain these stages.
Local Life: Formative Years (1940s-1960s)
He was born in 1938 in eastern Turkey into a Turkish family. The region is known for its
religious-nationalist culture which produced a handful of religious scholars and
nationalist politicians. 336 Gülen’s family is originally from the city where Said Nursi was
born (Ahlat town of Bitlis). 337 The population in this region is a diverse blend of Turks,
Kurds and Arabs. Like his predecessor Said Nursi, Fethullah Gülen's family is also
descended from Prophet Muhammad. According to his own records, Gülen's birth caused
a tension between his family and the early republican state officials. Right after the birth
of Gülen, his father, Ramiz wanted to name him ‘Muhammed Fethullah’ after the prophet
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Muhammad. However, the government official who was in charge of registering the birth
certificates rejected this name due to its religious connotations.
It was secularism's heyday in Turkey. Angry with the registry officer, Gülen’s
father left without registering his son. After a while, Ramiz was elected to the village
administration and established friendship with the military sergeant in the town. Three
years after Gülen’s birth, his father had another child. He took his military sergeant friend
to the registry office with him. The Military sergeant ordered the officer to name the
children the way Ramiz wanted. However, after the sergeant left, the registry officer
named Fethullah without Muhammed and the other child Seyfullah (sword of God)
instead of Sibghatullah (Paint of God) as the father originally wanted. That’s why
Gülen’s official birthday is April 27, 1941, roughly 3 years later than the actual one. This
event and how Gülen’s father dealt with it are remarkable examples of how Muslims deal
with the state and its policies. Instead of direct confrontation, they find a
nonconfrontational way within the state bureaucracy. It still looks like, however, at the
end of this process Muslims get only some part of what they want. This give and take and
mutual accommodations make up the journey of Islam within the secular state.
In Gülen’s ideals, the influence of his teacher, Alvar Imami, is obvious. 338 As a
Sufi master, Alvar Imami’s message to Gülen was a classical Sufi principle that personal
perfection is complete only if one serves to his/her God. 339 In one of his famous poems,
Alvar Imami shows how a Sufi should think and act contrary to whatever happens in a
person’s life.
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Mevla Bizi Affede (May God forgive us)
Bayram ol Bayram Olur (Festivals become real celebration)
Curm-u Hatalar gide (May our sins go away)
Bayram ol Bayram Olur (Festivals become real celebration)
Gor ne guzel Iyd Olur (See how Festivals become real celebration)
For his entire life, Alvar Imami lived in the same village and educated students.
Therefore, in a more personal manner, he states that the most important time to cherish
happiness would be the time when God forgives the sins. In Fethullah Gülen’s views,
however, a more social devotion by serving God via helping people without thinking or
expecting a return is praised. The social altruism that is based on his contacts with sufis
in his early life marks a one step ahead in Sufism that becomes the main tenets of his life
to come. In one of his recent writings Gülen mentions importance of people “who will
feel the [pain] in their hearts about an oppressed child in so,e forgotten part of the
world.” 340 Gülen’s preference of social action or sacrifice to Sufi seclusion is probably
due to his early acquaintance with Said Nursi’s ideas.
For the first time, Gülen met with the members of the Nur community in 1957.
The lecture of one of Nursi’s student inspired Gülen to pursue dawah method of Nursi.341
He saw the ideal of self-sacrifice of the companions of prophet Muhammad (Sahaba ) in
Said Nursi and his students. The companions of prophet Muhammad are important role
models for Gülen 342 because they emerged at a time when Arabian society was in a state
of chaos. Yet, the companions of prophet Muhammad constantly struggled to fulfill the
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message brought to them by prophet Muhammad. An objective assessment of their lives
and accomplishments served to inspire Gülen and his students that the effort (jihad) they
made on behalf of Islam would be successful, regardless of structural constraints. 343
Gülen’s argument was simple. Outside social and economic pressure along with
inner conflicts created by a wholly materialistic worldview create many problems in the
lives of modern people. Gülen argued that modern life creates internal tensions within
people between the material circumstances and the belief systems of faith. In this era, the
role model for ordinary people cannot be saintly, but must come from the same
environment. The example Gülen wanted to show to people was of ordinary Muslims
who could live in the world and be successful and happy, but not be dominated,
affectively, by the material aspects of modern life. They serve as examples of how a
religious life uniquely leads to personal happiness and inner peace. 344
From the beginning, contrary to many Islamic movements in Turkey, Gülen was
against a “saint-centered” religious approach. Many tariqahs, religious orders and
religious communities establish their movements around the stories of saints and other
charismatic figures who claim to have extraordinary spiritual qualities. Their followers
believe that these self-proclaimed saints can see the future or cure illnesses. 345 In Gülen’s
view, this kind of elitist religious understanding alienates the masses from the message of
God and instead elevates certain Sufi mystics above even the prophet, because they have
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authoritative status among the uneducated population. Therefore, for Gülen any Islamic
movement for reform must renew the faith based on prophetic tradition’s semiindividualistic approach where each individual has the right and authority to claim
responsibility rather than deferring it to saints who have supernatural qualities.
In line with this reasoning, Richard Bulliet explains the importance of
companions of prophet Muhammad as individual agents in Islam. Contrary to the
established reading of Islamic history in the Muslim world and in Orientalist scholarship,
Bulliet argues that we need to have a view from the edge, rather than the center, to be
able to grasp the development of an Islamic society in the ages of turmoil and progress.
Bulliet’s view from the edge is important because it directs scholarship to the peripheries
of society to understand the religious transformation in Turkey by movements that had
quietly gained momentum. As Bulliet states, “the view from the edge is not that from a
geographical (or political) periphery. The edge in Islamic history exists wherever people
make the decision to … rededicating themselves to Islam as the touchstone of their social
identity, or recasting their Muslim identities in a modern urban context.” 346
The view from the edge recognizes that edge is the source that creates the center:
it is a centripetal force. The centrifugal paradigms that prevail in scholarship on Islamic
movements in general limit them from recognizing the fact that it is the periphery that is
ultimately creating the center. Unfortunately, the centripetal forces are the least studied
aspect of the Islamic movements in the world, and this applies equally to the Gülen
movement. Bulliet argues that:
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Muhammad and virtually all of the companions were Arabs who
shared a common language, culture etc. These companions,
particularly after the death of Muhammad became revered as
repositories of knowledge about the prophet [and his tradition]. 347
Bulliet’s reading is accurate and just as relevant to the contemporary Muslim
world as it was to the earliest period. In an age full of uncertainties and confusion the
interpretation of the Qur’an and traditions of prophet Muhammad is plagued by
reactionary and anachronistic interpretations by Islamic movements. Particularly
noteworthy was the inability or unwillingness of the Islamic caliphate to institutionalize
alternative means of giving authoritative Islamic answers to specifically modern
problems. In the absence of an Islamic caliphate, and both a real and symbolic institution
capable of uniting Muslims, the history of the earliest companions provides guidance to
the contemporary Muslims who experience the similar problems. 348
This issue is particularly relevant to the Turkish Islamic case. The republican era
in Turkey imposed secularization on the nation as a necessary means towards
modernization. However, it was unable to generate a nationalist mythology beyond the
image of Kemal Ataturk. Moreover, while the secular authorities promised prosperity,
peace, and security as a corollary of modernization, they eventually failed to improve the
lives of the masses. In addition, the rampant corruption and self-indulgence of some of
the bureaucratic elite undermined their credibility. Gülen was able to appeal to early
Islamic history as an alternative Turkish-Muslim history. The example of the prophet and
his followers were contrasted favorably to the degenerate elite in Istanbul and Ankara.
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Since the early days of his life, Gülen’s view on Islamic renewal has been based
on the implementation of the prophetic tradition “in a modern urban context”. Fethullah
Gülen’s position has been consistent with other Islamic movements in that he legitimizes
his ideas as a return to tradition. The most important aspect of his interpretation of the
prophetic tradition included the idea of teaching and conveying the message to the
coming generations via a small group of loyal followings, similar to the Ashab-i Suffa of
Medina. 349 According to Muhammad Hamidullah, after prophet Muhammad migrated to
Medina the southern part of the mosque (the first religious institution) in Quba was given
to a group of students who spent all their days studying religion directly from the
prophet. 350 These students are called People of Suffa (Ashab-i Suffa), and numbered
around 400. Their close connection with the Prophet (who also lived in the Mosque) is a
source of information on the teachings and life of the prophet. This led to the centrality of
hadith literature transmitted by the companions. There were major companions of the
Prophet who lived with the Suffa group: Mus'ab ibn 'Umayr, 'Abdullah b. Mas'ud and
Abu Hurayra 351, who narrated by far the most hadith from the prophet. The contributions
of these close companions of prophet Muhammad became the source of Islamic
tradition.” 352
Nationwide Opening: Reaching out to a Bigger Audience (1960s – 1990s)
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Fethullah Gülen established his Ashab-i Suffa first in Edirne, a secular border town in
North-Western Turkey. It was the first city he officially worked in after he left his
hometown. In 1964, right after he began his job as Imam in Dar al-Hadith mosque he
prepared a room for a group of students in order to teach them Islamic sciences. 353 He
was a devoted teacher to his students. His own accounts present this method as a sacrifice
on his part for a better future of the students. He argues that he sacrificed for their
intellectual and spiritual nourishment, so that, when they were properly trained and ready
to enter the world, they would be willing to make sacrifices of their own for the
society. 354 Later on, Gülen’s study circle took a more established form where initial 10
students began to study traditional Islamic sciences. 355
After Fethullah Gülen finished his military service, he began to give lectures
about Mawlana Jalal al Din Rumi. While secular scholars portrayed Rumi as a humanist
and pantheist rather than an orthodox Sunni scholar and mystic, Gülen delivered lectures
on Rumi’s dedication to the Hadith tradition. 356 The respect Gülen showed for the
religious authenticity of Rumi was an attempt on his part to rescue Rumi’s religious
character from secular readings of Sufism. Rumi is popularly known as a poet and
mystic, yet, for Gülen, Rumi’s entire system of thought and action was based on the
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Quran and Sunna of prophet Muhammad. By emphasizing Rumi's attachment to the
normative practice of prophet Muhammad, Gülen was able to move the discussion from
literary concerns with the style of Rumi's verse to the affective influences on Rumi. The
primary influence on Rumi was the traditional material and the general Quranic discourse
on God, His messengers, the unseen world, the various examples used in the Quran about
communities that disobeyed God. The thought of someone like Rumi, who has been
romanticized in secular circles as a carrier of spiritual teachings, divorced from the
sources of Islam of course, was actually part of a revivalist movement in thirteenth
century Anatolia. 357
In 1966, Fethullah Gülen was assigned to work in Izmir. Izmir had always been
known as a secular region, dismissive towards religion. An Aegean Sea port city near
Greece, Izmir presented some very profound challenges for Gülen. Ordinary people in the
Aegean Sea region had previously been in contact with Said Nursi due to his years in
exile in the region as well as the popularity of his treatises. However, they were informed
about Nursi’s message only to the extent of intellectual assent and agreement. They had
not yet come to understand that Nursi was doing more than just writing in order to spread
ideas about spirituality, outside the context of duty and sacrifice. Nursi wanted to train
and create agents of Islamic revival in the face of the onslaught of secularism. He laid the
intellectual foundations for such a project. When Fethullah Gülen arrived in Izmir, he
worked to transform the intellectual assent with the ideas of Nursi into obedience to
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tradition and social activism. For the coming thirty years, secular Izmir would become
the backbone of the Islamic movement of Gülen.
The 1960s corresponded to the post- Nursi era for the Nur community. After his
death in 1960, Nursi’s devout followers formed various communities under the leadership
of his immediate students. This group was known as “older brothers” (Agabeyler). They
were de facto leaders of the religious community and legacy of Nursi, though the absence
of a charismatic leader made their efforts difficult. They tried to preserve the teachings of
Nursi by strictly following his representation of tradition. There was a vacuum of
leadership among the followers and student of Nursi which would come to be filled by
Fethullah Gülen. In addition, just as he was able to re-represent the teachings of Rumi as
an extension of orthodox Islam, Gülen emphasized that the writings of Nursi were less
doctrinal treatises and more a call to action by believing Muslims.
The Nur community, however, would later alienate Gülen by attempting to enter
into the political arena in an alliance with the centrist Justice Party (Adalet Partisi, AP).
Gülen repudiated this attempt to politicize the movement, distanced himself from the
members that were taking the movement in this direction and renewed his focus on the
prophetic tradition and educational activity. He was in an advantageous position to carry
on the message and work of Said Nursi because he was well trained in the Islamic
sciences: jurisprudence, Quranic exegesis, and hadith. Most other leaders within the Nur
movement were dependent on the writings of Nursi for their Islamic education. Like
Nursi, Gülen was fluent in Arabic and Persian, at least in terms of reading and
interpreting the texts. His language skills gave him access to the sources of religious
scholarship in rest of the Islamic World. No other Nur student was fluent in as many
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Islamic languages. This diminished their appeal among the ordinary members of the Nur
community. This is reflected in the quality of their scholarship and its application.
Fethullah Gülen dedicated his time to training his students as agents of change.
He felt as though this was the best way of effecting change in Turkey and the Muslim
world. This method exponentially increased his influence in the instruction of Islam. He
would focus on the development of a few of his brightest students, preparing a
curriculum specifically for them. Then they would mature intellectually and work under
his supervision in the development of the next group of students. From the time he
distanced himself from the mainstream followers of Nursi over their political activity he
established his movement on two pillars: religious education at a high level and the
development of a capable student body through direct instruction. 358
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Fethullah Gülen was still trying to find his
place as an Islamic leader. He was not able to bring the followers of Nursi under his
direction easily. Gülen brought unique skills to the Nur movement. Gülen's leadership
made his students more efficient and effective. He first began to promote his ideas in
local cafes where people spent their leisure time playing cards, drinking tea, smoking and
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chatting late into the night. In his memoirs, Gülen says that his aim was to go to reach out
to people who did not regularly attend the mosque. 359 He wanted to reach more people
and inspire them to be more interested and educated in religion. His followers rented
large pubs or concert halls during the weekends and Gülen lectured on the benefits of
creationism over Darwinism and gathered “thousands of people from all parts of the
society.” 360 No other religious community, including the Nur community, had organized
anything like this.
In the late 1970s, however, there was turmoil in Turkey. Divisive fights among
college students and government officials brought parliament to a halt. Members were
unable to elect a President for over 100 sessions. On September 12, 1980, the military
overthrew the government and declared martial law throughout the country. Due to his
prominent religious position in the Aegean region, Gülen was among those suspected by
the government of political radicalism. For the next 6 years, he went underground in
hiding from the military scrutiny.
Some scholars argue that the repression of Islamists in general and Gülen in
particular, produced a diaspora mentality and group mythology that came to dominate the
Islamist discourse in Turkey. 361 According to Yasin Aktay the Turkish diaspora is not
related to demographics and population movement, but rather a discursive one where
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people felt “being stranger and pariahs” in their own homelands. 362 He analyzed the ideas
and lives of prominent contemporary Islamic figures like Mehmet Akif Ersoy (the author
of the Turkish national anthem), Mustafa Sabri Efendi (the last shaikh ul Islam of the
Ottoman Empire), Necip Fazil Kisakurek (a prominent Islamist poet), and Elmalili
Hamdi Yazir (a well known religious scholar who authored the first Turkish
interpretation of Qur’an).
Aktay argues that this feeling of inhabiting a discursive diaspora resulted in a
search for stability in the hearts and minds of the Islamist intellectuals, notably Fethullah
Gülen. This search for stability resulted in a search for legitimization at the state level
which created a pro-state, somewhat nationalistic stance within Islamic movements.
Fethullah Gülen was patriotic; according to Yavuz, the frontier conditions of his
hometown (Dadas culture) caused him to support the state 363 because of the fact that state
apparatus provides security for its citizens, a strategy that has long been followed by the
Naksibendi order as well.. However, Yavuz’s Dadas culture thesis is limited by its
implicit structural bias. Nationalist sentiments stemming from the Dadas culture might
have affected Gülen’s ideas but they were at most secondary to his universalistic Islamic
message. Gülen’s ideas where nationalism plays a secondary role to religion is more
similar to Neo-Ottomanism than any other ideology. Nationalist Dadas culture is often
times associated with intolerant reactions towards pluralism within the society,
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particularly against Kurds, Communists and non-Muslims while Gülen tried to preserve a
tolerant stance. 364
Gülen, on the other hand, did not search for stability, in the Hobbesian sense, but
the realization of renewal (Tajdid), purifying society from social problems. Tajdid
recognizes the fact that the values of a society degenerate over time and human beings
lose their connection with God. The presence of this decay creates a sense of alienation
from the ideal Islamic imaginary. Therefore, rather than focusing on state apparatus,
Gülen, as his predecessor Nursi, aimed to continue their renewalist tradition which
required focusing on the self than the other. In that regard, Gülen shares the same ideas
with many of his Ottomanist predecessors who initiated a self-critique process.
Gülen, however, differs from many of his predecessors in his pragmatism in
utilizing new methods. His community used every means to reach out mainly to the
young generation and try to create its own “golden generation.” Gülen mainly, if not
solely, focused on the importance of education more than institutional reforms preferred
by his predecessors. The term “Golden Generation” (Altin Nesil) refers to the ideal
posterity in the mind of Fethullah Gülen which was formulated during lectures and
writings since 1970s. From these writings and lectures, he continuously described an
ideal generation which, he argued, will “save us spiritually.” 365 Referring to Plato’s
Republic, Al Farabi’s The Virtuous City (Al Madina al Fadila), and the City of the Sun of
Tommaso Campanella, Gülen argued that his ideal generation is not a theoretical
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construct like these scholars but an ideal based on the practices of the “Rose Age” (Gül
Devri), meaning the age of prophet Muhammad. 366
In one of this lectures he gave before the 1980 coup, Fethullah Gülen mentions
three main qualities of his ideal generation. 367 First is Love (Muhabbet). Gülen argues
that members of the golden generation love both their friends and enemies. In mainstream
identity formation literature that is influenced by social identity theories, a sense of
belonging or personal identity is dependent upon the construction of an anti-self, an
'other'. Gülen was aware of this tendency to articulate personal identity in opposition to
others. In addition, he wanted to eliminate this kind of behavior among his followers.
Therefore, he used the example of the companions of the prophet as well as the
messenger himself to teach the art of love. Love, or the ability to look towards others
sympathetically, stops the ego from using the external image to produce ideas about the
self.
The second quality of the golden generation is [positive] action (hamle). Fethullah
Gülen says that a person should first act to conquer his own soul, then propagate the
message to other members of society. This is a social aspect of the golden generation. In
his teachings, Gülen mention Jesus as an example of a prophet who was constantly
purifying himself. Love was the main component of Jesus’s message, one idealized by
366
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Gülen. Jesus looked at people with love and did not understand his own identity against a
negative appreciation of them. Gülen always gives references to the mission of Jesus, and
how the golden generation is the last bearer of this message. The appreciation of the Nur
community for Jesus, something promoted by Nursi, has given their movement an aspect
of spiritual humility.
The third quality of the golden generation was self-criticism (murakabe).
Considering the date of this lecture (1977) when conflicting sides of a polarized Turkish
society were attacking one another, Gülen must have been calling upon people to be
mindful of how they behave towards one another, and before acting, to be mindful of
how they speak to one another, and before speaking, to be mindful of how they think
about others. It is on the level of thought that the hatred of Turks for one another is
formulated. They act out these generic identities upon one another. Again one can look to
Jesus, the prophet Muhammad, or his companions as ideals of people who were selfcritical, not externalizing their judgmental faculties. 368
After the 1980 coup, the military government shut down all student dormitories
run by the Muslim communities. These dormitories were mostly non-profit organizations
(vakif), so it was easy for the military administration to takeover these institutions and
reallocate their resources. At this point Gülen’s community was operating some student
dormitories for high school and college students. To keep the institutions safe from
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government takeover, Gülen’s followers switched all the non-profit institutions to forprofit private schools. 369
The first known institution of the Gülen community would be Yamanlar Private
High School located in Izmir where Gülen preached for years. It was established in 1982.
Other major institutions which are now leading national private high schools are Fatih
College - Istanbul (1982), Samanyolu College –Ankara (1983). Later, establishing private
high schools became one of the main methods of the Gülen community. There are an
estimated 300 private schools in Turkey. Due to the university entrance system, college
preparation institutions are also popular in Turkey. The Gülen community has around
hundreds of these institutions which serves as another venue to build relationships with
students.
These schools and institutions are now associated with high level science
education in Turkey. The winners of national and international science olympiads are
often from these schools. Why is science so important for Gülen? The answer goes back
to Said Nursi, who saw the problems of the Muslim world as related to two issues;
rejection of religion in scientific education and rejection of sciences in the religious life.
Fethullah Gülen, by opening these schools, brought scientific education back into the
lives of Muslims. In addition, in late 1979 Gülen's community began to publish Sizinti, a
monthly popular magazine that focused on issues important to the Gülen community:
proving Darwinism false and supporting creationism. The importance of creationism and
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the existence of God were necessary because of the rise of communism and scientific
atheism.
In the media sector the most important accomplishment is the establishment of the
Zaman newspaper in 1986, right when Fethullah Gülen’s underground life ended. Zaman,
which is currently the bestselling newspaper in Turkey, was established together with
different Muslims groups, and later solely controlled by the Gülen community. 370 Until
the 1990s Gülen movement's activities were given little media coverage. Due to its local
and decentralized structure the movement was never adequately represented in the media,
academia and in policy circles.
End of the Cold War: Internationalisation of the Movement: (1990s- present)
With the end of the Cold War came the internationalization of the Gülen community. It
was the ability of the movement to forsee the transformation of the world politics and
find the opportunity to develop a new phase in their dawah method. 371 These were the
results of Gülen’s speeches beginning in late 1980s when he began to preach about the
importance of re-connecting with the people of Central Asia. He knew that once his
followers saw what the material and spiritual condition of the Central Asian peoples, after
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coercive state secularism, they would be inspired in their activism and inspiring in their
call to Islam. For Gülen this was a paypack to their ancestors. 372.
Opening schools in Central Asia had a transformative effect on the movement.
First, it made the community dynamic in terms of its cultural horizons and educational
capacity. Students from the Gülen schools began graduating from college and working in
these new institutions early 1990s. Second, this Central Asian expansion was the first
step in internationalization of the community, transcending national borders and state
allegiances.
Initial support came from the newly elected President Turgut Özal. Özal saw the
Gülen movement as a fulfillment of his vision. Originally a member of the Naqshbandi
movement, Özal was able to rise to the highest ranking position in the country due to his
ability to maneuver within bureaucratic circles. Özal was the person who began the
liberalization of the economy and opening the country to the world market. His policy
program intersected with the activities of the Gülen community, and Özal always helped
the community during his short tenure in presidential office. 373
In Central Asia, the Gülen community opened schools similar to the ones in
Turkey. 374 From the early writings and speeches of Gülen it is not clear what the
372
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movement exactly knew about the region. Considering the enmity between Turkey and
the USSR during the Cold War there had been contact between Turkish people and their
Central Asian brethren. Fethullah Gülen’s post-Cold War speeches were intended to
create a sentimental connection between his followers and the newly independent states.
For example, he mentioned that there was a place named Mengucistan that needed help.
This place only existed in the region during the pre-Ottoman period. Aside from the
material weakness of the arguments, Gülen had spiritual authority behind his claims. He
was essentially asking his followers to sacrifice for a greater cause, a greater effort, a
Jihad. His definition of jihad is based on spiritual principles of service to the community.
It is struggle between the self and the soul through humanitarian work. Gülen’s specialty
was education. This spiritual connection did not require material evidence and the
members of the Gülen movement began to spread their message.
For many in Turkey this was exporting "Turkish Model" to a region which was
under Iranian and Wahhabi influence. In policy circles, especially with U.S. support, the
Turkish model of a secular state with a moderate pro-western Islam was the most highly
regarded alternative. The international support for the Turkish Model also contributed to
the expansion of the Gülen community in the region without any impediment until
suspicion and resistance replaced the “cautious acquiescence of Russia” and some other
Central Asian states. 375 At times the activities of the movement was considered too pro–
American, and schools run by Gülen community both in Russia and Uzbekistan were
closed by the state in late 2000. 376
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Gülen welcomed the image of himself and his movement as moderate
representatives of Turkish Islam. Any analysis that views the expansion of the Gülen
community’s activities as a regional pan-Turkish or pan-Islamist project would be valid
in its understanding of certain particulars of the movement’s history and organization but
would altogether misunderstand the inner dynamics of the movement. Their positions visà-vis the major powers were not dependent on fear of punishment or hope for rewards
because they were acting on ideas which were deeply grounded in the teachings of Islam.
Gülen often times stated that fear, hope, and love should only be directed towards God,
because only God is worthy of such attention. 377
Gülen movement’s activities soon became so popular and well recognized that
they had to justify their activity, on secular grounds, to the ruling regime. He met with
politicians, party leaders and eventually with the Prime Minister Tansu Ciller 378 on
November 11, 1994. Gülen was already known throughout society but this was the first
time his community was given recognition on the governmental level. 379 In 1994,
Gülen’s close associates founded the Foundation for Journalists and Writers (Gazeteciler
ve Yazarlar Vakfi) 380 which became the venue for his (interfaith) dialogue activities.381
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However, these diaologue activities both inside and outside of the country did not save
Gülen from Kemalist scrutiny. His movement’s rising power became the major sign of
threat in the eyes of the secular establishment who saw the rise of religion in public
sphere as a direct challenge to its very own security. On March 21, 1999, Gülen went to
US for medical treatment amidst legal prosecutions.Since then Gülen was acquitted from
all the charges placed against him. He still resides in the USA for over a decade without
ever returning to Turkey.
In this chapter, I argued that Nur and Gülen movements focused on the
Islamization of the individual because Nursi was afraid of the corrupting influences of
political power. They wanted to propagate the practice of Islam without however
investing all their energy in gaining control of state institutions. For example, Fethullah
Gülen dedicated his life to training student whom he knew would one day have the
opportunity to work in powerful institutions. He had faith that individuals and not
institutions were the agents of change in society. The method he use to accomplish his
Islamic program, therefore, were educational: schools, media, and publications.
Six years after Fethullah Gülen’s message, a former member of Necmettin
Erbakan’s Islamist National View Movement, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, founded the
Justice and Development Party, promoting democratic values, human rights and a new
political agenda towards the EU. In blatant disregard of the Ottoman experiences of
pluralism, constitutionalism or even the traditional millet system rooted in the Ottoman
Empire, essentialist scholars argued that rather than a continuation of democracy, there is
381
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an abrupt transformation in Turkish politics concerning the place of religion in politics. It
is, therefore, difficult for this kind of scholarship to understand the democratic claims of
the Islamic movements.
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Chapter VI: AK PARTY AND NEO-OTTOMANISM
This chapter analyzes how and to what extent the Justice and Development Party
has been influenced by all three Islamic approaches. The different modes of the Islamic
approaches examined in this work lead to different interests, goals, and strategies; these
all have different political implications. So, what is the relationship between these Islamic
approaches (their self-definitions and political aspirations) and Justice and Development
Party’s ideology? A closer look at the ideas championed by AK Party and its major
figures show that they are committed to transforming the country more than previous
governments. Many secular leaders consider this to be a counter-revolution (karsi
devrim). 382
They argue that AK Party is a new version of Erbakan’s Islamist National View
Movement. Others argue that Erdogan’s political ideology was shaped by his Naqshbandi
background, which contradicted Erbakan’s ideology. Recently scholars suggested that
Erdogan had close ties with Nur community’s Fethullah Gülen, who was seen as
supportive of a US backed “Turkish Model” project favouring a moderate Islam in the
Middle East. Since the AK Party came to office they have demonstrated similarities with
the Islamic movements studied above. This chapter will argue that the similarity in policy
making is incidental, a product of a common religious heritage and that the policies of
AK Party have been sui generis, an authentic creation of its own decision makers.
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Since the foundation of AK Party, they had one major obstacle: the entrenched
Kemalist military posing as “guardians of the state.” 383 As a result, some scholars argued
that AK Pary deliberately tried to “avoid a head-on collision with the military.” 384 This
case is representative of how Islamic groups react to similar events in different ways.
Contrary to AK Party’s predecessor Islamist National View Movement, which had
deliberately popularized political slogans, the way AK Party handled its relations with the
Kemalist Military was similar to the strategy pursued by the Gülen group. Naqshbandi
groups, for their part, were vocal in their critique of the state, but mostly focused on their
own internal social activities.
The polarization between Kemalists and Islamists in the political arena had
already widened before the Justice and Development Party’s electoral victories. Erbakan
had previously been forced to resign from office because of a military coup. For some
scholars this was indicative of Huntington’s ‘torn country’ thesis. 385 This was the first
problem confronting the Justice and Development Party after its victory in the November
2002 elections in Turkey. The question was what kind of a policy the Justice and
Development Party would follow within the boundaries of the Kemalist regime? Ozcan, a
prominent Turkish political scientist, summaries the new identity of the Justice and
Development Party:
From the very start, the JDP [Justice and Development Party] leaders
contended that they are a mainstream party with conservative center-right
383
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credentials. Party leaders continually represented themselves as successors
of liberal/conservative Democrat Party of the 1950s and the Motherland
Party of the 1980s in contrast to the Islamist Welfare Party (WP) and its
successor Virtue Party. Party documents and official statements suggest
that JDP [Justice and Development Party] is determined to take a different
approach in foreign affairs than the Islamist tradition from which the
leaders have hailed. 386
The major difference between the Justice and Development Party and its failed
predecessors was the self-conscious and active attempt by the AK Party to be a centrist
party sympathetic to the demands of both political left and right. Though mostly
practicing Muslims, the Justice and Development Party party members publicly declared
their acceptance of the secular system. The significance of Justice and Development
Party’s challenge was to prove that it was not a marginal party coming from the periphery
to challenge the political center but transform it from within while still holding on to
centrist positions. The first major challenge to the traditional way of doing politics was
Justice and Development Party’s handling of the Cyprus crisis. In 2003, Justice and
Development Party took an enormous political risk and changed Turkey’s forty-year long
policy towards Cyprus to be in line with EU recommendations. 387 This is representative
of the differences between the new type of Islamist, Justice and Development Party, and
the old Muslim parties. Justice and Development Party introduced new approaches to
issues not ordinarily considered Islamic.
The major shift from their previous position shows that AK Party leadership acted
as an active agent of change rather than representing status quo in the country and within
the overall Islamic community. Their policies were a result of calculated attempts that
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have historical relevance to conservative Muslim mindset or part of a deliberate project
rooted in historical depth. AK Party leadership justified their new position by referring to
the richness of Turkish history with special reference to the Ottoman Empire. Therefore,
AK Party’s references to historical depth and its transformative impact of their ideas on
Turkish politics would be difficult to understand without referring to the Neo-Ottoman
ideology of the late Ottoman era. This historical connection enables AK Party leaders to
have a useful toolbox that they can use both for deep-rooted tradition based identity
formation and flexibility it brings with its eclectic nature. Every new reading of history is
remaking it according to the conditions of the today. Neo-Ottomanism, therefore, has
been a strong and reliable reference for Turks who wanted to preserve their identities in a
modern world.
With special reference to the preservation of the Ottoman State, Ottomanism
emerged in an eclectic way in order to incorporate Islamic principles like freedom, justice
and consultation into a political arena that was increasingly dominated by the secular
European concepts of the 19th century Europe. Interestingly, Ahmet Davutoğlu, 388 the
architect of Justice and Development Party’s foreign policy has written one of the most
articulate treatments of Ottomanism and its relevance to contemporary Turkey. He gives
important insight on the emergence of Ottomanism during the late Ottoman era and how
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it represents similarities with today’s Neo-Ottomanism. 389 For Davutoğlu there are two
main factors contributing to the rise of Ottomanism. As a political ideology, it emerged at
a time when late Ottoman era leaders wanted to limit the influence of post-French
Revolution Europe’s nationalism on multi-cultural multi-ethnic Ottoman State. 390
The second important factor was the emergence of the new European Order of
1815 after the Vienna Congress and the Ottoman desire to have a place in it. 391 As a
result, Ottomanism became an umbrella designation for the attempts to unite the
Empire’s dissident nations with newly coined terms like Ottoman nationality
(Osmanlilik) and homeland (Vatan) while at the same time trying to keep the Empire in
line with the new developments in the European order. 392 The most important result of
this process was the Tanzimat reforms (1839) when the Ottoman leadership began to give
equal rights to its citizens and initiate reforms that eventually limited Sultan’s power.
Major figures of the Ottomanist ideology were Sinasi, Namik Kemal and Ali
Suavi who began to propogate their ideas actively in and around 1865. 393 They were all
products of Tanzimat reforms; they had secular educations in newly established European
style schools where they learned western languages and concepts of governance.
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However, they also had a deep-rooted respect for religion and tradition including the
Sultan himself. In order to keep the multi-ethnic and multi-religious Ottoman State
together in an era of rising nationalist sentiments, they tried to achieve Unity of
Nationalities (Ittihad-i Anasir) regardless of their racial background. They believed that
different nationalities and millets (people of different religions) could be unified under an
Ottoman ideal which did not rely on religious allegiances but a new western concept of
citizenship disseminated by a pro-Ottoman (though not Islamic) education system. 394
Ottomanism argued for a free political system based on a constitution with a
parliament, and limited power for the Sultan. They took their ideas about
constitutionalism and parliamentary system from European thinkers (some of with whom
they personally identified with) 395 but they were able to modify it into an overall Islamic
tradition. Free democratic system was called Nizam-i Serbestane, Constitutionalism was
called Nizam-i Esasi and Parliament was called Shura-yi Ummet (Consultation of the
Umma)

396

which were all justified with the Islamic principles like hurriyet (freedom),

adalet (justice) and mesveret (consultation). Ottomanists were instrumental, at least on
the intellectual level, in bringing the Sultan Abdulhamid II to proclaim the first
constitution and open the Ottoman Parliamnet in 1876.
The ideal of Ottomanism was to keep different ethnic groups and religions under
one roof; it was one last attempt by the state to reassert its domination over territory
which was quickly being liberated by nationalist movements. With the advance of the
394

For more see Aksin 2007, 82- 83.

395

Shaw 1977, 130.

396

Eris 2002, 597; Shaw 1977, 130.

174

Balkan War in 1912 and consequent independence of Balkan States from the Ottomans,
Ottomanism became a bankrupt ideology. Following WWI (1914-1918), the War of
Independence (1918-1922), and the establishment of the secular republic in 1923
nationalism rather than Ottomanism became dominant. Ottomanism’s rise became visible
only after the 1980s when Turgut Özal, a former Naqshbandi bureaucrat, came to power
together with the support of a public which was aware of the Ottoman past. The gap
between the decline of Ottomanism in the beginning of the century and its re-emergence
at the last quarter of the century with the government of Özal can only be explained by
the activities of Islamic movements examined in the previous chapters.
Turgut Özal’s Prime Ministry, beginning in 1983, was a cornerstone in the
liberalization policies that diversified the traditional business and bureaucratic elite in
Turkey. During Özal's era Turkey began to see the rise of a new Muslim bourgeoisie. 397
Özal himself was a Naqshbandi. His mother and especially his brother Korkut were very
close to the Naqshbandi shaikh Zahid Kotku. 398 His liberal ideas in economic life
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and

lavish life style of his family often times gave mixed signals about his orientation but
Özal’s relationship with Islamic communities was not limited to Naqshbandi tariqah. He
was also a member of Erbakan’s National Salvation. More recently, Özal had become an
ardent supporter of the Gülen movement. During the Özal era all Islamic movements
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gained ground. This was already an ongoing trend but the late 1980s was better suited to
the advancement of the political prestige of Islamist groups 400
Turkey’s increasing involvement in the Balkans led to academic debates on NeoOttomanism. Concurrently, famous Turkish historian Kemal Karpat argues that the term
Neo-Ottomanism was first used by Greeks (not Turks) when Turkey landed its forces in
Cyprus in 1974. 401 In its inception, Neo-Ottomanism reflected how Turks were viewed
by their neighbors; the term then carried over into Turkish views of themselves. Therfore
scholars like Tunander and Constantinides focus solely on Neo-Ottomanism’s foreign
policy aspect mostly in terms of its involvement in the Balkans. They argue that any
Islamic reference in foreign policy is a representation of its Ottoman aspirations in the
region which they identify as Neo-Ottomanism. 402 By focusing solely on Özal’s policies
during his tenure in the 1980s, these authors overestimated the direct link between the
Turkish state’s decision makers and Neo-Ottomanism in Turkey.
Scholars misread two major events during Özal’s tenure; these events both
triggered debates on the rise of Neo-Ottomanism in Turkey. First, the 1986-1989
Bulgaria crises. Because of their Muslim identity, over three hundred thousand Muslim
Turks from Bulgaria were forced to either leave the country or assimilate. The Özal
government accepted all the immigrants coming from Bulgaria. Besides handling the
massive human movement into Turkey, an important part of the negotiations between
Turkey and Bulgaria was about famous Bulgarian Heavy Weight lifter Naim
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Suleymanoglu. Suleymanoglu was of Turkish origin and Özal reportedly paid between
four to seven million dollars to the Bulgarian government for his release. Politicians and
journalists at the time criticized Özal for his attempts. Özal thought that he was doing it
for the image of Turks but many people around him did not share his ideas.
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The

second important event happened a few years after this ciris. The Bosnian war began in
April 1992; Özal again tried to play an active role, this time he was President. To show
the solidarity of the Turkish people with Bosnians, in February 13, 1993 Özal attended a
famous protest in the heart of Istanbul. Although he was the highest-ranking politician in
the state, his attendance in the protest did not find coverage even in the state run
television. The commonaility of both of these events was that these events involved
Muslim Turks in former Ottoman lands in the Balkans, and Özal tried to play an active
role; most of the time he had to convince or force people around him to follow his
policies.
Neo-Ottomanism is a reconstruction of the Turkish identity together with two
important factors. First, after Özal era Islamic movements were more able to influence
and act in transforming the limited interpretation of Kemalist Turkish nationalism and
bring forward the Ottoman heritage as a more inclusive framework. Neo-Ottomanism
acknowledges the fact that religion has been an integral part of Turkish society and that
Islam is not necessarily an anti-western ideology. This understanding of religion requires
more space for religious expression than the relegating interpretation of the secular
establishment in Turkey. Syncretistic notions of religion and state have also existed in
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Turkey; the “Turkish Islamic synthesis” is one of the major examples. 404 However
contrary to “Turkish–Islamic Synthesis’s” nationalist vision,405 Neo-Ottomanism deals
with issues current in the late Ottoman and contemporary period, though with a
diminished emphasis on the state as the agent of change in Turkey. In fact, the most
important aspect of Neo-Ottomanism is its unique treatment of the relationship of religion
with the secular state.
The inability of the Kemalist regime to co-opt religion into the governmental
system and provide a widely accepted national identity led Muslim populations into NeoOttomanist religious expression with stong elite and intellectual support. This intellectual
background of Neo-Ottomanism is similar to Conservatism as a middle way between the
changes of modernity and tradition. It is not totally against change; nor is it blindly
accepting of westernization. By following such a conservative perspective NeoOttomanswere able to practice their faith and still live happily in a Kemalist secular
democracy. 406 Young Muslims were able to find in the Ottoman-Turkish experience an
ideal of the past. It provided practicing Muslims with the tools necessary to reform the
ideological bonds of Kemalism. In this sense, although Neo-Ottomanism is not statist or
Nationalist, it still does not question the legacy of Ataturk. Rather, its proponents defend
the possibility of reading Kemalism in a different way. As Taspinar states, therefore,
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Neo-Ottomanism wanted the Kemalist republic to be at peace with its Ottoman past. This
process is not an Islamization at the expense of Ataturk legacy but a sign of correction of
excesses associated with high Kemalism. 407 It is interesting to see that Neo-Ottomanism
allowed Muslims in Turkey to co-opt Ataturk after it had become clear that Ataturk and
the secular establishment he founded were unable to co-opt Islam.
As a politician who lived during turbulent times, Ataturk left a legacy on almost
all aspects of Turkish life. 408 Kemalist elites envisioned a strictly controlled militaristic
country 409 that followed an exclusively westward looking foreign policy. 410 Therefore,
Turkey distanced itself from its Ottoman past in the Middle East and the Balkans, 411 as
well as from the Turkish speaking states of Central Asia. 412 The post-Cold War
emergence of Central Asian Muslim states and the Balkans gave Muslims in Turkey the
means to reconnect with modern international developments. Kemalist ideology had
failed to address these developments to the deep disappointment of the general public. 413
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The Justice and Development Party experience in Turkey becomes more
significant than the Özal era because the Justice and Development Party leadership have
more public and elite support from the Muslim bases. On the other hand, they seem more
unified in their Neo-Ottomanist vision than the sporadic attempts of the Özal era. They
were able to connect themselves to the late Ottoman era by showing that there are
important similarities with contemporary Turkey. Justice and Development Party’s NeoOttomanism is the result of independent Muslim intelligentia. These Muslim scholars
were highly educated, did postgraduate work and were fluent in one or two foreign
languages. The most important one is Professor Ahmet Davutoğlu.
Justice and Development Party’s foreign Minister Davutoğlu is an independent
scholar rather than a representative intellectual of any religious movement or ideological
school of thought. 414 Davutoğlu’s situation makes the relationship between Islamic
movements and the Justice and Development Party government more interesting. Tayyip
Erdoğan has always preferred to work with these types of intellectuals because of their
scholarly credentials and independent characters. As a politician, Erdoğan did not want to
have orthodox religious oversight over him. In that regard he is similar to Erbakan.
However, Erdoğan’s main difference from Erbakan was that he gave close consideration
to the analysis of his advisors rather than formulating positions based on personal
prejudice and emotion.
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Davutoğlu graduated from Bosphorus University, receiving his Ph.D. under the supervision of Serif
Mardin, the leading scholar on Religion and politics in Turkey. His initial focus was the Islamic
Weltanschauung, its makeup and contribution to other civilizations which helped Davutoglu develop his
ideas on Neo-Ottomanism. Early on Davutoğlu directed his scholarship to develop Islamic solutions to
Turkish and modern problems.

180

Moreover, Erdoğan and the scholars around him are not bombastic or blatantly
ideological like Erbakan, and this seems to suit the new brand of Turkish Islamist first
seen during the Özal era. Interestingly enough the place of religion in the current Turkish
case resembles Turkey’s Ottoman example where, as we have seen in the previous
chapters, political elites have constantly been jealous of their position and tried to keep
the religious elite under control. In Turkish history the place of religious elites in any
setting, be it Ottoman or Neo-Ottoman, has been secondary to the political office. In that
regard Neo-Ottomanism is direct continuation of its Ottoman predecessor.
In his writings Davutoğlu viewed Islam as the backbone of the civilization it
created and inspired rather than a religion understood restrictively. This enabled him to
develop a language more open to an international audience. He was able to speak the
civilizational language of Islam which could be recognized and respected across borders
and cultures. After receiving his doctorate, Davutoğlu chose to teach in Malaysia, a
Muslim country, rather than accepting a teaching position in the United States. His years
in Malaysia helped him to understand the varieties of Islamic self-expression among
contemporary Muslims. His main accomplishment was to develop an international
curriculum intended for students from diverse backgrounds. 415
After returning to Turkey he utilized his experiences mainly in the Foundation for
Science and Art (Bilim ve Sanat Vakfi, BISAV), a non-profit think-tank. During his time
there BISAV became the center of meaningful debates, where leading scholars attended
public lectures and courses. BISAV acted like an informal university with a graduate
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level curriculum appealing to a young generation of mostly moderate Muslims. At the
same time he taught International Relations at Marmara University and later, until
entering the current Turkish government, he served as the head of the international
relations department at Beykent University. His interests embrace not only politics and
international relations, but also philosophy, history, geography, especially its specialized
branch geopolitics, as well as cultural studies and economics.
He mentions five major similarities: (i) reconfiguration of the state body in line
with the international system; (ii) attempts to form new political identity and culture in
order to respond to rising nationalist demands; (iii) trying to keep a balance between the
new thinking and the traditional values; (iv) attempts to integrate into the European
system (European System in the post-Vienna Settlement and EU, respectively); (v)
harmony with the superpowers of the time (Britain and US, respectively). 416 These issues
and how AK Party handled them can best be understodd when we see how Davutoğlu
defines his idea of self.
Davutoğlu’s most important contribution to the literature is his studies on the
“self-conception of civilizations” which served as the philosophical foundation of his
later writings on foreign policy. 417 His works suggests that Islamic identity is ontological
rather than social:
The main factor of this universality of the Islamic civilization is an
ontological consciousness which directly penetrates each individual
416
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human mind regardless of his ethnic and regional origin. Common cultural
and political responses to colonialism and modernity in different parts of
the Muslim World are themselves the indicators of this consciousness. The
rise of Islamic identity and its socio-cultural reflections in these lands
which were recently governed by atheist Soviet authoritarianism serves to
confirm the impact of this ontological consciousness. 418
Davutoğlu argues that contrary to the majority of modernizing efforts,
civilizations like Islam persisted due to a 'core' that they had which is not appreciated in
current theoretical discussion. He argues that since the 1980s policy oriented studies
began to follow structural explanations, focusing solely on external factors affecting
Muslim communities rather than "internal dynamics based on mindset formation,”
resembling what Serif Mardin calls the “internal spring” of Islamic identity. 419 He has
used this concept to analyze Muslim societies and has argued for its use among scholars
of the Muslim world. His work is critical of the scholars who use structural explanations
in analyzing the Islamic world.
Davutoğlu’s discussion of self-concept makes up the core of Neo-Ottomanism
and counters many scholarly formulations which give primacy to the construction of an
external other in identity formation. Mesbahi explains this characteristic of the new
Turkish Foreign Policy as follows:
Turkey is a self-referential international ‘visionary’ actor, an actor on the
world stage purposefully and deliberately (not reactively) embracing the
world, its challenges, and opportunities and a conscious agent with a
particular set of ideas and positions worthy of playing on the world stage.
This is a major ideational and temperamental/psycho-political change
about what foreign policy actually is, what its functions and purposes are,
and what Turkey actually means to the world polity; a change that only a
418
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new elite, a new group of constructivist agents with a different selfperception could introduce and construct. 420
Davutoğlu argues that “identity is based on social recognition and requires two
parties while self-concept represents individual consciousness that does not require/need
social recognition.” 421 He attempts to define the self-concept of the actor without
referring to the inherent place of “other” in western identity formation. For him human
nature has, by definition, qualities that resist social forces and resurface back, even after
long periods of suppression where the self-concept was not able to accomplish its selfreferential qualities. This is the modern equivalent of Ihsan as expressed in the hadith of
Gabriel. Living with God-consciousness, actors should act according to certain criteria
even during hostile environments. In his formulation of Islamic self-concept he is not
alone.
A theology professor and another member of the Justice and Development Party
cabinet, Mehmet S. Aydin, had expressed a number of similar ideas. He argued that Islam
does not need to construct values in opposition to other value systems. Islam is based on
the idea of God as creator and Lord, and Islamic values come from this theological
premise. For him Islam is the “inner core” of the Turkish cognitive map. 422 Due to the
difficulty in formulating a “metaphysical” ontological position in secular scientific
language, in his formulation of the self-concept Davutoğlu stops short of saying that the
ontology of the self-concept comes from Islam.
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Ottoman-Turkish experience has become a valuable reference tool for Davutoğlu
in understanding the behavior of Muslims in Turkey. Ottoman references to justice,
freedom and its treatment of religious minorities (mainly Orthodox Christians and Jews)
under the Ottoman Millet system (which was derived from classical Islamic laws
concerning religious minorities) have become the major points in his re-construction of
Self-Concept and its policy implications. Similarly, Hakan Yavuz argued that religions
are integral parts of human societies, providing the model of how to live. 423 His treatment
of the emergence of religious identities is shaped primarily by structural factors,
contradicting Davutoğlu’s claim. Yavuz's perspective subordinates the ontological
approach to structural considerations. There would then be no need for a foundational
base upon which identity and action spring; structural approaches analyze identity with
exclusive reference to external developments.
For Davutoğlu self concept is not culture specific. Therefore, what he calls NeoOttomanism is only Turkish implementation of a universal set of values. This brings the
question of whether he tries to ‘export’ his ideas to other Muslim countries with common
Islamic backgrounds. “Turkish Model” explanations that have emphasized the strict
secular control of the public sphere 424 are at odds with Davutoğlu’s pluralist reading of
the Neo-Ottoman legacy. Because Davutoğlu sees the self-concept as an ontological
position it can only be remodeled by ready recipient actors rather than exported by the
conveyors. 425
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Neo-Ottomanism is not only a foreign policy making principle but also the core
component of the Turkish State’s new identity during the Justice and Development Party
era. Davutoğlu and his Neo-Ottoman policy came to the center of political power in
Turkey. As stated in the party program, the Justice and Development Party is cognizant
of globalization and post cold war developments. 426 The first major issue in the party is
regional cooperation, followed closely by relations with the EU, Islamic countries and
strategic and defense relations with the USA. These policy preferences were the product
of Ahmet Davutoğlu. Although Justice and Development Party and Davutoğlu have faith
in a dedicated EU path they are cautiously optimistic. In a statement before his
ministerial post, Davutoğlu argued that the EU will not accept Turkey’s membership but
will try to keep it at its gates (probably with a special membership). Davutoğlu argues
that Turkey cannot wait forever at the EU door, and needs to develop a genuinely
multidirectional foreign policy by utilizing its geostrategic advantages.”

427

Euro-scepticism is the main factor inducing Turkey to improve its relations with
its neighbors. Davutoğlu’s “‘strategic depth’ doctrine calls for an active engagement with
all regional systems in Turkey’s neighborhood. Turkey needs to rediscover its historic
and geographic identity and reassess its own position vis-à-vis regional and global
issues.” 428 “Davutoğlu called for a re-engagement with the Middle Eastern region, in
particular with Iran, Syria and the Gulf States. In the Balkan region he stressed the
importance of Greece and Bulgaria, while in Caucasus he pointed to the robustness of
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Georgian–Turkish relations.” 429 Turkey’s economic and foreign relations with regional
countries have experienced their peak during the tenure of the Justice and Development
Party government. This regional and international orientation that the Justice and
Development Party government aspired to develop is a major break from Erbakan’s
foreign policy of Islamic identity. Erbakan stressed the importance of regional relations
with Islamic countries and his policy choices were strictly anti-western rather than
diverse. During his career Erbakan spoke against Turkey’s relations with the US and
EU; 430 he never supported relations with regional countries other than Muslim ones.
According to Davutoğlu’s primary foreign policy principle, due to its historical
and cultural background Turkey is a “Pivot Country.” 431 For him the cultural and political
legacy of the Ottoman Empire makes Turkey both Western and Islamic geographically
and culturally. Turkey borders many of the key regional players such as Iraq, Syria, and
the Central Asian republics, so it has a responsibility in these areas, together with Balkans
and Caucasus and Eurasia region, to be engaged in many controversial issues. The Justice
and Development Party was able to successfully engage in and address the important
metropolitan issues in Istanbul. They feel confident that they could have the same kind of
success on the international stage.
The major turning point in Turkey’s new foreign policy under Davutoğlu was
with the US. From the start of their tenure in office Justice and Development Party tried
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to maintain good relations with the US, despite critical policy issues affecting bilateral
relations. It was quite symbolic that Erdoğan’s first international debut was staged in the
White House. However, Turkey’s direct involvement in Iraqi problems put itat odds with
the US on many issues. Post 9/11 US foreign policy emerged as unilateral and
hegemonic. Bush’s uncompromising policy was a major challenge to those who dared to
qualify their involvement in America’s war on terror. The war on terror emerged at a very
critical juncture in Turkish domestic politics. When the Bush administration began to
toughen its diplomatic language against Iraq, Turkey’s new government began to worry
about instability in the region and future problems. In order to seek a westward looking
foreign policy Turkey needed predictability, security and regional stability.
Based on the experience of the first Gulf war an instable Iraq meant an instable
Turkey, if not the entire Middle East. Turkey did not support direct military involvement
in Iraq but was asked by the US to allow troops to enter Turkish territory in expectation
of an invasion. Erdoğan specifically expressed his willingness to support the bill
authorizing US forces to deploy in Turkey in order to invade Iraq from the northern front.
However, he was caught in the political crossfire in the parliament, both from the
opposition and his own party's MPs alike. 432 All Islamic communities were against the
bill as well. Fresh from the election civil society groups from all strands of the society
lobbied to have the bill rejected. As a result, on March 1, 2003 the bill was rejected in the
parliament. The rejection of the bill in the parliament was a shock not only for the US but
for Erdoğan himself, who at the initial statges of his Prime Ministry did not know what
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kind of a policy to follow. Scholars give two different explanations of this situation. First
Erdogan either wanted to support the US initiative to be part of the operation and have a
say over US policies in Iraq.
One major long-term, unresolved issue has been Turkey’s relations with EU. The
Justice and Development Party came into power with the specific goal of improving
Turkey’s prospects for EU membership. 433 They "enthusiastically worked to implement
the National Program drawn up by the previous government in 2001. The Program
required Turkey to comply with the EU's Copenhagen Criteria, namely, the rule of law,
respect for human rights and advocacy of a free market economy. Major packages of
reforms were passed through parliament in an effort to bring the legal system in line with
the EU policy.”
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The Justice and Development Party government has shown its

commitment to democratization and Turkey’s EU membership process from the
beginning of its tenure in office. This is both a continuation of previous policy and a
dedication of Justice and Development Party’s decision makers. 435
Before he became Prime Minister Erdoğan began visiting European capitals in
order to urge EU leaders to set a definite date for the commencement of accession
negotiations at the December 2002 European summit in Copenhagen. His attempt to
secure a date failed but it established him as a leader wedded to the idea of Turkey’s EU
bid in the eyes of European leaders such as Schroder, Berlusconi and Blair. 436 This
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helped the Justice and Development Party on other fronts. First, it enhanced the
relationship between the EU and the Justice and Development Party where the Justice
and Development Party was able to establish a positive image in the eyes of western
political circles where political Islamists had previously had a negative image. This
young generation of Islamists demonstrated that EU membership was not antithetical to
being an activist Muslim in both a democratic and pluralistic world. Secondly, EU began
to function as a shield against the antidemocratic forces in the country in Justice and
Development Party’s favor. 437
In line with the Neo-Ottoman foreign policy, the Justice and Development Party
leadership demonstrated its commitment to EU ideals by completing at least seven
harmonization packages by 2003. 438 On 6 October 2004, the EU Commission in its
annual Regular Report on Turkey indicated that Turkey had fulfilled the Copenhagen
political criteria and recommended that the Council open accession negotiations with
Turkey. After tough negotiations at the EU Council Summit on 17 December 2004, the
Council decided to start the accession negotiations with Turkey on 3 October 2005. 439
However, after 2005 AK Party’s commitment to the accession waned. After 2006 AK
Party members began to voice their dissatisfaction with the process by criticizing the EU
for not being honest with Turkey’s membership. Often times the rhetoric brought back
memories of the reactions of nationalist parties in the country to whom AK Party itself
437
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was opposed. The mixed messages coming from AK Party elite showed cautious
commitment which came from its Neo-Ottoman background. It is apparent that AK Party
does not want to link itself to EU at the expense of its other objectives in the rest of the
region; the AK party wants to extend its regional alliances beyond the specific confines
of EU membership.
One of the major foreign policy issues faced by the Justice and Development
Party government has been its relations with Israel. Turkey’s relations with Israel are
linked to the state of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Turkish-Israeli relations are an issue
of religious conscience, with most Turks strongly sympathetic towards the Palestinians.
The main premise of a social identity analysis is that religious and cultural links propel
Turkish people to support the Arab cause against Israel. 440 As a result, it has been argued
that a foreign policy issue like the Palestinian problem is an extension of the domestic
divide between the secular rulers and the Muslim population. 441 With regards to antiSemitism, the Justice and Development Party has displayed a different attitude than
former Islamist parties. From the beginning, it has not resorted to anti-Semitic discourses
and has liberated itself from the ideological burdens it inherited. Addressing the
Organization of Islamic Countries in Malaysia in October 2003, then Foreign Minister
Abdullah Gul denounced anti-Semitism.442
The question of Palestine became a major issue during the Justice and
Development Party era, a result of greater visibility of Islamic sentiments in the political
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arena. AK Party’s foreign policy towards the Palestinian issue is important due to a
couple of other developments. First Israel’s attacks on Gaza and Jenin were seen as
unacceptable in Turkish public opinion. Secondly, the 9/11 attacks made the issue more
critical for Muslim and western countries in an age of global and state-sponsored
terrorism. Since Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit 443 called Israeli policy towards Palestinian
civilians' genocide, Turkey’s relations with Israel began to deteriorate. 444 Ariel Sharon’s
Prime Ministry and his assertive policy against the Palestinians were not accepted by
even a secularist agnostic like Ecevit. The position of AK Party government, which came
to office after Ecevit, were intensified because he represented the moral sentiment of the
majority of Turks, as well as the specific discontent of believing Muslims. The first issue
that involved Turkey and Israel would be the Turkish Al Qaida's attack on the
Synagogues in Istanbul in November 2003. Erdoğan visited the chief rabbi Ishak Aleva in
December 2003 becoming the first Turkish premier to visit the Jewish community since
the establishment of the Turkish Republic. 445
Erdoğan’s sympathy towards Turkish Jews, however, did not extend to Israel.
When Israeli forces shot and killed Hamas leader Sheikh Ahmed Yasin in March 2004
Erdoğan strongly denounced the attack. 446 The same strong language continued when
Israeli incursions into Gaza in May 2004 caused an outrage in the country. Erdoğan
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called Israel’s Gaza policy “state sponsored terrorism.” 447 It would be a year before
Erdoğan made a visit to Sharon in Israel. In the visit, both showed their tough side by
focusing on the Palestinian issue. Erdoğan's innovative political style even made Ariel
Sharon surprised, as he offered novel solutions to the conflict. 448 In the case of his
remarks in Israel, at the time it was not made public but later in September of the same
year Turkey mediated a deal between Israel and Pakistan, which did not have official
relationship.
This kind of political maneuvering in controversial areas resembles neither the
policies of any Muslim grassroots movement nor the National View movement that
preceded the Justice and Development Party. It is uniquely a product of the Justice and
Development Party government and the pragmatic leadership of Erdoğan. Among
grassroots Muslim movements there is only one that has engaged Israel in a comparable
manner. The followers of Fethullah Gülen, with their highly institutionalized media
outlets and non-profit organizations, have established positive relations with their Israeli
counterparts at the civil society and bureaucracy level. The results of these relations
repaired the image of Gülen in the eyes of the Israelis. Even in the semi-pro-Israeli
journals like Middle East Forum and Meria there were positive articles calling Gülen the
face of liberal Islam in Turkey. 449
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The honeymoon between Israel and Turkey, however, did not last long, especially
after the Israeli incursions into Gaza after the Hamas victory and its attacks on Hezbollah
in Lebanon, resulting in a high number of civilian casualties. The Justice and
Development Party government clearly sided with Hamas after the January 2006 election
victory and argued that there cannot be a solution to the Palestinian problem without
considering Hamas. Supporting Hamas and establishing direct contacts with Hezbollah
have been the most risky political decisions in the Justice and Development Party
engagement in the region where even Iranian and Arab leadership worry about being
represented as terrorist by the US. It created an aura of suspicion around the Justice and
Development Party leadership about a hidden Islamist agenda. For some it was a clear
sign that Islamists were only superficially pro-western. They critically argued that the
Justice and Development Party’s “Zero Problem with neighbors approach” did not
include Israel.
The determinants of what makes AK Party’s ideology come down to its unique
treatment of of Islam. It is evident that AK Party is proud of its Muslim past. However its
identity is not confrontational in the sense that secularism is viewed as a threat. Their
Neo-Ottomanism does not use religion as an ideological weapon to get power or
intimidate opponents into sunmission; it is a representation of Turkish identity. While
practicing the religion on their own, side by side with their political or professional
activities, AK Party elite recognized that the rhetorical use of Islam has only limited
benefits and has to be accompanied or substituted by direct and effective action.
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Chapter VII: CONCLUSION
Islam has been understood, articulated, and practiced in as many ways as there are
Muslims. It has both a shared history as well as many different specific histories. 450
According to Piscatori “if we want to know about Islam today, we must think of it more
as conduct than as theology and doctrine” 451 because what Muslims understand of the
sacred texts and traditions and how they represent their religion is relative to place, time,
and context. 452 This study has been concerned with organizing and presenting a typology
of Turkish Islamists using a religious source, a saying of prophet Muhammad, the Hadith
of Gabriel, as the conceptual framework. The analysis concluded with the newest and
undoubtedly most successful Islamist actor in Turkey, the Justice and Development
Party. After coming into power in a landslide election in 2002 the Justice and
Development Party, comprised mainly of self-professed Muslim politicians, had to deal
with the pressure of identifying with Islam in a reactionary secular state.
The saliency of the Islamic movements and their different approaches to politics
in Turkey has to be recaptured in analyzing the transformation of Islam and politics in
Turkey. The Naqshbandi tradition constantly tried to influence the political decision
making from without while Islamist National View, although a Naqshbandi movement,
argued for direct involvement in politics. Nur-Gülen movement, the third approach that
examined in this work, had a strictly apolitical position by focusing on religious service
at the public level. Opening educational institutions eventually had political implications
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when people inspired by Nursi’s and Gülen messages began to influence politics. All of
these groups had access to the Justice and Development Party ranks to variying degrees.
However, none of the Islamic groups studied above has more than a limited influence on
the Justice and Development Party. The leaders of the Justice and Development Party are
conscious of the influences upon them, and appreciative of those sources of thought and
inspiration, but are not dependent on them in any way.
Justice and Development Party leaders were underestimated in their ability to deal
with secular issues as well as over-exaggerated in terms of their religious allegiances. 453
They were a product of late Ottoman thinking but not a direct continuation of it. The
diversity in the Islamic approaches as in the typology developed here is personified in the
Justice and Development Party’s mixed identity. From the place of religion in politics to
the treatment of state as a secular apparatus Justice and Development Party tried to
synthesize a vast legacy in a turbulent time. The term Neo-Ottomanism, therefore, is
appropriate in defining Justice and Development Party’s position. Neo-Ottomanism puts
less emphasis on the state as an agent of change in society. In Neo-Ottomanism, more
attention was paid to the development of individuals and promoting a social environment
wherein plurality of Ottoman legacy was practiced. When it comes to relations with EU
or Israel, often the Justice and Development Party gave conflicting messages. This
quality of the Justice and Development Party can only be addressed within the eclectic
framework of Neo-Ottomanism. Neo-Ottomanism enables us to look at both the actors
and their environments rather than given primacy to one over the other.
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Serif Mardin has written about an Islamic core based in the sacred texts and
religious practices of Muslims.454 To him, the special characteristics of the TurkishOttoman case requires a renewed focus. As Mardin states
“… the specifics of Turkish history have endowed the Ottomans and the
Turkish Republic with characteristics that have worked cumulatively to
create a special setting for Islam, a setting where secularism and Islam
interpenetrate, which of course is quite different from saying that Islam
and secularism have fused. This interpenetration or overlap is the real
methodological obstacle that faces the investigator of Islamic modernism
in Turkey. It establishes a field for study that shows much more
complexity than the research based on the essentialism of Islam, the core
of contemporary studies of “political” Islam in Turkey and elsewhere.” 455
The Turkish context that enabled the ‘interpenetration’ of Islam and Secularism
has not been dealt with in any detail in the primary literature on religion and politics in
Turkey. The greater part of the scholarship on the Justice and Development Party
erroneously attributes its origins to Necmettin Erbakan’s Islamist National View
Movement. This argument limits the scope of Islam’s experience with politics in Turkey
to one political movement because of Justice and Development Party's association with
Islamist National View Movement. In fact, the Justice and Development Party is unique
in that it has been influenced by many types of Islam in Turkey. One reason for the
success of the Justice and Development Party is that they have balanced their deep faith
in Islam and commitment to Islamic causes such as justice and peace with the political
and social requirements of a secular life in a secularist state. They have made themselves
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indespensible to the welfare of secularism in Turkey while also acting as model Muslim
politicians.
The typological framework offered above based on the Hadith of Gabriel divided
the Islamic experience into three broad categories. The first is that of Shariah, the
outward manifestation of Islam. It was described by the prophet Muhammad in terms of
the five pillars, or minimal obligations of all Muslims. The second sphere was that of
Iman, or tariqah. It was described as a deeper internalization of faith and the belief in the
articles of faith. I used the religious orders as examples of Iman because they have
traditionally institutionalized the spirituality of Iman in the form of Sufi brotherhoods.
Lastly, there was the haqiqah, described as worshipping God as if one could see Him.
This is the highest level of religious expression in Islam and it has been manifested in
Turkish society in the persons of Said Nursi and Fethullah Gülen.
This view of the Justice and Development Party as merely an extension of the
National View Movement, having an “other based” anti-western identity, assumes that
the influence and role of Islam in Turkey is external and generic, rather than authentically
Turkish. I would argue, alternatively, that secularism is a structural force introduced from
without, yet exercising an unrepresentative role on Turkish life and identity. Secular
notions of nationalism entered the common imagination of Turkish people mostly in the
last two centuries, though most scholars in the Western world consider it to be constant
and normative, rather than as part of an unsettled debate within Turkish society.
This study showed that contrary to the fundamental reforms and secularization
projects Islam is still a constant in the minds and hearts of the Turkish people. Contrary
to all the changes in the republican era “the influence of the moral culture of Islam, its
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voice, was still around as an autonomous force given the lackluster ethical message of the
Republic.” 456 The modern imagination of the Republican era was not able to fill the
ethical or the moral void that the Turkish society had felt for decades. Hence it was the
moral culture which shaped Islamic grassroots movements for decades which many
Justice and Development Party members embraced after they separated from the National
View Movement.
Turkish political history shows us that Islam has been an integral part of the
political and social imagination among Turks, though after the fall of the Ottoman
Empire and the establishment of the Republic that voice had been systematically
suppressed by the state. It can be argued that no viable long-term social or political
imagination can exist in Turkey without having to merge or coexist in some way with
Islamic actors and their ever-present voice. Much of the scholarly literature on Turkey in
the modern era has normativized the effects and status of secularism, even where that
system has been repressive and ineffectual. As Mardin argues “[w]hat we still need today
is a reconstitution of the process that led to the emergence of the AKP [Justice and
Development Party]” 457 for which, this dissertation argues structural analyses are
inadequate.
This dissertation followed a more agency-centered analysis focusing on the identities
and the internal dynamics of the actors. The legacy and the impact of the Turkish Islamic
movements in response to the changes and challenges typified in the Republican period led to
the construction of the Turkish Islamic political identity and the change and continuity of this
456

Mardin 2006, 13.
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identity in different periods among different groups. In this sense, based on the differences

within and among different Islamic groups, this dissertation argued that, à la Wendt, 458
Islam is what Muslims make of it.
As a result, I criticized the fixed definition of Islamic identity where the
institutional-essentialist scholars argue that there is an essential unchanging Islam. For
these scholars, Islam has frozen in time fourteen hundred years ago and cannot
accommodate the environment of the modern world. For them, Islam needs and seeks
power to exercise control over others, as if Muslims are always looking outward. The
power-seeking radicals who often times use even democratic processes clearly represent
Islam’s reactionary nature. The Justice and Development Party’s unique actions certainly
do not fit into this picture. However, in any given religion there are different features of
the religion that even the political actors can adhere to. The Hadith of Gabriel provided
the type used for this study to show the plurality of the Islamic movements and in which
ways they influenced the Justice and Development Party governments.

458
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